Indian Law Articles 139 Harv. L. Rev. 1257

Indigenous Constitutionalism


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In the past we have always had laws; however the Choctaw people shall possess this series of strong laws. . . . Now, in coming days we should take well to heart these laws we have passed as we continue our lives. It is imperative that we not forget.

— Choctaw Constitution of 18261

“How long will Indian constitutions last?” . . . An Indian constitution will exist as long as there remains in human hearts a community of interdependence, of common interests, aspirations, hopes, and fears, in realms of art and politics, work and play.

— Felix S. Cohen (1939)2

Introduction

The United States is known for its constitutions. At the nation’s birth, the American Revolution sparked a bold political experiment: The newly declared states replaced their colonial charters with the world’s first written constitutions and organized into a loose confederation.3 A decade later, delegates from twelve of the thirteen states, a group of fifty-five white men, met in Philadelphia and wrote a constitution that transformed that confederation into a national republic.4 Over 230 years later, that document, the U.S. Constitution, still governs us. And the list of our constitutional contributions has only expanded, with the addition of twenty-seven amendments to the U.S. Constitution,5 the admission of thirty-seven more states with their own constitutions,6 the successive adoption of thousands of amendments and rewritten constitutions by the fifty states,7 and continually raging debates over constitutional meaning.8

But this familiar picture of American constitutionalism is incomplete.9 Beyond the fifty-four federal, state, and territorial constitutions,10 approximately 230 other constitutions11 currently govern millions of people and tens of thousands of square miles of territory within the boundaries of the United States.12 And these contemporary constitutions are part of a much larger legal tradition, one that stretches back 200 years and includes an archive of over 1,000 constitutions and associated documents.13 These missing documents within the American constitutional picture14 — documents that comprise a substantial portion of this picture — are the constitutions of Native nations.15

Despite their number and long history, the written constitutions of Native nations have been overlooked by legal and historical scholarship thus far. While the U.S. Constitution, and increasingly state constitutions,16 command the field of constitutional law scholarship as the documents establishing the quintessential American governments, tribal constitutions are constrained to the supposedly “tiny backwater”17 of federal Indian and tribal law.18 Additionally, only one tribal constitution — that of the Cherokee Nation in 1827 — shows up in mainstream narratives of American constitutional history and solely in the context of debates on the U.S. Constitution.19 Otherwise, Native nations’ constitutions have been pushed to the margins, confined to the histories of specific Indigenous polities.20 As a result, Indigenous political activity has been separated from both American constitutionalism and mainstream U.S. history, leading to a stunted narrative on American constitutional development.

This Article seeks to correct these oversights. First and foremost, this Article counters tribal constitutions’ obscurity by calling for the recognition of a category of Indigenous constitutionalism.21 It contends that a coherent and shared constitutional tradition among Native nations exists and that uncovering this tradition is necessary to grasp fully the scope and history of American constitutionalism. And this Article sets out to understand and describe a particular historical and legal phenomenon that is part of this shared constitutional practice: Native nations adopting and transforming a Euro-American legal instrument — the written constitution22 — to commit their legal traditions and unwritten fundamental law23 to textual form. This syncretic process of adaptation and transformation is Indigenous constitutionalism. And its study illuminates not only the history of tribal sovereignty and governance, but also offers insights into Indigenous self-determination around the globe and the diversity and exceptionalism within American constitutionalism.24

On one level, this work is conceptual. This Article frames Indigenous constitutionalism as a distinct constitutional practice through which Native nations claim and exercise self-governance while embedded in the wider constitutional — and colonial — landscape of the United States.25 And it identifies four defining features of Indigenous constitutionalism: (1) the appropriation of the Euro-American concept of constitutionalism, including the written constitutional form; (2) the subversion of constitutions’ tendency to assimilate and erase non-Western polities and customary law; (3) the adaptation of unwritten customary law and written law to construct a hybrid legal order; and (4) the resistance to incorporation into the United States while demanding recognition of tribal sovereignty.26

But this work is also historical, drawing Indigenous constitutionalism’s features from the two-hundred-year history of written tribal constitutions. Using archival research alongside the work of Indian Country scholars, this Article identifies and explores three major eras of tribal constitutional development. The first era centers on the origins of written tribal constitutions in the nineteenth century, events that led to the recognition of tribal sovereignty in American law. Unfolding in the time of Indian Removal, the narrative of this era focuses on a moment never before studied in full: the simultaneous creation of the first written tribal constitutions — those of the Choctaw and Cherokee Nations — in the 1820s South, showcasing how these nations turned to constitutionalism to exercise and reify tribal power when faced with attempts to strip them of their homelands and their sovereignty.27 The second era covers the explosion of constitutions in the early twentieth century under the federal Indian Reorganization Act of 193428 (IRA). Despite a heavy-handed federal approach and a standard constitutional format,29 this era demonstrates that Native constitutional thought persisted even in a period of imposition. Felix Cohen — the legendary author of the Handbook of Federal Indian Law30 — relied on the nineteenth-century Native constitutions to both spell out and recognize the substantial breadth of tribal sovereignty that persisted after a century of Native dispossession, genocide, and subjugation.31 Finally, the third era is comprised of the movement for tribal constitutional reform that has stretched from the final decades of the twentieth century to today. Coinciding with the Self-Determination Era32 in federal Indian law that began in the 1960s and 1970s, tribes that had been stripped of their earlier constitutions, had recently regained federal recognition, or had struggled to govern under their IRA constitutions undertook constitution-writing projects — all pursuing innovative ways to bolster their status as modern nations with sophisticated tribal state apparatuses.33

Through this history, Indigenous constitutionalism has much to teach us. First, it promotes the continued flourishing of tribal law scholarship. Tribal law studies are currently undergoing a renaissance as scholars demand external recognition of tribal law as part of American law,34 call for attention to tribal law innovations in various regulatory areas,35 and propose methods for expanding tribal court systems to incorporate customary law and restorative justice methods.36 The study of Indigenous constitutionalism supplements this growing field by exploring in depth the ways in which Native peoples have approached their written constitutions, which — along with customary law — serve as the primary foundation for all other tribal law. It shows that just because tribal constitutions were written in the context of colonialism does not mean that these documents are inauthentic. In fact, their colonial nature helps to unearth Indigenous constitutionalism’s extensive history and diversity, which can inform further research into tribal law as a hybrid and congruent field combining Native customary and Euro-American positive law.

Perhaps Indigenous constitutionalism’s greatest contribution to the field of tribal law, though, is providing scaffolding for a tribal constitutional law framework. By viewing tribal constitutional practices as an ongoing, two-centuries-long dialogue among Native nations, Indigenous constitutionalism reveals the fundamental and persistent questions that Native peoples have encountered through writing and interpreting their constitutions. While tribal constitutions could easily slot into a federal or state constitutional law framework — with their similar concerns around issues such as separation of powers and individual rights — they also confront challenges that no other American polity faces due to their tribal character, persisting cultures, and colonial positionality. This Article points to three such issues that could structure the distinctive aspects of an academic and legal framework for tribal constitutional law: the construction of Native polities around membership and territory,37 the legal hybridity of constitutions that combine elements from Indigenous and Euro-American legal orders,38 and the effects of Native nations’ status within a protectorate system.39 And by showing how Native nations have taken various approaches to overcoming these same challenges across time and space, Indigenous constitutionalism emphasizes the sheer amount of constitutional creativity that Native peoples have exhibited.

Further, this Article positions Indigenous constitutionalism as a bridge between tribal law and federal Indian law. Uncovering the histories of tribal constitutions revises the standard origin stories of the field of federal Indian law, shifting its foundations from the isolation from — and even subjugation of — tribal law to being inextricably intertwined with respect for tribal authority. The common understanding is that federal Indian law derives from two moments — the “Marshall Trilogy”40 of U.S. Supreme Court cases in the early nineteenth century and the publication of Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law41 in the mid-twentieth century — and is the work of non-Native people wrestling with how to justify and ameliorate conquest. But inserting the foundational eras of tribal constitutional development — namely, the first constitutions in the Removal Era and the IRA constitutions of the twentieth century — into these stories reveals that Native peoples and their claims to and exercises of tribal sovereignty heavily influenced the field of federal Indian law.42 Thus, Indigenous constitutionalism demonstrates that tribal constitutions and federal Indian law were cocreated, ultimately providing more space for the further recognition and incorporation of tribal law into federal Indian law. And doctrinally, tribal constitutional provisions could concretize the often-amorphous concept of tribal sovereignty in federal law.43

This Article also opens pathways for examining how Indigenous constitutionalism may inform the practice of U.S. constitutional law. For instance, originalism is ascendant as a method of constitutional interpretation at the U.S. Supreme Court, and some have argued the same is true of state courts.44 But the same is not true for tribal courts that have engaged in their own acts of constitutional interpretation — acts that both reveal alternative interpretive approaches and challenge originalism’s inevitability.45 Likewise, tribes have implemented diverse approaches to allocating power across legislative, executive, and judicial branches46 — approaches that can inform ongoing separation of powers debates, such as arguments over legislative constitutionalism,47 the unitary executive,48 and judicial review.49 Awareness of antebellum tribal constitutions can even shed light on important interpretive debates, providing Native-authored documents that serve as evidence for what Native people thought of the U.S. Constitution and how they shaped its meaning.50 And such potential further indicates why we should view tribal constitutions as part of the wider debates over American constitutionalism.51 Although space constraints preclude a full investigation of these evergreen constitutional law debates in this Article, this study’s aim is to offer initial thoughts on how this category of Indigenous foundational documents might reorient our current approaches to U.S. history, federal Indian law, and American constitutional law.

But, most importantly, Indigenous constitutionalism complicates the nature and scope of American constitutionalism. By focusing on the federal and state constitutions, we have accepted the view that constitutions share the same structure, are the sole sources of supreme law, are pure expressions of popular sovereignty, and focus on two matters: internal governance through a three-branch framework and rights protection.52 But, recently, scholarship on state constitutional law has begun to alter the ways we think about American constitutionalism, highlighting state constitutions’ unique pro-democracy structures and alignment with features of other constitutions around the world.53

This Article contends that like state constitutions, tribal constitutions offer their own distinct perspective on American constitutionalism. Indigenous constitutionalism shows that Native nations have departed from the prevalent definitions of a Euro-American constitution. They have followed different formats in expressing their constitutional thought. They have also refused to recognize their written constitutions as the only and ultimate source of legal authority, placing them alongside other sources of fundamental law, such as treaties and customary law.54 Further, Native nations wrote constitutions for internal and external audiences, asserting their sovereignty and defining their relationship to other American governments.55 And tribal constitutions have employed alternative and creative institutional structures to reflect political circumstances and tribal culture. Thus, Indigenous constitutionalism expands the concept of American constitutionalism by pointing to the complex ways in which these charters have navigated Indigenous and colonial power.56 But exploring Indigenous constitutionalism also forces us to reexamine the dominant narrative on how we think about and interpret the U.S. Constitution, recovering features that were once seen as part of the Constitution but that have been obscured over time.57 In other words, what makes Indigenous constitutionalism distinctive for modern Americans would have been familiar to our forebears from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus, this Article shows that instead of being merely a “mirror[]”58 of their American neighbors’ documents, tribal constitutions are actually a prism that refracts what we think we know about constitutionalism in the United States.

Ultimately, Indigenous constitutionalism speaks to the past, present, and future of Native nations and of the United States. This Article, however, is only the beginning of a much larger project. It focuses on three constitutional moments and a sampling of tribal constitutions to paint the broad outlines of the concept and illuminate the role of tribal constitutions in protecting Native self-government vis-à-vis the United States. Nevertheless, much remains to be explored in future work, including the constitutions’ impact on inter- and intratribal politics, changes in constitutional ideas across both adopted and proposed tribal constitutions from the nineteenth century to today, and the relationship between tribal constitution-making efforts and the drafting of both state and territorial constitutions. What follows is the theoretical and historical foundation required for such future research.

This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I proposes Indigenous constitutionalism as the necessary paradigm for understanding Native nations’ fundamental law, particularly their written constitutions. Parts II through IV then discuss the three eras of tribal constitutional development from the nineteenth century to the present, drawing out how Native nations have used written constitutions and built a lasting constitutional tradition. Finally, Part V provides preliminary thoughts on the lessons that can be learned from the study of Indigenous constitutionalism, including rethinking the tribal constitutional law framework, revising the origin stories of federal Indian law, reframing the dominant narratives on U.S. constitutional law and history, and questioning the category of American constitutionalism.

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Footnotes
  1. ^ Entries from August 5, 1826 [hereinafter Const. of the Choctaw Nation of 1826], in Peter Perkins Pitchlynn, A Gathering of Statesmen: Records of the Choctaw Council Meetings, 1826–1828, at 45, 61–62 (Marcia Haag & Henry J. Willis eds. & trans., 2013).

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  2. ^ Felix S. Cohen, How Long Will Indian Constitutions Last?, in The Legal Conscience: Selected Papers of Felix S. Cohen 222, 228–29 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1960).

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  3. ^ See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at 133, 356–57 (1969).

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  4. ^ See Meet the Framers of the Constitution, Nat’l Archives (Feb. 18, 2026), https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/founding-fathers [https://perma.cc/NSG3-GWJJ].

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  5. ^ See U.S. Const. amends. I–XXVII.

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  6. ^ Ben Leubsdorf et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47747, Admission of States to the Union: A Historical Reference Guide 1 (2024).

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  7. ^ For a compilation of original and rewritten state constitutions through the twentieth century, see John Joseph Wallis, The NBER/Maryland State Constitutions Project, http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/6C4W-RJ3E]. For a compilation of current state constitutions, see 50 Constitutions, State Democracy Rsch. Initiative, Univ. Wis. L. Sch., https://50constitutions.org [https://perma.cc/J6LA-Y8PK].

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  8. ^ The various topics of current constitutional debate, ranging from the scope of the individual right to bear arms to the Executive’s power to remove officers, are too numerous to list here. However, debates over originalism and the role of history permeate modern discussions on constitutional meaning and interpretation. See, e.g., Jonathan Gienapp, Against Constitutional Originalism: A Historical Critique 2–3 (2024);Jack M. Balkin, Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation 8–9 (2024).

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  9. ^ This Article builds on Native legal scholar Professor Elizabeth Hidalgo Reese’s work foregrounding the importance of including tribal law in our study of American law. Although this Article situates tribal constitutions as both in conversation with and separate from American constitutions, it picks up her call by seeking to end the obscurity and marginalization of tribal constitutions within American constitutional history and constitutional law scholarship. See Elizabeth A. Reese, The Other American Law, 73 Stan. L. Rev. 555, 559–64 (2021).

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  10. ^ See Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law, at ix, 10–11 (2018); Anthony M. Ciolli, Territorial Constitutional Law, 58 Idaho L. Rev. 206, 214–15 (2022).

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  11. ^ See Robert Miller, Tribal Constitutions and Native Sovereignty, in Oxford Handbook Topics in Politics (online ed. 2015), https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/41327/chapter/496999456 [https://perma.cc/D2Z8-GTMS].

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  12. ^ See Reese, supra note 9, at 558 & n.5, 569. While recognizing that there are thousands of other legal documents in the United States that could be considered “foundational,” such as municipal charters, I am limiting my analysis here to documents that are held out as constitutions and therefore expressions of popular sovereignty within a polity — features not shared by municipal or corporate charters as creatures of state and federal law or by private associations’ articles of incorporation.

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  13. ^ The number of tribal constitutions and associated documents comes from an ongoing project led by Professors Beth Redbird and Erin Delaney at Northwestern University to compile and catalog all such documents from Native nations. See Examining Tribes’ Sovereignty Through Their Constitutions, Nw. Univ.: Inst. for Pol’y Rsch. (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/news/2024/examining-tribes-sovereignty-through-their-constitutions.html [https://perma.cc/6JCD-HJAC].

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  14. ^ While tribal constitutions have been largely excluded from the study of U.S. constitutional law thus far, Native legal scholar Professor Maggie Blackhawk’s groundbreaking work has shown that federal Indian law and Native nations have been central to the development of American constitutionalism. As she has convincingly illustrated, the “plenary power” doctrine has provided space for Native nations to “reclaim and reshape” American colonialism to their benefit. Maggie Blackhawk, The Supreme Court, 2022 Term — Foreword: The Constitution of American Colonialism, 137 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8, 12 (2023) [hereinafter Blackhawk, Constitution of American Colonialism]. This Article both posits that tribal constitutions offer one example of this phenomenon and answers Blackhawk’s call for the recognition of a “borderlands constitutionalism” that would uphold tribal self-determination. See id. at 19–21, 89–90, 100–03; see also Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1795–96 (2019) [hereinafter Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law] (arguing that modern constitutional doctrines governing presidential and congressional power draw on earlier analogues in federal Indian law); Maggie Blackhawk, Legislative Constitutionalism and Federal Indian Law, 132 Yale L.J. 2205, 2211 (2023) [hereinafter Blackhawk, Legislative Constitutionalism] (“Federal Indian law has . . . reshaped the face of U.S. government . . . and [its] constitutional framework.”).

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  15. ^ This Article uses the terms “Native nation” and “Indian tribe” to describe the Indigenous polities of the United States, as well as the terms “Native” and “Indian” to describe the Indigenous peoples of the United States. The term “Indian” is used in its historical and legal context and as part of key terms of art. For discussion of these various terms as they are used — and should be used — in historical writing, see Brooke Bauer & Elizabeth Ellis, Indigenous, Native American, or American Indian?: The Limitations of Broad Terms, 43 J. Early Republic 61, 62–64, 70–71 (2023).

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  16. ^ See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, State Constitutional Rights and Democratic Proportionality, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 1855, 1857–59 (2023).

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  17. ^ Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 383 (1993) (“Federal Indian law does not deserve its image as a tiny backwater of law inhabited by impenetrably complex and dull issues.”).

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  18. ^ For examples of the scattered legal scholarship on tribal constitutions, see Eric Lemont, Developing Effective Processes of American Indian Constitutional and Governmental Reform: Lessons from the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, Hualapai Nation, Navajo Nation, and Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 26 Am. Indian L. Rev. 147, 149–50 (2002); Kristen A. Carpenter, Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian Tribal Constitutional Law, in The Indian Civil Rights Act at Forty 159, 168–72 (Kristen A. Carpenter, Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Angela R. Riley eds., 2012); Sarah Deer & Cecilia Knapp, Muscogee Constitutional Jurisprudence: Vhakv Em Pvtakv (The Carpet Under the Law), 49 Tulsa L. Rev. 125, 149 (2013); Jason P. Hipp, Rethinking Rewriting: Tribal Constitutional Amendment and Reform, 4 Colum. J. Race & L. 73, 80–81 (2013); Robert J. Miller, American Indian Constitutions and Their Influence on the United States Constitution, 159 Procs. Am. Phil. Soc’y 32, 33 (2015); and Kekek Jason Stark, Exercising the Right of Self-Rule: Tribal Constitutional Law and Customary Law, 51 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 94, 97 (2024).

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  19. ^ See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Union, Commerce, and Slavery in the Age of Federalisms 248–50 (2024); Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 Yale L.J. 1792, 1856–61 (2019); see also Gerald Leonard & Saul Cornell, The Partisan Republic: Democracy, Exclusion, and the Fall of the Founders’ Constitution, 1780s–1830s, at 201–03 (2019) (providing a detailed account of how the Cherokee Nation’s claim to sovereignty shaped American constitutional law).

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  20. ^ See, e.g., Keith Richotte Jr., Claiming Turtle Mountain’s Constitution: The History, Legacy, and Future of a Tribal Nation’s Founding Documents 6 (2017); Jean Dennison, Colonial Entanglement: Constituting a Twenty-First-Century Osage Nation 45 (2012); Duane Champagne, Social Order and Political Change: Constitutional Governments Among the Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the Creek 12 (1992); Rennard Strickland, Fire and the Spirits: Cherokee Law from Clan to Court 188 (1975). Lumbee political scientist Professor David Wilkins’s recent book approaches tribal constitutions in a more comprehensive way, but that discussion is couched within a larger study on Native nations’ various forms of government. See David E. Wilkins, Indigenous Governance: Clans, Constitutions, and Consent 159–60 (2024).

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  21. ^ This Article is not the first to use the term “Indigenous constitutionalism.” Legal scholars have previously used the term to refer to constitutional thought in nations that are distinct from colonial or Western conceptions. See, e.g., Margaret A. Burnham, Indigenous Constitutionalism and the Death Penalty: The Case of the Commonwealth Caribbean, 3 Int’l J. Const. L. 582, 583 (2005); Steven Wang, Indigenous Constitutionalism and Global Legitimacy: Excavating the Roots of Chinese Constitutionalism, 46 Yale J. Int’l L. Online 99, 124 (2021). And in Canada, the term has been employed extensively to describe First Nations’ traditional legal orders, conceptions of rights, and written constitutions. See, e.g., John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism 12 (2016); Aaron Mills, The Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today, 61 McGill L.J. 847, 872 (2016); John Borrows, Indigenous Constitutionalism: Pre-Existing Legal Genealogies in Canada, in The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution 13, 13–17 (Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers eds., 2017); Alex Geddes, Indigenous Constitutionalism Beyond Section 35 and Section 91(24): The Significance of First Nations Constitutions in Canadian Law, 3 Lakehead L.J. 1, 2 & n.3 (2019); Karen Drake, Indigenous Constitutionalism and Dispute Resolution Outside the Courts: An Invitation, 48 Fed. L. Rev. 570, 571 (2020). But this Article is the first to apply this term to the written constitutions of Native nations within the United States, and it does so in order to stress that such constitutions — with uniquely Indigenous features — comprise part of the same overarching tradition in the United States. See infra section I.B, pp. 1274–83.

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  22. ^ For scholarship on the various iterations of constitutionalism in the American colonies and, later, the United States, including the role of written constitutionalism, see, for example, Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire 195–96 (2004); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–1830, at 7–8 (2005); Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1397, 1400 (2019); and Jonathan Gienapp, Written Constitutionalism, Past and Present, 39 Law & Hist. Rev. 321, 322 (2021).

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  23. ^ For discussions of fundamental and customary law among Native nations, see, for example, Daniel K. Richter, Ordeals of the Longhouse: The Five Nations in Early American History, in Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600–1800, at 11, 16–18 (Daniel K. Richter & James H. Merrell eds., 2003), and John Phillip Reid, A Law of Blood: The Primitive Law of the Cherokee Nation 35–48 (1970).

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  24. ^ See infra section I.B, pp. 1274–83.

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  25. ^ This Article’s sole focus is the Native nations — American Indian tribes and Alaska Native villages — within the continental United States, even though its insights may also apply to other Indigenous polities that have been subsumed within the United States, such as the Kingdom of Hawai’i, or exist around the world. For studies of constitutionalism in Hawai’i, see generally Noelani Arista, The Kingdom and the Republic: Sovereign Hawaiʻi and the Early United States (2019), and Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawai’i: The Cultural Power of Law (2000).

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  26. ^ See infra section I.A, pp. 1270–74. By focusing on Indigenous peoples’ use of law as a means of resistance and decolonization, this Article comports with other recent scholarship in global constitutional history and theory emphasizing the role of law rather than violence for subordinated groups to achieve autonomy. See, e.g., Linda Colley, The Gun, the Ship, and the Pen: Warfare, Constitutions, and the Making of the Modern World 10–11 (2021); Richard Albert, Decolonial Constitutionalism, 25 Chi. J. Int’l L. 341, 345 (2025).

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  27. ^ See infra section II.A, pp. 1285–91. Although plenty of scholars have studied the Cherokee Constitution of 1827, the Choctaw Constitution of 1826 has escaped sustained analysis and has never been placed into conversation with the Cherokee document. For scholarship that mentions the Choctaw Constitution while dismissing its significance as a legal document, see James Taylor Carson, Searching for the Bright Path: The Mississippi Choctaws from Prehistory to Removal 97 (1999); Champagne, supra note 20, at 151; Clara Sue Kidwell, Choctaws and Missionaries in Mississippi, 1818–1918, at 111–12 (1995); and Angie Debo, The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic 48–49 (3d prtg. 1972).

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  28. ^ Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479).

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  29. ^ These features of the IRA constitutions have given rise to the oft-repeated critique that the constitutions are “boilerplate” documents that were imposed on Native nations. See, e.g., David Wilkins, Seasons of Change: Of Reforms, Melees, and Revolutions in Indian Country [hereinafter Wilkins, Seasons of Change], in American Indian Constitutional Reform and the Rebuilding of Native Nations 35, 40 n.12 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006) [hereinafter American Indian Constitutional Reform]; Graham D. Taylor, The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934–45, at 96–98 (1980). However, the political scientists Professors Elmer Rusco and David Wilkins refute this claim. See Elmer Rusco, The Indian Reorganization Act and Indian Self-Government, in American Indian Constitutional Reform, supra, at 49, 62–66; David E. Wilkins, Introduction [hereinafter Wilkins, Introduction] to Felix S. Cohen, On the Drafting of Tribal Constitutions, at xi, xxii–xxiii (David E. Wilkins ed., 2006); see also infra section III.B, pp. 1308–11.

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  30. ^ Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (3d prtg. 1942).

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  31. ^ See id. at 122–26; see also infra section III.A.2, pp. 1305–08.

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  32. ^ See Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 1.07, at 93 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter Cohen’s Handbook].

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  33. ^ See infra section IV.A, pp. 1313–19.

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  34. ^ See Reese, supra note 9, at 557 (“Tribal law is American law, and as such . . . ought to occupy an equally prominent place alongside federal, state, and local law.”).

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  35. ^ See Angela R. Riley, Tribal Law Innovations in Native Governance, 71 UCLA L. Rev. 1742, 1745 (2025); Alejandro E. Camacho et al., Adapting Conservation Governance Under Climate Change: Lessons from Indian Country, 110 Va. L. Rev. 1549, 1557–58 (2024); Katherine Florey, Making It Work: Tribal Innovation, State Reaction, and the Future of Tribes as Regulatory Laboratories, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 713, 718–19 (2017); Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Justice Brandeis and Indian Country: Lessons from the Tribal Environmental Laboratory, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 857, 858–59 (2015); Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 Geo. L.J. 1675, 1729 (2012).

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  36. ^ See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Three Lives of Mamengwaa: Toward an Indigenous Canon of Construction, 134 Yale L.J. 696, 763–66 (2025); Stark, supra note 18, at 97; Kekek Jason Stark, Gwayak Ateg Onaakonigewi Dibenjigewin: Decolonizing Jurisdiction in Anishinaabe Tribal Courts, 103 Neb. L. Rev. 199, 235–37 (2024); Lauren van Schilfgaarde, Restorative Justice as Regenerative Tribal Jurisdiction, 112 Calif. L. Rev. 103, 142–43 (2024).

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  37. ^ See infra section V.A.1, pp. 1322–24.

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  38. ^ See infra section V.A.2, pp. 1324–25.

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  39. ^ See infra section V.A.3, pp. 1325–26.

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  40. ^ See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. Rev. 627, 627 (2006).

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  41. ^ See Cohen, supra note 30.

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  42. ^ See infra section V.B, pp. 1326–29.

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  43. ^ See infra notes 556–560 and accompanying text.

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  44. ^ See Jeremy M. Christiansen, Originalism: The Primary Canon of State Constitutional Interpretation, 15 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 341, 344 (2017) (arguing that state courts are primarily originalist). But see Chihiro Isozaki & Maryjane Johnson, State Justices Continue to Challenge Originalism, State Ct. Rep. (Aug. 12, 2025), https://statecourtreport.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/state-justices-continue-challenge-originalism [https://perma.cc/KKS7-SU9H].

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  45. ^ See, e.g., Standing Bear v. Whitehorn, No. SCO-2015-01, slip op. at 3–6 (Osage Nation Sup. Ct. Mar. 8, 2016), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/sco-2015-01-slip-opinion-3-8-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN8Y-8T6T] (using Osage history and custom to interpret the Osage Constitution’s separation of powers principles). For more examples of the various approaches tribal courts have used in constitutional and statutory interpretation, see Fletcher, supra note 36, at 747–61, and Stark, supra note 18, at 134–62.

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  46. ^ See, e.g., infra sections II.A.1, pp. 1286–89 (describing mixing of powers in the Choctaw Constitution of 1826), and III.B, pp. 1308–11 (describing legislative supremacy in IRA constitutions).

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  47. ^ See, e.g., Blackhawk, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 14, at 2214.

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  48. ^ For a discussion of the unitary executive concept, see generally Ashraf Ahmed, Lev Menand & Noah A. Rosenblum, The Making of Presidential Administration, 137 Harv. L. Rev. 2131 (2024).

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  49. ^ See, e.g., Elizabeth Hidalgo Reese, Native Marburys: Judicial Review in Tribal Courts, 93 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026) (manuscript at 3) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).

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  50. ^ For the argument that we should take Native peoples’ views on the meaning of the U.S. Constitution seriously, see Gregory Ablavsky & W. Tanner Allread, We the (Native) People?: How Indigenous Peoples Debated the U.S. Constitution, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 243, 252 (2023). One potential constitutional debate in which we should consider Native views is the current one over the meaning of the phrase, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. As Professors Gregory Ablavsky and Bethany Berger have shown, Native peoples were not subject to U.S. jurisdiction — and therefore were not birthright citizens — because of their membership in Native nations, which “lay within the territorial borders of the United States” but were “self-governing, independent sovereign[s].” Gregory Ablavsky & Bethany Berger, “Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof”: The Indian Law Context, 100 N.Y.U. L. Rev. Online 201, 205 (2025). Native peoples’ understandings of tribal jurisdiction in their own constitutions align with this federal law interpretation as they claimed exclusive jurisdiction over their territories and peoples and had to explicitly opt in to U.S. jurisdiction when they wished to subject themselves to it. See, e.g., Declaration of the Seneca Nation of Indians, Changing Their Form of Government, and Adopting a Constitutional Charter §§ 4–5, reprinted in Documents of Native American Political Development: 1500s to 1933, at 77, 78 (David E. Wilkins ed., 2009) [hereinafter Documents] (relinquishing partial jurisdiction over its members to New York state courts).

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  51. ^ As Professor Ablavsky and I have shown, prevailing approaches to U.S. constitutional history have overlooked Native-authored sources debating the Constitution, thereby omitting Native peoples’ views. See Ablavksy & Allread, supra note 50, at 248–50. However, once they are included within the American constitutional tradition, tribal constitutions provide a source base for such research.

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  52. ^ See infra section V.D, pp. 1332–40.

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  53. ^ See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in State Constitutions, 119 Mich. L. Rev. 859, 864–65 (2021); Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1641, 1643–46 (2014).

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  54. ^ See infra section V.D.1, pp. 1334–36; see also, e.g., Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality and Separate Consciousness [Re]Incorporating Customs and Traditions into Tribal Law, 1 Tribal L.J. 1, 12–13 (2000) (noting that both the Laguna and Hopi Constitutions provide for the application of traditional law, or orally transmitted “custom”).

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  55. ^ See infra section V.D.2, pp. 1336–38; see also, e.g., Developments in the Law — Chapter One: Tribal Executive Branches: A Path to Tribal Constitutional Reform, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1662, 1662 & n.9 (2016) (noting that tribal constitutions have been motivated, in part, by an interest in both serving their polities and inspiring confidence in outsiders with whom they interact).

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  56. ^ See infra section V.D, pp. 1332–40.

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  57. ^ See id.

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  58. ^ See Mary Young, The Cherokee Nation: Mirror of the Republic, 33 Am. Q. 502, 524 (1981).

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