The Statistics

TABLE I^a

(A) Actions of Individual Justices

	Opinions Writtenb				Dissenting Votesc
					In Disposition by
	Opinions of Courtd	Concur­rencese	Dissentse	Total	Opinion	Memo­randumf	Total
Roberts	6	0	0	6	2	0	2
Thomas	7	13	9	29	13	1	14
Alito	6	5	5	16	14	0	14
Sotomayor	6	9	6	21	12	0	12
Kagan	6	0	3	9	9	0	9
Gorsuch	6	4	7	17	16	1	17
Kavanaugh	7	5	1	13	4	0	4
Barrett	7	2	4	13	6	0	6
Jackson	5	9	8	22	16	1	17
Per Curiam	2	—	—	2	—	—	—
Total	58	47	43	146	92	3	95

^a A complete explanation of how the tables are compiled may be found in The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—The Statistics, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 415, 415–19 (2005). Table I, with the exception of the dissenting-votes portion of Table I(A) and the memorandum tabulations in Table I(C), includes only full-opinion decisions. Two per curiam decisions contained legal reasoning substantial enough to be considered full-opinion decisions in October Term 2024. These opinions were Andrew v. White, 145 S. Ct. 75 (2025) (per curiam), and Tiktok Inc. v. Garland, 145 S. Ct. 57 (2025) (per curiam). This table includes every opinion designated by the Court as a 2024 Term Opinion except for nine. SeeOpinions of the Court—2024, Sup. Ct. of the U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/24 [https://perma.cc/S3YL-C84D]. The omitted opinions include Goldey v. Fields, 145 S. Ct. 2613 (2025) (per curiam), which was published after the cut-off date of June 27, 2025; Hamm v. Smith, 145 S. Ct. 9 (2024) (per curiam), which is counted as a memorandum order because it disposed of a case on the merits by vacating it; three cases — Facebook, Inc.v. Amalgamated Bank, 145 S. Ct. 10 (2024) (per curiam), NVIDIA Corp. v E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB, 145 S. Ct. 33 (2024) (per curiam), and Laboratory Corp. of American Holdings v. Davis, 145 S. Ct. 1608 (2025) (per curiam) — in which the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted; Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond, 145 S. Ct. 1381 (2025) (per curiam), which was affirmed by an equally divided court; and three cases that came up on the emergency docket without full briefing and oral argument: Department of Education v. California, 145 S. Ct. 966 (2025) (per curiam), Trump v. J.G.G., 145 S. Ct. 1003 (2025) (per curiam), and A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1034 (2025) (per curiam). A memorandum order is a case decided by summary order and contained in the Court’s weekly order lists issued throughout the Term. This category excludes summary orders designated as opinions by the Court. The memorandum tabulations include memorandum orders disposing of cases on their merits by affirming, reversing, vacating, or remanding. They exclude orders disposing of petitions for certiorari, dismissing writs of certiorari as improvidently granted, dismissing appeals for lack of jurisdiction, disposing of miscellaneous applications, and certifying questions for review. The memorandum tabulations also exclude orders relating to payment of docketing fees and dissents therefrom.

^b This portion of Table I(A) includes only opinions authored in the fifty-eight cases with full opinions this Term. Thus, dissents from denials of certiorari and concurrences or dissents from summary affirmances are not included. A concurrence or dissent is recorded as a written opinion whenever its author provided a reason, however brief, for their vote. In cases where an opinion is authored by multiple Justices, Table I treats that opinion as if it were multiple opinions, one by each authoring Justice.

^c A Justice is considered to have dissented whenever he or she voted to dispose of the case in any manner different from the manner specified by the majority of the Court.

^d A plurality opinion that announced the judgment of the Court is counted as the opinion of the Court.

^e Opinions concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in both are counted as concurrences. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part are counted as dissents.

^f Dissenting votes in memorandum decisions include instances in which Justices expressed that they would not have disposed of the case by memorandum order or that they would not have granted the writ of certiorari. This category does not include dissenting votes in orders relating to applications for emergency relief; that information is presented in Table IV and its accompanying footnotes.

TABLE I (continued)

(B1) Voting Alignments ⎯ All Written Opinions^g

		Roberts	Thomas	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan	Gorsuch	Kavanaugh	Barrett	Jackson
	O	—	41	41	38	45	36	52	48	35
	S	—	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0
Roberts	D	—	41	42	38	45	38	53	48	35
	N	—	58	57	58	58	56	58	58	58
	P (%)	—	70.7	73.7	65.5	77.6	67.9	91.4	82.8	60.3
	O	41	—	40	26	34	31	50	42	24
	S	0	—	14	0	1	10	7	8	2
Thomas	D	41	—	50	26	35	38	46	47	26
	N	58	—	57	58	58	56	58	58	58
	P (%)	70.7	—	87.7	44.8	60.3	67.9	79.3	81.0	44.8
	O	41	40	—	27	34	30	42	41	25
	S	1	14	—	1	2	7	7	6	1
Alito	D	42	50	—	28	35	36	46	46	26
	N	57	57	—	57	57	55	57	57	57
	P (%)	73.7	87.7	—	49.1	61.4	65.5	80.7	80.7	45.6
	O	38	26	27	—	41	26	37	36	37
	S	0	0	1	—	11	2	0	1	17
Sotomayor	D	38	26	28	—	50	28	37	36	50
	N	58	58	57	—	58	56	58	58	58
	P (%)	65.5	44.8	49.1	—	86.2	50.0	63.8	62.1	86.2
	O	45	34	34	40	—	30	44	42	39
	S	0	1	2	11	—	2	0	1	11
Kagan	D	45	35	35	50	—	31	44	43	48
	N	58	58	57	58	—	56	58	58	58
	P (%)	77.6	60.3	61.4	86.2	—	55.4	75.9	74.1	82.8
	O	36	31	30	26	30	—	33	34	24
	S	2	10	7	2	2	—	0	1	3
Gorsuch	D	38	38	36	28	31	—	33	35	27
	N	56	56	55	56	56	—	56	56	56
	P (%)	67.9	67.9	65.5	50.0	55.4	—	58.9	62.5	48.2
	O	52	43	42	37	44	33	—	50	34
	S	1	7	7	0	0	0	—	4	0
Kavanaugh	D	53	46	46	37	44	33	—	53	34
	N	58	58	57	58	58	56	—	58	58
	P (%)	91.4	79.3	80.7	63.8	75.9	58.9	—	91.4	58.6
	O	48	42	41	35	42	34	50	—	32
	S	0	8	6	1	1	1	4	—	1
Barrett	D	48	47	46	36	43	35	53	—	33
	N	58	58	57	58	58	56	58	—	58
	P (%)	82.8	81.0	80.7	62.1	74.1	62.5	91.4	—	56.9
	O	35	24	25	36	38	24	34	32	—
	S	0	2	1	16	10	3	0	1	—
Jackson	D	35	26	26	50	48	27	34	33	—
	N	58	58	57	58	58	56	58	58	—
	P (%)	60.3	44.8	45.6	86.2	82.8	48.2	58.6	56.9	—

TABLE I (continued)

(B2) Voting Alignments ⎯ Nonunanimous Cases^h

		Roberts	Thomas	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan	Gorsuch	Kavanaugh	Barrett	Jackson
	O	—	22	22	19	26	17	33	29	16
	S	—	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0
Roberts	D	—	22	23	19	26	19	34	29	16
	N	—	39	38	39	39	37	39	39	39
	P (%)	—	56.4	60.5	48.7	66.7	51.4	87.2	74.4	41.0
	O	22	—	21	7	15	12	24	23	6
	S	0	—	11	0	1	8	3	7	2
Thomas	D	22	—	31	7	16	19	27	28	8
	N	39	—	38	39	39	37	39	39	38
	P (%)	56.4	—	81.6	17.9	41.0	51.4	69.2	71.8	20.5
	O	22	21	—	8	15	11	23	22	6
	S	1	11	—	1	2	7	4	5	1
Alito	D	23	31	—	9	16	17	27	27	7
	N	38	38	—	38	38	36	38	38	38
	P (%)	60.5	81.6	—	23.7	42.1	47.2	71.1	71.1	18.4
	O	19	7	8	—	22	7	18	17	18
	S	0	0	1	—	11	2	0	1	15
Sotomayor	D	19	7	9	—	31	9	18	17	31
	N	39	39	38	—	39	37	39	39	39
	P (%)	48.7	17.9	23.7	—	79.5	24.3	46.2	43.6	79.5
	O	26	15	15	21	—	11	25	23	20
	S	0	1	2	11	—	2	0	1	11
Kagan	D	26	16	16	31	—	12	25	24	29
	N	39	39	38	39	—	37	39	39	39
	P (%)	66.7	41.0	42.1	79.5	—	32.4	64.1	61.5	74.4
	O	17	12	11	7	11	—	14	15	5
	S	2	8	7	2	2	—	0	1	3
Gorsuch	D	19	19	17	9	12	—	14	16	8
	N	37	37	36	37	37	—	37	37	37
	P (%)	51.4	51.4	47.2	24.3	32.4	—	37.8	43.2	21.6
	O	33	24	23	18	25	14	—	31	15
	S	1	3	4	0	0	0	—	3	0
Kavanaugh	D	34	27	27	18	25	14	—	34	15
	N	39	39	38	39	39	37	—	39	39
	P (%)	87.2	69.2	71.1	46.2	64.1	37.8	—	87.2	38.5
	O	29	23	21	16	23	15	31	—	13
	S	0	7	5	1	1	1	3	—	1
Barrett	D	29	28	27	17	24	16	34	—	14
	N	39	39	38	39	39	37	39	—	39
	P (%)	74.4	71.8	71.1	43.6	61.5	43.2	87.2	—	35.9
	O	16	6	6	17	19	5	15	13	—
	S	0	2	1	14	10	3	0	1	—
Jackson	D	16	8	7	31	29	8	15	14	—
	N	39	39	38	39	39	37	39	39	—
	P (%)	41.0	20.5	18.4	79.5	74.4	21.6	38.5	35.9	—

TABLE I (continued)

^g Table I(B1) records the frequency with which each Justice voted with each of the other Justices in full-opinion decisions, including the two per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. See supra note a.

Two Justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the Reporter of Decisions or the explicit statement of a Justice in their own opinion. This table does not treat a Justice as having joined the opinion of the Court unless that Justice authored or joined the opinion of the Court in full, or authored or joined at least part of the opinion of the Court and did not author or join any opinion concurring in the judgment, even in part, or dissenting, even in part. For the purpose of counting dissents and concurrences, however, a Justice who partially joined an opinion is considered to have fully joined it. For example, Justice Gorsuch is counted as having joined Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 145 S. Ct. 2090 (2025), even though he only joined Part II of the concurrence.

In Tables I(B1) and I(B2), “O” represents the number of decisions in which a particular pair of Justices agreed in an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. “S” represents the number of decisions in which two Justices agreed in any opinion separate from the opinion of the Court. Such separate opinions include concurrences, dissents, and those portions of an opinion of the Court not joined by at least four other Justices. Justices who together joined more than one separate opinion in a case are considered to have agreed only once. “D” represents the number of decisions in which two Justices agreed in a majority, plurality, concurring, or dissenting opinion. A decision is counted only once in the “D” category if two Justices both joined the opinion of the Court and joined a separate concurrence. Thus, in some situations the “D” value will be less than the sum of the “O” and “S” values. “N” represents the number of decisions in which both Justices participated and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. “P” represents the percentage of decisions in which one Justice agreed with another Justice and is calculated by dividing the “D” value by the “N” value and multiplying the quotient by 100.

^h Like Table I(B1), Table I(B2) records the frequency with which each of the Justices voted with each other Justice in full-opinion decisions, but Table I(B2) records these voting alignments only for cases that were not unanimously decided. A decision is considered unanimous for purposes of Table I whenever all the Justices joined the opinion of the Court and no Justice concurred only in the judgment, even in part, or dissented, even in part. Removing the unanimous cases produces lower rates of agreement overall, providing a more accurate picture of how the Justices’ votes aligned in divisive cases.

TABLE I (continued)

(C) Unanimity

	Unanimous		With Concurrencei		With Dissent		Total
Full Opinions	19	(32.8%)	6	(10.3%)	33	(56.9%)	58
Memorandum Orders	71	(97.2%)	0	(0.0%)	2	(2.7%)	73

(D) Voting Patterns in Nonunanimous Cases^j

	Total Cases	Joining the Opinion of the Courtk		Agreeing in the Disposition of the Casel
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Roberts	39	37	94.9%	36	92.3%
Thomas	39	26	66.7%	24	61.5%
Alito	38	25	65.8%	23	60.5%
Sotomayor	39	28	69.2%	22	56.4%
Kagan	39	30	76.9%	29	74.4%
Gorsuch	37	23	62.2%	18	48.6%
Kavanaugh	39	35	89.7%	35	89.7%
Barrett	39	33	84.6%	32	82.1%
Jackson	39	22	59.0%	19	48.7%

_ⁱ A decision is listed in this column if at least one Justice concurred in the judgment, but not in the Court’s opinion in full, and no Justice dissented, even in part. See, e.g., Tiktok Inc. v. Garland, 145 S. Ct. 57 (2025) (per curiam).

^j Table I(D) records the frequency with which each Justice joined the opinion of the Court in nonunanimous, full-opinion decisions. This table includes per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions, see supra note a, if they produced dissenting votes or a concurrence in the judgment.

^k This portion of the table reports the number of times that each Justice joined the opinion of the Court, according to the rule described in the second paragraph of note g.

^l This portion of the table reports the number of times that each Justice agreed with the Court’s disposition of a case. It includes all cases in which a Justice joined the opinion of the Court, but unlike the portion of the table described in note k, it also includes those cases in which the Justice concurred in the judgment without joining the Court’s opinion in full. Cases in which the Justice dissented, even in part, are not included.

TABLE I (continued)

(E) 5–4 Decisions

Justices Constituting the Majority	Number of Decisionsm
Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jacksonn	3
Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugho	1
Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrettp	1
Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jacksonq	1
Roberts, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrettr	1
Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jacksons	1
Total	8

(F) Average Opinion Length^t

	Opinion of the Court	Plurality Opinionu	Concurring Opinion	Concurring in Judgmentv	Dissenting Opinionv	Total Pages
Roberts	15.4	—	—	—	—	92.6
Thomas	17.3	—	10.0	14.0	21.6	453.8
Alito	24.2	—	2.5	10.7	13.8	243.7
Sotomayor	17.2	—	2.9	5.2	22.9	276.1
Kagan	16.3	—	—	0	12.7	135.8
Gorsuch	18.9	6.0	0.6	5.0	14.9	233.4
Kavanaugh	20.7	—	6.0	0	24.8	199.5
Barrett	16.1	—	10.2	0.4	8.7	158.2
Jackson	13.7	—	2.3	3.1	19.3	247.9
Per Curiam	13.9	—	—	—	—	27.8

^m This column lists the number of 5–4 full-opinion decisions in which each five-Justice group constituted the majority. A case is counted as 5–4 if four Justices voted to dispose of any issue in a manner different from that specified by a majority of the Court, even if one or more of those Justices joined part of the majority opinion. Cases involving plurality opinions are included so long as the Justices divided 5–4 in favor of the disposition.

ⁿ Mansalvo Velázquez v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 1232 (2025) (Gorsuch, J.); Perttu v. Richards, 145 S. Ct. 1793 (2025) (Roberts, C.J.); Hewitt v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2165 (2025) (Jackson, J.). o City & County of San Francisco v. EPA, 145 S. Ct. 704 (2025) (Alito, J.).

^p Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025) (Alito, J.).

^q Williams v. Reed, 145 S. Ct. 465 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J.). r Feliciano v. Dep’t of Transp., 145 S. Ct. 1284 (2025) (Gorsuch, J.). s Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, 145 S. Ct. 931 (2025) (Barrett, J.).

^t The data in this table reflect the length of opinions as published in the Court’s slip opinions, estimated to the nearest tenth of a page. Though the slip opinions are eventually superseded by official case publication in the United States Reports, the total opinion length, in pages, is generally preserved in the final publication. Average opinion length is obtained by summing the number of pages written by each Justice within each category of opinion and then dividing by the number of opinions of that type written by that Justice. For the number of opinions written by each Justice, see supra Table I(A).

TABLE I (continued)

^u An opinion announcing the judgment of the Court is only counted as a “plurality” for the purposes of Table I(F) if no portion of it commanded a majority of five votes from the Court. For a recent example, see Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018). This Term, no opinion announcing the judgment of the Court entirely failed to command a majority of five votes from the Court.

^v Opinions concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in both are categorized under Concurring in Judgment. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part, or concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, are categorized under Dissenting Opinion.

TABLE II^a

(A) Final Disposition of Cases

	Disposed of	Remaining on Docket	Total
Original Docket	3	0	3
Appellate Docketb	1,369	246c	1,615
Miscellaneous Docketd	2,652	328c	2,980
Total	4,024	574	4,598

(B) Cases Granted Review^e

	Review Grantedf	Petitions Consideredg	Percentage Granted
Appellate Docket	64	1,369	4.7%
Miscellaneous Docket	4	2,652	0.2%
Total	68	4,021	1.7%

^a All numbers in Tables II(A), II(B), and II(C) are derived from statistics published in the Supreme Court’s annual Journal. From 2009 to 2022, the Statistics relied on data provided directly by the Court. Volume 137 marked a return to the methodology laid out in The Supreme Court, 2007 Term — The Statistics, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 516, 523 n.a (2008). Employing the Court’s official published statistics will ensure that tabulation methodology remains consistent from year to year going forward. See Sup. Ct. of the U.S., Journal, October Term 2024, at II, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/Jnl24.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PD8-B22N].

^b The appellate docket consists of all paid cases.

^c The number of cases remaining on the appellate and miscellaneous dockets is calculated by adding the number of cases not acted upon in the 2024 Term to the number of cases granted review in the 2024 Term but carried over to the 2025 Term.

^d The miscellaneous docket consists of all cases filed in forma pauperis.

^e Table II(B) reports data that versions of Table II prior to 1998 reported under Rev-iew Granted. For a full explanation, see The Supreme Court, 1997 Term — The Statistics, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 372 n.d (1998). Table II(B) does not include cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction.

^f The number of cases granted review includes only those cases granted plenary review in the 2024 Term. It includes neither cases summarily decided nor those granted review in a previous Term and carried over to the 2024 Term. It does include cases granted review in the 2024 Term but carried over to a subsequent Term.

^g The number of petitions considered is calculated by adding the number of cases docketed in the 2024 Term to the number of cases carried over from prior Terms (reported as the number of cases remaining on the docket at the end of the 2023 Term, see Sup. Ct. of the U.S., Journal, October Term 2023, at II, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/Jnl23.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BVM-AHXR]), and subtracting the number of cases not acted upon in the 2024 Term and the original jurisdiction cases disposed of during the 2024 Term.

TABLE II (continued)

(C) Method of Disposition^h

On Reviewi	65
Summarily Decidedj	66
By Denial, Dismissal, or Withdrawal of Appeals or Petitions for Reviewk	3,890
Total	4,021

(D) Disposition of Cases Reviewed on Writ of Certiorari^l

	Reversedm		Vacatedn		Affirmed		Total
Full Opinions	31	(52.5%)	13	(35.2%)	15	(25.4%)	59
Memorandum Orders	0	(0.0%)	73	(100.0%)	0	(0.0%)	73
Total	31	(23.5%)	86	(65.2%)	15	(11.4%)	132

^h Table II(C) does not include cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction.

ⁱ This category encompasses all cases granted plenary review in the 2024 Term or a prior Term and disposed of during the 2024 Term. The total excludes cases granted review but carried over to a subsequent Term. This number includes writs dismissed after review was granted. The number is calculated by adding the total number of petitions for writs of certiorari and appeals granted by the Court to the number of cases available for argument at the end of the 2023 Term, and then subtracting the number of cases available for argument at the end of the 2024 Term.

^j This category includes cases summarily affirmed, reversed, or vacated.

^k This category consists primarily of dismissals of appeals and denials of petitions for certiorari. It also includes withdrawals of appeals and denials of other applications for review, such as petitions for writs of habeas corpus or mandamus. It is calculated by subtracting the number of cases disposed of on review and summarily decided from the total number of cases disposed of during the 2024 Term.

^l Table II(D) reports the disposition of cases reviewed on writ of certiorari and decided on the merits. It does not include the cases reviewed under other bases of jurisdiction.

^m This category includes cases reversed in part and affirmed in part, as well as cases reversed in part and vacated in part.

ⁿ This category includes cases vacated in part and affirmed in part.

TABLE II (continued)

(E) Origins of Cases and Their Dispositions^o

	Full Opinionsp			Memorandum Ordersq
	Reversed	Vacatedr	Affirmed	Reversed	Vacated	Affirmed	Total
Federal Courts	27	13	15	0	69	0	124
Circuit Courts	27	13	15	0	69	0	124
First	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Second	3	0	2	0	2	0	7
Third	1	0	1	0	2	0	4
Fourth	6	2	0	0	7	0	15
Fifth	5	4	3	0	11	0	23
Sixth	0	2	2	0	2	0	6
Seventh	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
Eighth	0	1	1	0	10	0	12
Ninth	3	0	0	0	4	0	7
Tenth	4	1	0	0	6	0	11
Eleventh	0	1	2	0	17	0	20
D.C.	2	1	2	0	6	0	11
Federal	2	0	1	0	2	0	5
District Courtss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Armed Forces	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
State Courts	3	0	0	0	4	0	7
Total	30	13	15	0	73	0	131

^o Table II(E) counts consolidated cases disposed of by the same lower court opinion as a single case. Table II(E) does not include original jurisdiction cases.

^p This section reports full opinions decided on the merits. It thus includes the two per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be counted as full opinions. See supra Table I, note a.

^q This category includes cases reversed in part and affirmed in part, as well as cases reversed in part and vacated in part.

^r This category includes cases vacated in part and affirmed in part.

^s This category includes statutorily authorized direct appeals from district courts.

TABLE III^a

Subject Matter of Dispositions with Full Opinions

		Principal Issue		Decisionb
	Total	Consti­tutional	Other	For Gov’t	Against Gov’t
Civil Actions from Inferior Federal Courts	47	10	37	18	14
Federal Government Litigation	24	4	20	13	8
Review of Administrative Action	15	2	13	7	6
Administrative Procedure Act	2	0	2	2	0
Clean Air Act	2	0	2	1	1
Clean Water Act	1	0	1	0	0
Food & Drug Administration	1	0	1	0	1
Immigration and Nationality Act	2	0	2	1	1
Medicare Act	1	0	1	1	0
National Enironmental Policy Act	1	0	1	0	0
Nondelegation Doctrine	1	1	0	1	0
Standing	1	1	0	0	1
Veterans’ Affairs/Benefits	3	0	3	1	2
Other Action by or Against the United States or Its Officers	8	2	6	5	2
Appointments Clause	1	1	0	1	0
Bankruptcy	1	0	1	1	0
Jurisdiction/Judicial Power	2	0	2	1	1
Taxation	1	0	1	1	0
State or Local Government Litigation	10	5	5	4	5
Americans with Disabilities Act	2	0	2	1	1
Attorney’s Fees	1	0	1	1	0
Civil Rights Act	1	0	1	1	0
First Amendment	2	2	0	1	1
Fourteenth Amendment	1	1	0	0	0
Section 1983	2	2	0	0	2
Title VII	1	0	1	0	1

^a Table III records the subject matter of dispositions by full opinion, including per curiam opinions on the merits containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. See supra Table I, note a.

^b “Government” refers to federal, state, or local government, or an agency thereof, or to an individual participating in the suit in an official capacity. A decision is counted as “for” the government if the government prevailed on all contested issues. When the federal government opposed a state or local government, a decision is counted as “for” the government if the federal government prevailed on all contested issues. When two states, two units of local government, or two federal agencies opposed each other, the decision is counted as neither “for” nor “against” the government. When the government prevailed on at least one but not all of the issues before the Court, a decision is counted as neither “for” nor “against” the government.

TABLE III (continued)

Subject Matter of Dispositions with Full Opinions

		Principal Issue		Decision
	Total	Consti­tutional	Other	For Gov’t	Against Gov’t
Private Litigation	13	1	12	—	—
Federal Question Jurisdiction	13	1	12	—	—
Due Process	1	1	0	—	—
ERISA	1	0	1	—	—
Fair Labor Standards Act	1	0	1	—	—
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure	2	0	2	—	—
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act	1	0	1	—	—
Hobbs Act	1	0	1	—	—
Lanham Act	1	0	1	—	—
Prison Litigation Reform Act	1	0	1	—	—
Religious Freedom Restoration Act	1	0	1	—	—
RICO	1	0	1	—	—
Telephone Consumer Protection Act	1	0	1	—	—
Federal Criminal Cases	5	0	5	2	3
Sentencing	3	0	3	1	2
Statutory Interpretation	2	0	2	1	1
Federal Habeas Corpus	2	1	1	1	1
AEDPA	1	1	0	0	1
Due Process	1	1	0	0	1

TABLE III (continued)

Subject Matter of Dispositions with Full Opinions

		Principal Issue		Decision
	Total	Consti­tutional	Other	For Gov’t	Against Gov’t
Civil Actions from State Courts	3	1	2	0	2
State or Local Government Litigation	2	1	1	0	2
First Amendment	1	1	0	0	1
Section 1983	1	0	1	0	1
Private Litigation	2	1	1	0	2
Supplemental Jurisdiction	1	0	1	—	—
State Criminal Cases	1	1	0	0	1
Due Process	1	1	0	0	1
Total	58	13	45	21	21

TABLE IV^a

(A) Dispositions of Applications for Emergency Relief^b

	Total Applications	Dispositionc			Unanimityd		Separate Writings
		Granted	Denied	Percentage Granted	Unanimous	Public Dissenting Votes	Concurrences	Dissents	Statements
Applications for Injunctive Reliefe	9	2	7	22.2%	6	5	0	3	0
Applications for Stays	84	14	70	16.7%	64	51	1	9	0
Applications for Stays (General)	50	12	38	24.0%	35	38	1	7	0
Applications for Stays of Executionf	31	1	30	3.2%	27	10	0	1	0
Applications for Stays of Injunction	1	1	0	100.0%	0	3	0	1	0
Applications for Stays of Mandate	2	0	2	0.0%	2	0	0	0	0
Applications to Vacate	11	3	7	30.0%	1	0	0	0	0
Applications to Vacate the Injunctiong	10	3	6	33.3%	0	0	0	0	0
Applications to Vacate Stays	1	0	1	0.0%	1	0	0	0	0
Applications to Vacate Stays of Execution	0	0	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0	0
Otherh	4	0	4	0.0%	3	3	0	0	0
Total	108	19	88	17.8%	75	59	1	12	0

^a This is the fifth year that The Statistics has included data on Applications for Emergency Relief. Monitoring this part of the Court’s docket will likely be useful for tracking how the types of applications and dispositions of applications change over time. It will also likely be useful for examining how the Justices’ actions on applications for emergency relief compare to their actions on the merits docket. For recent scholarship on the Court’s behavior relating to how it resolves applications for emergency relief, see generally William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1 (2015); Stephen I. Vladeck, Essay, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 123 (2019); and Michael Morley, Congressional Intent and the Shadow Docket, Harv. L. Rev. Blog (Jan. 24, 2020), https://harvardlawreview.org/blog/2020/01/congressional-intent-and-the-shadow-docket [https://perma.cc/8E6K-8Z8V]. See also House Committee on the Judiciary, The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, YouTube (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/live/oC1Vo-MJ9IQ?si=H-OOKGHjwLc53YFP [https://perma.cc/KY36-YZDH]; Press Release, Senate Judiciary Comm., Senate Judiciary Committee to Examine the Texas Abortion Ban and the Supreme Court’s Abuse of Its “Shadow Docket” (Sep. 3, 2021),

TABLE IV (continued)

https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/dem/releases/senate-judiciary-committee-to-examine-the-texas-abortion-ban-and-the-supreme-courts-abuse-of-its-shadow-docket [https://perma.cc/KMD5-JAGB].

As is the case for most of The Statistics, Table IV includes orders disposing of applications for emergency relief that are included in the Supreme Court Reporter. Because of the nature of how the Review defines the Court’s Term — beginning on the day after the Court releases its last full opinion of the prior Term and ending the day the Court releases its last full opinion in the current Term — cases in last Term’s Supreme Court Reporter sometimes are included in the current statistical term. To stay true to the statistical year, such cases are included.

These tables do not include orders relating to motions to proceed in forma pauperis, see, e.g., Borne v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 123 (2024) (mem.), petitions for rehearings, see, e.g., Lomax v. Colorado, 145 S. Ct. 409 (2024) (mem.), petitions for writs of habeas corpus, see, e.g., In re Dickey, 145 S. Ct. 409 (2024) (mem.), petitions for writs of mandamus, see, e.g., In re Stevenson, 145 S. Ct. 409 (2024) (mem.), or denials of petitions for writs of certiorari, see, e.g., Gross v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 414 (2024) (mem.). These tables also exclude in-chambers denials of applications because they are not reflected in the Supreme Court Reporter, as well as in-chambers dispositions of applications for emergency relief by individual Justices acting in their capacity as Circuit Justices. See Sup. Ct. R. 22.

Because Table IV relies on the Supreme Court Reporter, the tables in this section cannot account for and do not include “stealth” dissents. See, e.g., Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 14, 15 (2016) (statement of Roberts, C.J.) (mem.) (noting that he was providing a courtesy fifth vote to grant a stay in an order from which no Justices recused but only two Justices publicly dissented). Justices are counted as voting in favor of the relevant order’s disposition unless they explicitly dissented or voted to resolve the application on different grounds.

^b Table IV(A) records the number of applications by type. The table also records the number of applications granted and the number denied, as well as the percentage granted; the number of applications that were unanimous and the number that included public dissents; and the number of separate writings, including concurrences, dissents, and statements.

^c For the purposes of Table IV(A), if an application was granted at least in part, it is categorized as granted. If the Court treated an application for emergency relief as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment, and subsequently granted, vacated, and remanded the writ, the application is categorized as neither granted nor denied. If the Court deferred consideration of the application pending oral argument, the application is categorized as neither granted nor denied. Dispositions of consolidated applications are counted only once. The percentage granted is thus calculated by dividing the number of applications granted by the sum of the number of applications granted and denied, then multiplying by 100. This means that, in some instances, the sum of the number of applications granted and denied may be less than the total number of applications listed. Any such case is also included in any table that includes data related to memorandum decisions.

^d For the purposes of Table IV(A), a Justice is considered to have recorded a public dissenting vote whenever a Justice voted to dispose of a case in any manner different from that specified by the memorandum order.

^e This category includes applications for stay pending certiorari.

TABLE IV (continued)

^f Due to the expansion of The Statistics to include Table IV, the earlier Table II(F) — Dispositions of Applications for Stays of Execution — has been merged into Table IV(A). The method for collecting the data on applications for stays of execution has not changed. The granted, denied, and percentage granted columns in Table IV(A) can be used to compare yearly data to the data included in Table II(F) from its first appearance in Volume 121 to its last appearance in Volume 134.

This table treats multiple applications from the same person incarcerated on death row as a single application. This table includes only those dispositions that appear in the Supreme Court Reporter.

For useful background information on how the Court handles stays of execution, see generally Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court Practice §§ 18.1–.8, at 897–911 (9th ed. 2007); Sup. Ct. of the U.S., A Reporter’s Guide to Applications Pending Before the Supreme Court of the United States (2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MRP-RYAG]; and The Supreme Court, 2006 Term — The Statistics, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 436, 446 n.t (2007).

^g The category includes applications to vacate a temporary restraining order. See, e.g., Bessent v. Dellinger, 145 S. Ct. 515 (2025) (mem.).

^h This category includes three applications for a writ of injunction and an application to suspend the effect of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari. In previous years, this category has included applications to order the judgment forthwith, see, e.g., Comms. of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Trump, 141 S. Ct. 196 (2020) (mem.), and applications for interim relief, see, e.g., Gohmert v. Pence, 141 S. Ct. 972 (2021) (mem.). Additionally, applications relating to custody under Supreme Court Rule 36 would be included in this category. This form of relief has become dormant, in large part due to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3062, 3141–3150. However, it is still within the Court’s jurisdiction.

TABLE IV (continued)

(B1) Voting Alignments ⎯ All Ordersⁱ

		Roberts	Thomas	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan	Gorsuch	Kavanaugh	Barrett	Jackson
	O	—	101	100	91	97	101	104	105	89
	S	—	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roberts	D	—	101	100	91	97	101	104	105	89
	N	—	108	107	108	108	107	108	108	108
	P (%)	—	93.5	93.5	84.3	89.8	94.4	96.3	97.2	82.4
	O	101	—	101	85	91	99	102	100	83
	S	0	—	4	0	0	1	1	0	0
Thomas	D	101	—	103	85	91	100	103	100	83
	N	108	—	107	108	108	107	108	108	108
	P (%)	93.5	—	96.3	78.7	84.3	93.5	95.4	92.6	76.9
	O	100	101	—	85	90	99	101	99	83
	S	0	4	—	0	0	2	1	0	0
Alito	D	100	103	—	85	90	101	102	99	83
	N	107	107	—	107	107	106	107	107	107
	P (%)	93.5	96.3	—	79.4	84.1	95.3	92.5	77.6	85.2
	O	91	85	85	—	91	88	89	92	88
	S	0	0	0	—	4	0	0	1	7
Sotomayor	D	91	85	85	—	94	88	89	93	94
	N	108	108	107	—	108	107	107	108	108
	P (%)	84.3	78.7	79.4	—	87.0	82.2	82.4	86.1	87.0
	O	97	91	90	91	—	92	94	97	89
	S	0	0	0	4	—	0	0	1	5
Kagan	D	97	91	90	94	—	92	94	98	93
	N	108	108	107	108	—	107	108	108	108
	P (%)	89.8	84.3	84.1	87.0	—	86.0	87.0	90.7	86.1
	O	101	99	99	88	92	—	102	99	84
	S	0	1	2	0	0	—	1	0	0
Gorsuch	D	101	100	101	88	92	—	103	99	84
	N	107	107	106	107	107	—	107	107	107
	P (%)	94.4	93.5	95.3	82.1	86.0	—	93.5	95.4	78.5
	O	104	101	100	89	94	99	—	103	86
	S	0	1	1	0	0	2	—	0	0
Kavanaugh	D	104	102	102	89	94	100	—	103	86
	N	108	108	107	108	108	107	—	108	108
	P (%)	96.3	94.4	95.3	82.4	87.0	93.5	—	95.4	79.6
	O	105	100	99	92	99	100	103	—	89
	S	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	—	1
Barrett	D	105	100	99	93	99	100	103	—	90
	N	108	108	107	108	108	107	108	—	108
	P (%)	97.2	92.6	92.5	86.1	90.7	92.5	95.4	—	83.3
	O	89	83	83	89	89	84	86	89	—
	S	0	0	0	7	5	0	0	1	—
Jackson	D	89	83	83	94	93	84	86	90	—
	N	108	108	107	108	108	107	108	108	—
	P (%)	82.4	76.9	77.6	96.9	86.1	78.5	79.6	83.3	—

TABLE IV (continued)

(B2) Voting Alignments ⎯ Nonunanimous Orders^j

		Roberts	Thomas	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan	Gorsuch	Kavanaugh	Barrett	Jackson
	O	—	20	19	10	16	20	23	24	8
	S	—	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roberts	D	—	20	19	10	16	20	23	24	8
	N	—	27	26	27	27	27	27	27	27
	P (%)	—	74.1	73.1	37.0	59.3	74.1	85.2	88.9	29.6
	O	20	—	20	4	10	18	21	19	2
	S	0	—	2	0	0	1	1	0	0
Thomas	D	20	—	22	4	10	19	22	19	2
	N	27	—	26	27	27	27	27	27	27
	P (%)	74.1	—	84.6	14.8	37.0	70.4	81.5	70.4	7.4
	O	19	20	—	4	9	18	20	18	2
	S	0	2	—	0	0	2	1	0	0
Alito	D	19	22	—	4	9	20	21	18	2
	N	26	26	—	26	26	26	26	26	26
	P (%)	73.1	84.6	—	15.4	34.6	76.9	80.8	69.2	7.7
	O	10	4	4	—	10	7	8	11	7
	S	0	0	0	—	3	0	0	1	6
Sotomayor	D	10	4	4	—	13	7	8	12	13
	N	27	27	26	—	27	27	27	27	27
	P (%)	37.0	14.8	15.4	—	48.1	25.9	29.6	44.4	48.1
	O	16	10	9	10	—	11	13	16	8
	S	0	0	0	3	—	0	0	1	4
Kagan	D	16	10	9	13	—	11	13	17	12
	N	27	27	26	27	—	27	27	27	27
	P (%)	59.3	37.0	34.6	48.1	—	40.7	48.1	63.0	44.4
	O	20	18	18	7	11	—	19	19	4
	S	0	1	2	0	0	—	1	0	0
Gorsuch	D	20	19	20	7	11	—	20	19	4
	N	27	27	26	27	27	—	27	27	27
	P (%)	74.1	70.4	76.9	25.9	40.7	—	74.1	70.4	14.8
	O	23	21	20	8	13	19	—	22	5
	S	0	1	1	0	0	0	—	2	0
Kavanaugh	D	23	22	21	8	7	13	—	20	22
	N	27	27	26	27	27	27	—	27	27
	P (%)	85.2	81.5	80.8	25.9	48.1	74.1	81.5	—	18.5
	O	24	19	18	11	16	19	22	—	8
	S	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	—	1
Barrett	D	24	19	18	12	17	19	22	—	9
	N	27	27	26	27	27	27	27	—	27
	P (%)	88.9	70.4	69.2	44.4	63.0	70.4	81.5	—	33.3
	O	8	2	2	8	8	4	5	8	—
	S	0	0	0	6	4	0	0	1	—
Jackson	D	8	2	2	13	12	4	5	9	—
	N	27	27	26	27	27	27	27	27	—
	P (%)	29.6	7.4	7.7	48.1	44.4	14.8	18.5	33.3	—

TABLE IV (continued)

ⁱ Table IV(B1) records the frequency with which each Justice voted with each of the other Justices in the disposition of applications for emergency relief.

In Tables IV(B1) and IV(B2), “O” represents the number of decisions in which a particular pair of Justices agreed in an order disposing of an application for emergency relief. “S” represents the number of orders in which two Justices agreed in any writing separate from the memorandum order. Such separate opinions include concurrences, dissents, and “statements.” Justices who together joined more than one separate writing in a case are considered to have agreed only once. “D” represents the number of orders in which two Justices agreed in the disposition in the memorandum order, in any concurring or dissenting opinion, or in a separately written statement. An order is counted only once in the “D” category if two Justices did not dissent from a memorandum opinion and joined multiple separate concurrences. Thus, in some situations the “D” value will be less than the sum of the “O” and “S” values. “N” represents the number of opinions in which both Justices participated, and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. “P” represents the percentage of decisions in which one Justice agreed with another Justice either in the Court’s disposition or in a separate dissenting writing and is calculated by dividing the “D” value by the “N” value and multiplying the quotient by 100.

^j Like Table IV(B1), Table IV(B2) records the frequency with which each of the Justices voted with each other Justice in the disposition of applications for emergency relief, but Table IV(B2) records these voting alignments only for cases that were not unanimously decided. An order is considered unanimous for purposes of Table IV when all Justices would have resolved the case in the exact same way and where no Justice publicly dissented. Removing the unanimous cases produces lower rates of agreement overall, providing a more accurate picture of how the Justices voted in divisive cases.

TABLE IV (continued)

(C) Separate Writings of Individual Justices^k

	Concurrences	Dissents	Statements	Total
Roberts	0	0	0	0
Thomas	0	0	0	0
Alito	0	2	0	2
Sotomayor	0	1	0	1
Kagan	0	2	0	2
Gorsuch	1	3	0	4
Kavanaugh	1	0	0	1
Barrett	0	0	0	0
Jackson	0	8	0	8
Total	2	16	0	18

^k Table IV(C) records the number of times a Justice wrote separately in an order disposing of an application for emergency relief.