Vol. 136 No. 7 Abstract Our system of stare decisis enables and encourages people to rely on judicial decisions to form expectations about their legal rights and duties...
Vol. 136 No. 5 “It is a settled and invariable principle,” Chief Justice Marshall once wrote, “that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy.” Not quite. Although some view the idea of a substantive constitutional right without a remedy as oxymoronic, rights to remedies have always had a precarious constitutional status, which the Supreme Court has lately subjected to multifaceted subversion. . . .
Vol. 136 No. 5 Natural law “still spooks many constitutional lawyers.” Justice Scalia, for example, was once asked: “Does natural law have a place in interpreting the Constitution?”...
Vol. 136 No. 3 Affirmative action in the form of race-conscious admissions is being legally challenged by a conservative activist organization . During the Supreme Court’s 2022 October...
Vol. 136 No. 3 Personal precedent is a judge’s presumptive adherence to her own previously expressed views of the law. This Essay shows that personal precedent both does...
Vol. 136 No. 2 The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough. Justice Oliver Wendell...
Vol. 136 No. 2 In 1951, a promising young student submitted his application to the School of Theology at Boston University. His application was compelling but contained a...
Vol. 136 No. 2 This Article provides the first empirical and doctrinal analysis of how the modern Supreme Court uses the common law to determine statutory meaning, based on a study of 602 statutory cases decided during the Roberts Court’s first fourteen and a half Terms.