Vol. 136 No. 5 “It is a settled and invariable principle,” Chief Justice Marshall once wrote, “that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy.” Not quite. Although some view the idea of a substantive constitutional right without a remedy as oxymoronic, rights to remedies have always had a precarious constitutional status, which the Supreme Court has lately subjected to multifaceted subversion. . . .
Vol. 133 No. 8 The editors of the Harvard Law Review respectfully dedicate this issue to Professor David L. Shapiro. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Among members of the...
Vol. 130 No. 2 In litigation under the Equal Protection, Free Exercise, Establishment, Free Speech, and dormant commerce clauses, among others, the Supreme Court sometimes inquires whether the...
Response to Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?
Vol. 129 No. 1 David Strauss’s Foreword, entitled Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, is both provocative and wise. I agree with nearly everything that it says....
Vol. 121 No. 7 The best case for judicial review in politically and morally healthy societies does not depend (as is commonly believed) on the idea that courts are more likely than legislatures to define vague rights correctly. It rests instead on the subtly different ground that legislatures and courts should both be enlisted to protect fundamental rights and, accordingly, that both should have veto powers over legislation that might reasonably be thought to violate such rights.
Vol. 120 No. 8 This Article provides a broad-lens, synoptic perspective on war-on-terrorism questions arising within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. Analytically, it develops a clear framework for sorting out the tangle of jurisdictional, substantive, procedural, and scope-of-review issues that habeas cases often present. Methodologically, it champions a common law—like approach to habeas adjudication under which courts must exercise responsible judgment in adapting both statutory and constitutional language to unforeseen exigencies.
