The Second Amendment was designed to protect the people and the states from a tyrannical and unrepresentative central government. Excavating this history today is important, particularly for liberals accustomed to treating the Second Amendment as the ugly duckling of the Bill of Rights. Recent events suggest that America is slouching towards authoritarianism and democratic off-ramps are becoming more frail. If all else fails, there must be a backstop. The Second Amendment places that responsibility at the feet of the people and the states. Unfortunately, it is a role the people and states—particularly the liberal ones—are woefully unprepared to serve. Whether and at what point the threat of authoritarianism is sufficient to warrant the exercise of anti-authoritarian Second Amendment rights is a hard political question. This Essay provides possible answers but more broadly simply encourages liberals to consider the topic seriously.
This might seem incendiary, but it could have a bipartisan effect. Conservatives often frame the tremendous social costs of gun violence as necessary to ensure that the people are armed to resist tyranny. Liberals often roll their eyes at such claims. Perhaps a liberal embrace of the Second Amendment would make the left more sympathetic to such claims. It might also encourage the right to take a more nuanced view of when the Second Amendment’s anti-authoritarian purpose is properly invoked and to consider more seriously the stabilizing benefits of placing anti-authoritarian Second Amendment rights at the feet of states instead of individuals.
I. The Second Amendment’s Anti-Federalist Core Purpose
Although the individual self-defense angle—think, defending oneself from armed individuals—has become the focus of Second Amendment law in recent decades, its anti-authoritarian core—think, defending against a federal force arm-in-arm with neighbors—was its original purpose. An abridged version of the history supporting this interpretation is presented, followed by a summary of commentary (including critiques of this reading).
A. History
As a result of English despotic practices, many post-Revolution state constitutions included explicit guarantees of the people’s right to bear arms for the defense of the state. In 1788, the new U.S. Constitution had no such declaration and transferred much of the military power to the central government. That infuriated Anti-Federalists. They variously grieved “the militia may be here destroyed,” “this government . . . does not leave us the means of . . . waging war against tyrants,” and “the militia, the only defence and protection which the State can have for the security of their rights . . . is taken entirely out of [their] power . . . . [This would prevent them from] thwart[ing] and oppos[ing] the general government.” Federalists tried to reassure them. James Madison, for example, responded “the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger [of an abusive federal military]. . . . [because it] would be opposed [by] a [large] militia . . . with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves . . . .”
The Constitution passed, but it became clear that these concerns had to be addressed, resulting in the Second Amendment. The anti-authoritarian understanding of that Amendment was reiterated after its passage. One Continental Congress delegate said “rulers . . . may attempt to tyrannize, and as the military . . . might pervert their power . . . the people are confirmed by the [Second Amendment] in their right to keep and bear . . . arms.” Later, in 1814 Daniel Webster declared it “the solemn duty of the State Governments to protect their own authority over their own Militia, and to interpose between their citizens and arbitrary power.” Joseph Story in 1833 described the Amendment as “the palladium of the liberties of a republic” because it protected the militia which was the “natural defence” against “domestic usurpations of power by rulers.”
B. Commentary
This history is often read as showing that the Second Amendment has an anti-authoritarian core. Among those who agree on that purpose, there is disagreement as to the Amendment’s mechanism. Some see it as a right of states to maintain militias as a check against a dangerous federal standing army. Others assert that the Second Amendment is an individual right in service of defense against federal tyrants or other individuals. Some take an in-between view and see it as an individual right, but one exercised in service of the state’s anti-authoritarian goals.
Of course, some strongly refute the claim that the Second Amendment has an anti-authoritarian (or insurrectionist) core at all. In its place, scholars have argued that the Second Amendment is about defending from threats like foreign governments, Native American tribes, or slave revolts.
The Supreme Court has supported the anti-authoritarian interpretation in dicta. For example, District of Columbia v. Heller, while endorsing an individual right to self-defense, said “the fear that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army . . . was pervasive [at the Founding] . . . .” and thus one of the Second Amendment’s motivating rationales was “when the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny.” The dissent, taking an opposing states-first view, nonetheless identified the same motivating rationale.
II. Preconditions
Recent events suggest that triggers for the exercise of anti-authoritarian Second Amendment rights have become more likely and democratic off-ramps more frail.
A. Triggers
The Constitution “protect[s] the preconditions for armed opposition . . . [but] it d[oes] nothing to clarify . . . in which circumstances such opposition is justified.” Threats of armed resistance should not be trotted out “upon every little mismanagement in public affairs.” Instead, this Essay argues that triggering conditions should be narrowly construed as only those which fundamentally attack representative democracy.
That is subject to reasonably differing interpretations, but three such potential triggers are raised here: President Trump (i) serving a constitutionally forbidden third term, (ii) suppressing voting with federal forces, or (iii) overseeing widespread unlawful killings of protesters.
If these do not come to pass, great. But there is evidence they are not spurious musings. President Trump displays “Trump 2028” hats in the White House. He continues to sell them. In March 2025, he said he was “not joking” about considering serving a third term. In October 2025, he said “I would love to” serve a third term. Steve Bannon—not the President, but an influential ally—said Trump “is going to be President in 2028, and people just ought to get accommodated with that.” According to a 2025 survey, 62% of Americans believe President Trump is serious about a third term.
As for “nationaliz[ing]” elections, President Trump has said Republicans should “take over the voting.” Steve Bannon (again, not currently in the administration, but influential) has said “We’re going to have ICE surround the polls come November. We’re not going to sit here and allow you to steal the country again.” He later said the military should be deployed under the Insurrection Act—a similar move to one President Trump has “repeatedly floated.” After the 2020 election, President Trump “considered . . . direct[ing] the military to seize voting machines.” In 2026, he said he “should have” done it. A draft executive order leaked in February 2026 would use foreign interference claims “to declare a national emergency” and “unlock extraordinary presidential power over voting.” As of this writing, a Polymarket bet on President Trump nationalizing elections has 28% odds.
As for widespread unlawful killings. Alex Pretti and Renee Good were two American citizens, shot and killed while protesting. The videos are public, and the narratives contested. According to one poll from January 2026, 55% of Americans viewed the amount of force used on Alex Pretti as unjustified (18% justified). Another poll from February 2026 said 62% of Americans viewed Renee Good’s death as unjustified. If such killings were to become widespread, they could rise to the level of a concerted campaign to silence and attack dissidents, which could also be a valid trigger.
Beyond those events, it is generally noteworthy that voters supported President Trump in 2024 despite his election denialism and his role in the January 6, 2021 insurrection. That might suggest a generalized disregard for democratic rules and norms, which could signify authoritarian trouble on the horizon even if and after President Trump leaves office.
B. Off-Ramps
There are peaceful democratic off-ramps. None are surefire.
First, litigation. The judiciary has occasionally rebuffed the President. In Trump v. Illinois, the Supreme Court declined to stay a lower court injunction barring President Trump from federalizing and deploying Texas and Illinois National Guard members in Illinois. In Learning Resources v. Trump, the Supreme Court infuriated the President by denying his authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Justice Barrett, asked about a Trump third term, indicated that the Twenty-Second Amendment bar was fairly clear. But, the Court could use its myriad tools to avoid saying anything about such cases. Even if the judiciary were to act, President Trump could defy it. His administration has largely complied with judgments, but it has flirted with defiance and heatedly attacked the judiciary.
Aside from litigation, political appeals may be made to Congress. Congress has tools to rein in an abusive President. Unfortunately, it has largely abdicated its powers. Perhaps if any of the egregious triggers highlighted herein came to pass, or if control of Congress switched hands, it might rouse itself.
Moral and legal appeals might also be made to individual military members. Soldiers are permitted and possibly required to disobey unlawful orders. There have been instances throughout history of remarkable courage by American soldiers in the face of unlawful orders. But President Trump has ensured loyalty in the ranks of the military. According to one (disputed) report, he said, “I need the kind of generals that Hitler had,” people “totally loyal.” And during the 2020 transition, “[t]he holdouts [in recognizing the 2020 election] included . . . scarily from a national security standpoint, the Department of Defense.”
Finally, persuasion and outreach across political divides is always feasible and laudable. But it might not work. Americans are increasingly divided. Even in cases where people watch the same videos, as with Alex Pretti and Renee Good, different people come away with radically different views.
All of these off-ramps should be attempted before resorting to the Second Amendment, but they may fail.
III. Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
Another consideration counseling hesitation is that preparation for Second Amendment resistance might be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If a state trains and equips itself, that can make triggers more likely by substantiating federal claims of insurrection, which can serve as pretext for executive overreach, like militarizing peacetime cities or extending a presidential term. On the other hand, the same actions could also serve as deterrents and make triggers less likely (as may have happened in the Election Crisis of 1800, when Republican governors threatened to use militias if Jefferson was not sworn into office). In other words, a show of strength can either enrage or silence a bully, depending on the circumstances.
IV. The Law
If tyrannical triggers happen, and off-ramps fail, then the Second Amendment’s anti-authoritarian purpose could come to the fore. If it does, the success of the exercise of those rights will depend on whether the states and the people—particularly the liberal ones—have prepared in advance. Open rebellion against the federal government is not lawful. The Constitution bars it. But there are lawful means, both statutory and constitutional, to prepare for the exercise of Second Amendment rights.
Before proceeding, there is an important distinction to note between standing armies and militias. That distinction might not be clear to modern audiences, but it was to the Founding generation. To many of them, standing armies were antithetical to liberty, while militias were the surest defense of liberty. The latter were understood to be the people, employed in the professions of life, but armed and trained on a semi-regular basis by their government and available in case of emergency.
A. Statutory
The Constitution bars states from maintaining standing armies without Congress’ consent. However, Congress has already given its statutory consent. And as for state militias, it has not restricted them—and it likely could not constitutionally.
1. The National Guard
The National Guard is “a federally funded and controlled force with a (very) thin facade of state control.” National Guard units can have “State Active Duty” status (state missions at state expense), Title 32 status (state missions at federal expense), or Title 10 status (federal missions at federal expense). Most of the time, they operate under Title 32 status. As a result, nearly “all of [their] budget [is] drawn from the federal government.” States are largely powerless to resist Title 10 federalization—although there are statutory restrictions on when and how the President can do so (as in Trump v. Illinois). National Guard members also swear allegiance to the United States (in addition to their respective states). As a result, “the National Guard is [really] . . . a federal force.” Illinois learned this the hard way, when Illinois National Guard units were federalized and turned on Illinoisans. “The National Guard was never designed to resist a tyrannical government” and it would likely not serve that purpose well. The only practical step here would be for governors to inquire into the loyalties of National Guard members and to train them on when to resist unlawful federal orders.
2. State Defense Forces
Under 32 U.S.C. § 109(c), states are authorized to maintain state defense forces (SDFs). These are statutorily barred from being federalized and can only be used within state jurisdictions. Less than half of the states exercise this option and across the United States there are a mere 14,000 SDF members (compared to 432,000 National Guard members and over two million federal military personnel). SDFs are generally underfunded, undersupported, and unknown. But if states wished, this would present an excellent statutory route to building a loyal force.
3. The People, Well-Regulated
There is no statutory bar to states offering lessons, training, and regimentation to willing individuals exercising their Second Amendment rights. The Insurrection Act of 1807 (10 U.S.C. §§ 251-55) permits the President to use federal forces to suppress insurrections, but it seems unlikely that peaceful training of civilians would qualify as an insurrection. 18 U.S. Code § 231 criminalizes “[w]hoever teaches . . . the use . . . of any firearm . . . in furtherance of[] a civil disorder.” But that likely does not apply to states and their officers (it explicitly excludes state law enforcement officers). Even if either statute did apply, the application of the statute might be federally unconstitutional, as explained in section IV.B.
Under this paradigm, a state could establish facilities where citizens arrive unarmed and are offered weapons and training. States might teach their citizens where to report to get their weapons and whose orders to follow in emergencies. They might teach combat basics. At the end of trainings, citizens might return their weapons and go home. This might be particularly appealing for liberal states that have heavy firearm restrictions and whose citizens are culturally loath to keep firearms at home. Alternatively, or additionally, a state could take all the same measures but ask citizens to arrive with private arms. These two routes would likely be closest to the Founding-era vision of militias.
4. The People, Unregulated
Individuals could also arm themselves, without state involvement. Individuals might go further and form private, unregulated militias. Conservatives have often taken this route. Private militias are outlawed by every state, but enforcement is lax, and if a state withdrew those prohibitions, that would leave only federal restrictions on gun ownership, which are not very restrictive.
B. Constitution
If any of the foregoing routes are taken, constitutional rights become crucial because the federal government could enact statutes to undermine such efforts. Under current constitutional law, it is clear that the federal government could not widely disarm the people. The federal constitutional role of state militias and state-endorsed (or acquiesced) private militias is less clear.
The Second Amendment expressly contemplates that the militia be “well regulated.” But authority to “regulat[e]” is split between the states and the federal government. The Militia Clauses allow Congress to “organiz[e], arm[], and disciplin[e]” the militia, but reserve to the states the power to appoint officers and to “train[] the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” Furthermore, Congress has the power to “call[] forth the Militia to . . . suppress Insurrections.”
Congress could expansively interpret its power to “organize” and “discipline” to the point of outlawing militias. Congress might also call up the militias of liberal states into federal service to suppress the insurrection that the militias were organized to perpetrate in the first place. Whether any of this would be constitutional has not been squarely tested because typically Congress has wanted states to maintain militias. Even in the leadup to the Civil War, the federal government refrained from disarming southern states, in part out of fear of provoking a premature conflict.
Nonetheless, it seems highly likely that state militias cannot be federally regulated out of existence or called forth merely to disarm a state. In Heller, the Court said the Second Amendment was meant “to prevent elimination of the militia,” which “might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional order broke down.” And in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), the Court indicated that federal restrictions on firearms bearing a “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia” would be unconstitutional. Statements like these appear to give constitutional imprimatur to every option laid out above, except perhaps unregulated private militias. As to those, the Court has clearly said that states can outlaw them, but it has never held that the federal government may. Altogether, it seems unlikely that the federal government could bar the states from either creating regulated militias (like modified State Defense Forces or a widely trained citizenry), and it might even be barred from interfering with state-endorsed private militias. The caveat is of course that none may engage in open rebellion—the Second Amendment only protects the preconditions for resistance.
V. Culture & States
The largest barrier to the Second Amendment having a liberal moment may be cultural. Republicans are 2.25 times more likely to personally own guns than Democrats. Republicans and Democrats have widely divergent views on the value of gun control. Conservatives, unlike liberals, have a culture of invoking the martial language of militias to resist the federal government.
To counteract this unease, this Essay has highlighted the role of states. States can provide arm’s-length firearm training (e.g., by providing firearms at training facilities, not requiring private arms) and lend a legal and cultural imprimatur to the project which might make otherwise uncomfortable individuals more likely to engage.
And an emphasis on states makes good historical, constitutional, and normative sense too. If Second Amendment resistance occurs, the likelihood of its benefits outweighing its costs seems much higher when a state is part of the mission. What happens after a resistance begins depends heavily on the institutional landscape. The American Revolution produced relative stability, compared to, for example, the French Revolution. That may have much to do with the fact that colonial governments were already in place and could play a stabilizing role. The Second Amendment recognizes this stability-enhancing role of the states when it refers to a “well regulated militia” and the “security of a free State.” James Madison also recognized this crucial role of the states: “Besides the advantage of being armed . . . the existence of subordinate governments to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprizes of ambition.” This is possibly one way that bands of roving modern militias misunderstand the Second Amendment under which they claim to operate.
Conclusion
The Second Amendment imposes immense social costs already. Living up to the anti-authoritarian Second Amendment’s purposes would impose even more costs. America is separated from her last domestic war by over 160 years and should not take that lightly. The fire of war, once kindled, often spreads beyond control. But the Founding generation found such costs a worthy payment for sloughing off tyranny—it spoke frequently in grand militaristic terms about dying for freedom. That might reasonably not fit modern proclivities. But should tyranny raise its head, the Second Amendment provides the way out—if liberals and allies are willing and able to take it.