Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG
DOJ Approves T-Mobile/Sprint Merger Under DISH Network–Entry Theory.
Vol. 133 No. 2
Antitrust
Vertical Shareholding
Vol. 133 No. 2
Introduction A vigorous debate about the effects and legality of “horizontal shareholding” — when a common set of investors owns significant shares in corporations...
Apple Inc. v. Pepper
Vol. 133 No. 1
Antitrust standing doctrine has remained in uneasy repose since the Court’s decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, over four decades ago. Under Illinois...
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle
Ninth Circuit Holds Collective Bargaining Ordinance Not Entitled to State Action Immunity.
Vol. 132 No. 8
Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power
Vol. 132 No. 2
Recent research indicates that labor market power has contributed to wage inequality and economic stagnation. Although the antitrust laws prohibit firms from restricting competition...
FTC v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center
Third Circuit Clarifies Geographic Market Definition and Raises Bar for Efficiencies Defense.
Vol. 130 No. 6
On the Relevance of Market Power
Vol. 130 No. 5
Market power is the most important determinant of liability in competition law cases throughout the world. Yet fundamental questions on the relevance of market...
Antitrust Law is Not That Complicated
Responding to Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power
Response to On the Relevance of Market Power
Vol. 130 No. 5
Horizontal Shareholding
Vol. 129 No. 5
Horizontal shareholdings exist when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that are horizontal competitors in a product market. Economic models...
Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, and Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement with Professor Elhauge
Response to Horizontal Shareholding
Vol. 129 No. 5
More than a century ago, a loophole in the antitrust laws helped trigger a giant wave of industrial consolidation, by which rival manufacturing firms...