The editors of the Harvard Law Review respectfully dedicate this issue to Professor Ronald Dworkin.
Ronald Dworkin
- Charles Fried
- Martha Minow
- Richard H. Fallon
- John C.P. Goldberg
- Laurence H. Tribe
- Frances Kamm
- Frank I. Michelman
- Volume 127
- Issue 2
- December 2013
Topic:
December 20, 2013
More from this Issue
-
The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information
Vol. 127 No. 2 The United States government leaks like a sieve. Presidents denounce the constant flow of classified information to the media from unauthorized, anonymous sources. National security professionals decry the consequences. And yet the laws against leaking are almost never enforced. Throughout U.S. history, roughly a dozen criminal cases have been brought against suspected leakers. There is a dramatic disconnect between the way our laws and our leaders condemn leaking in the abstract and the way they condone it in practice. This Article challenges the standard account of that disconnect, which emphasizes the difficulties of apprehending and prosecuting offenders, and advances an alternative theory of leaking. -
The Path Not Taken: H.L.A. Hart’s Harvard Essay on Discretion
Vol. 127 No. 2 It is an extraordinary privilege to be able to introduce a previously unpublished essay by H. L. A. Hart, one of the most distinguished figures in twentieth-century legal philosophy, alongside a fine commentary by Geoffrey Shaw, the scholar whose intellectual imagination and meticulous archival research has brought the essay to light. It is particularly apt that H. L. A. Hart’s essay should be published by this Review, appearing fifty-seven years after it was written in the early months of his visit to Harvard, thus joining a distinguished tradition of posthumously published scholarship of the 1950s, most notably Lon Fuller’s The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, and Henry Hart and Albert Sacks’s The Legal Process. Its publication is also timely, albeit long delayed, in that it comes hard on the heels of a period in which the intellectual history of legal thought has been the subject of wide interest and some very powerful scholarship. -
Discretion
Vol. 127 No. 2 In this field questions arise which are certainly difficult; but as I listened last time to members of the group, I felt that the main difficulty perhaps lay in determining precisely what questions we are trying to answer. I have the conviction that if we could only say clearly what the questions are, the answers to them might not appear so elusive. So I have begun with a simple list of questions about discretion which in one form or another were, as it seemed to me, expressed by the group last time. I may indeed have omitted something and inserted something useless: if so, no doubt I shall be informed of this later.