Vol. 139 No. 8 Introduction In a constitutional showdown with the executive branch, the courts may seem to have limited remedial options. Once we reach a point where...
Vol. 139 No. 8 Because the Supreme Court is powerful, it is largely able to fulfill its legal responsibilities. Because it is a court — because it lacks both the...
Vol. 139 No. 8 Introduction In a time of “constitutional crisis, scholars are asking how federal courts can preserve a basic “imperative” of constitutional structure: “[A] system of...
Vol. 139 No. 8 Although the Federal Convention of 1787 considered proposing a Council of Revision as part of the new government it devised, it ultimately provided for...
Vol. 139 No. 7 In December 2025, without oral argument or a written opinion, the Supreme Court did something it had never done before: It set aside a lower court judgment upholding a vaccine mandate that lacked religious exemptions. In Miller v. McDonald...
Vol. 139 No. 7 In Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College. (SFFA), the Supreme Court invalidated the race-based affirmative action programs at Harvard University and the University of North Carolina (UNC) under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The SFFA majority held that the programs could not survive strict scrutiny: The universities’ interests in their affirmative action programs were not sufficiently compelling...
Vol. 139 No. 7 Organized labor is in crisis. Despite recent polling showing higher levels of public support for unions than at any time since the 1960s, the...
Vol. 139 No. 6 Any respectable textbook account of the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts would leave one with the impression that...
Vol. 139 No. 3 Modern textualism has long criticized the use of practical, or consequentialist, reasoning when construing statutes. And yet in practice, textualist jurists long have invoked practical consequences arguments to help justify their statutory constructions.
