Property Articles 138 Harv. L. Rev. 1260

Waste, Property, and Useless Things

Response:


Download

Introduction

In 2020, Apple “agreed to pay up to $500 million” in a consumer-fraud lawsuit that alleged that it had issued a software update to intentionally slow down older phones.1 The suit alleged that the slowdown was intended to frustrate consumers into discarding their existing phones and purchasing new phones rather than simply replacing the phone battery.2

If the allegations in the suit were accurate, then Apple was engaged in a strategy of planned obsolescence.3 Planned obsolescence is a business strategy where a product is intentionally designed to have a limited lifespan and to become obsolete within a designated time frame.4 This strategy encourages (or in some cases, forces) consumers to replace their existing products with newer models, leading to repeat purchases and increased income for the manufacturer.5 In designing products to fail within a designated time frame, manufacturers are engaged in the mass production of intentionally useless objects.

Unsurprisingly, planned obsolescence strategies also generate enormous amounts of physical waste in the form of discarded objects.6 Electronic waste is one of the most harmful forms of this waste.7 Electronic waste is generated when consumers discard obsolete refrigerators, laptops, smartphones, gaming consoles, microwaves, cameras, printers, and so forth.8 These electronic objects contain toxic materials such as lead, mercury, cadmium, and brominated flame retardants that leach into the surrounding environment, poisoning water supplies and wildlife and posing grave risks to human health.9

Nearly sixty million tons of electronic waste is discarded annually, much of it produced by planned obsolescence, representing a substantial form of resource depletion.10 Intentionally useless objects require enormous amounts of energy and raw material, including rare and precious metals.11 As of 2019, electronic waste represented approximately sixty-two billion dollars’ worth of tangible raw materials (such as gold and other scarce metals) that have been intentionally rendered useless.12

Electronic waste also accounts for seventy percent of our toxic waste production.13 Only about twenty percent of electronic waste is recycled.14 The remaining eighty percent ends up in landfills and other waste repositories.15 Not only does this impose land use and other environmental costs, but it also imposes significant costs on human health, environmental justice, and community wellbeing.16

A great challenge posed by planned obsolescence is that most of the costs imposed by the practice are not borne by the manufacturers who profit from it.17 From the perspective of manufacturers, planned obsolescence is an extremely profitable strategy.18 In other words, planned obsolescence produces excessive negative externalities in the form of resource depletion and the proliferation of useless, toxic objects.19

To some degree, consumer protection law has attempted to address the issue (as evidenced by the Apple case), but consumer protection law has not succeeded in causing manufacturers to bear enough of the costs associated with planned obsolescence to disincentivize the practice.20 Legislation that specifically addresses planned obsolescence could potentially force manufacturers to internalize more of the social costs associated with the strategy.21 Indeed, the European Union has adopted a legislative model known as “extended producer responsibility” that requires manufacturers to take economic (and in some cases, physical) responsibility for the electronic waste generated by planned obsolescence.22 However, a successful legislative response to planned obsolescence has not been forthcoming in the United States.23 Fortunately, a legislative response is not the only means of correcting the negative externalities associated with planned obsolescence.

This Article demonstrates that common law property rules — as currently constituted and consistently applied — are capable of correcting some of the negative externalities of planned obsolescence. Property rules — when viewed through the lens of an antiwaste principle — limit manufacturers’ capacity to convey title to an object that has been intentionally rendered useless. When a manufacturer creates an object with an intentionally limited lifespan, the object has a defeasible condition24 built into the thing itself. Because the manufacturer has intentionally equipped the object with a utility time bomb, the manufacturer cannot convey title beyond the point in time of the planned obsolescence.

For example, if the object is a phone, it will only be a phone until the point of intentional obsolescence at which point it no longer functions as a phone and will transition into an intentionally useless object. In that scenario, the manufacturer cannot convey title to the phone in fee simple.25 Fee simple title means ownership of the object could potentially extend into infinity.26 It is impossible to own a phone indefinitely if it will — by design — cease existing as a functional phone within a predetermined period of time.27 Consequently, the manufacturer can only convey a defeasible title28: title until the intended obsolescence.29 Because the manufacturer can only convey a defeasible title, the manufacturer necessarily retains a reversionary interest30 in the object.31 The reversionary interest requires the manufacturer to assume responsibility for disposing of the intentionally useless object when it becomes obsolete.32

The idea that a fee simple cannot be conveyed in an object of planned obsolescence is consistent with property law’s broader commitment to an antiwaste principle.33 Antiwaste is a fundamental commitment of property law, although the relationship between common law property rules and antiwaste principles has been both misunderstood and undertheorized.34 In fact, many of the rules of property are rendered more coherent when we understand them as a series of instantiations of the Lockean imperative against waste.35 Often confused with a consequentialist efficiency imperative, the Lockean imperative against waste is a deontological proposition that it is wrong to intentionally (or negligently) destroy objects of property.36

Regardless of whether Locke gets this right (that is, whether the content of the proposition is true), this imperative against waste forms a central commitment of property doctrine as it is currently constituted.37 Central to the Lockean imperative against waste is the understanding that the right of ownership simply does not extend to the power to destroy.38 Insofar as we intentionally destroy an object, we lose the right to own it — and thereby the power to convey it.39

A consistent application of property law’s existing commitment to an antiwaste principle reveals that property law is already positioned to prompt manufacturers to bear more of the social costs of planned obsolescence. The existing rules of property, when consistently applied, prohibit the conveyance of a fee simple in an intentionally useless object.40 Applying the Lockean antiwaste imperative in this context would mean that manufacturers can only convey a defeasible interest in the object, retaining a reversionary interest that serves to correct some of the negative externalities associated with the strategy of planned obsolescence.

These arguments are presented in the following format. Part I of this piece offers an overview of the problem of intentionally useless objects. Part II describes the relationship between property law and the imperative against waste. Part III illuminates how a consistent application of property law’s preexisting commitment to the Lockean imperative against waste creates a reversionary interest in intentionally useless objects.

Continue Reading in the Full PDF


* Professor of Law at the University of Alabama School of Law. The author would like to
thank Dean Mark Brandon, whose support of this project made it possible. The author is also
thankful to Dean William Brewbaker, Paula Monopoli, and Shalini Ray for their support of this
project. The author is grateful for exceptionally helpful comments from Gregory Alexander, Lee
Fennell, Jason Gillmer, Luke Herrine, Paul Horwitz, Gordon Hull, Ronald Krotoszynski, Ela
Leshem, Brandi Lupo, Anna Mance, Timothy Mulvaney, Michael Pappas, Michael Pardo, Joseph
Singer, Tyler Valeska, Fredrick Vars, and participants in the 2024 Grey Fellows Forum at Stanford
Law School.

Footnotes
  1. ^ Jonathan Stempel, Apple to Pay up to $500 Million to Settle U.S. Lawsuit over Slow iPhones, Westlaw J. Class Action, Mar. 17, 2020, https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id82330aa62d211eaadfea82903531a62/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 [https://perma.cc/VQ83-F4G9].

    Return to citation ^
  2. ^ See Aaron Perzanowski, Consumer Perceptions of the Right to Repair, 96 Ind. L.J. 361, 367 (2021) (“Many bought new devices rather than simply replace their phone’s battery. Apple’s throttling and the secrecy surrounding it steered consumers away from repair and toward replacement, inflating Apple’s bottom line in the process.” (footnote omitted) (citing Adi Robertson, Apple Agrees to $500 Million Settlement for Throttling Older iPhones, The Verge (Mar. 2, 2020, 12:01 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/2/21161271/apple-settlement-500-million-throttling-batterygate-class-action-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/U35V-MPDU])).

    Return to citation ^
  3. ^ See Jeremy Bulow, An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence, 101 Q.J. Econ. 729, 729 (1986) (defining planned obsolescence as “the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases”).

    Return to citation ^
  4. ^ Shmuel I. Becher & Anne-Lise Sibony, Confronting Product Obsolescence, 27 Colum. J. Eur. L. 97, 101 (2021). There are at least five ways in which a product can be intentionally rendered obsolete, including: (1) planned obsolescence: the strategy by which companies strategize “for their product to become objectively useless after a certain period of time,” id.; (2) functional obsolescence: the practice of manufacturing products with lower quality components that are intended to fail or become outdated within a specific time frame, see id. at 102; (3) technological obsolescence: the phenomenon when advancements in technology make a functioning product undesirable, id. at 103; (4) postponement obsolescence: the decision by companies to only apply new features to their flagship devices, despite those features being compatible with existing devices, increasing consumer desire and waste, id. at 103–04; and (5) psychological obsolescence: the phenomenon where objects become subjectively undesirable due to marketing or other methods, id. at 104. For a history of planned obsolescence, see Kamila Pope, Understanding Planned Obsolescence: Unsustainability Through Production, Consumption and Waste Generation 9–42 (2017).

    Return to citation ^
  5. ^ Perzanowski, supra note 2, at 367.

    Return to citation ^
  6. ^ Joseph Guiltinan, Creative Destruction and Destructive Creations: Environmental Ethics and Planned Obsolescence, 89 J. Bus. Ethics (Special Issue) 19, 19 (2009) (“Today, the mounting numbers of functioning durable goods ending up in landfills have led to renewed criticism of product obsolescence.”).

    Return to citation ^
  7. ^ See id. (“[T]he rapid pace of product upgrading ha[s] resulted in negative environmental consequences for consumers and society.”).

    Return to citation ^
  8. ^ Faheem Gul Gilal et al., Consumer E‐Waste Disposal Behaviour: A Systematic Review and Research Agenda, 46 Int’l J. Consumer Stud. 1785, 1785 (2022) (describing commonly discarded e-waste).

    Return to citation ^
  9. ^ Soaring E-Waste Affects the Health of Millions of Children, WHO Warns, World Health Org. (June 15, 2021), https://www.who.int/news/item/15-06-2021-soaring-e-waste-affects-the-health-of-millions-of-children-who-warns [https://perma.cc/AA3V-JECE] (“‘With mounting volumes of production and disposal, the world faces . . . a mounting “tsunami of e-waste,” putting lives and health at risk.’ . . . As many as 12.9 million women are working in the informal waste sector, which potentially exposes them to toxic e-waste and puts them and their unborn children at risk. . . . [C]hildren live, go to school and play near e-waste recycling centres where high levels of toxic chemicals . . . can damage their intellectual abilities.” (quoting Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Preface to World Health Org., Children and Digital Dumpsites: E-Waste Exposure and Child Health, at vi–vii (2021))); Richard Grant, E-Waste Challenges in Cape Town: Opportunity for the Green Economy?, Urbani Izziv, Feb. 2019, at 5, 5 (describing e-waste as producing toxic substances such as “cadmium, mercury, lead, brominated flame retardants, or polychlorinated biphenyls . . . [that] pose environmental health risks from inhalation of toxic fumes as well as from accumulations of chemicals in soil, water, and food, particularly in the vicinities of unregulated landfills”).

    Return to citation ^
  10. ^ See Victoria Gill, Waste Electronics Will Weigh More than the Great Wall of China, BBC (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-58885143 [https://perma.cc/C3YL-4RHV]; Olivia Rosane, This Year’s E-Waste to Outweigh Great Wall of China, World Econ. F.: F. Institutional (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/10/2021-years-e-waste-outweigh-great-wall-of-china [https://perma.cc/9D6B-PMFN].

    Return to citation ^
  11. ^ See Tamar Makov & Colin Fitzpatrick, Is Repairability Enough? Big Data Insights into Smartphone Obsolescence and Consumer Interest in Repair, J. Cleaner Prod., Sept. 1, 2021, art. 127561, at 1 (“[E]ach [smartphone] makes use of over 75 different elements of the periodic table, many of which have very low recycling and recovery rates, including a variety of precious, critical, and conflict materials.” (citation omitted)).

    Return to citation ^
  12. ^ Gill, supra note 10 (“‘A tonne of discarded mobile phones is richer in gold than a tonne of gold ore,’ said Dr Ruediger Kuehr, director of the UN’s Sustainable Cycles (SCYCLE) programme.”).

    Return to citation ^
  13. ^ Ankit et al., Electronic Waste and Their Leachates Impact on Human Health and Environment: Global Ecological Threat and Management, Env’t Tech. & Innovation, Nov. 2021, art. 102049, at 2 (“Although e-waste occupies only 2%–5% of the total solid volume, it contributes more than 70% in terms of toxicity. The toxicants such as lead (Pb), chromium (Cr)[,] beryllium (Be), palladium (Pd), gallium (Ga) etc. contaminate our food chain by mixing in air, water and soil. When ingested, they cause several adverse health effects on the human body. Besides the harmful metals e-waste [is] also associated with several chemical pollutants like phthalate, esters benzene, dioxins, polyaromatic hydrocarbons, polyvinyl chloride, etc. that are hazardous not only for the humans directly but also to the plant, soil and microbial species found in the nearby area.” (citations omitted)).

    Return to citation ^
  14. ^ Seth Doane, The Tragic Cost of E-Waste and New Efforts to Recycle, CBS News (Nov. 26, 2023, 10:11 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-tragic-cost-of-e-waste-and-new-efforts-to-recycle [https://perma.cc/LAT5-4698]. Of the 20% of electronic waste that is recycled “50%–80% [is] shipped to third world nations where workers use dangerous, primitive processes for extracting recyclable materials, often exposing themselves to toxic gases in the process.” Guiltinan, supra note 6, at 19.

    Return to citation ^
  15. ^ See Guiltinan, supra note 6, at 19.

    Return to citation ^
  16. ^ Pope, supra note 4, at 76 (“[E]lectronic waste contain[s] high levels of persistent biological toxins (PBTs), ranging from arsenic to antimony, cadmium, beryllium, lead, nickel and zinc. When electronic waste is burned anywhere in the world, dioxins, furans and other pollutants are released into the air and land, with potentially disastrous consequences for health around the globe. When electronic waste is burned in landfills, PBTs eventually leak into the groundwater, causing contamination.” (citation omitted)); see also Joanna Diane Caytas, Legal Aspects of Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis in Sustainable Urban Development, 14 Consilience 71, 83 (2015) (“As a result of planned obsolescence, shiploads of electronic waste . . . are carried from industrialized countries to the Third World, creating vast environmental problems with grave consequences.”). Planned obsolescence also imposes both economic and annoyance costs on consumers who have to expend time, energy, and money to replace objects that are designed to fail. As Giles Slade (quoting Lewis Mumford) puts it, “No one is better off for having furniture that goes to pieces in a few years.” Giles Slade, Made to Break 79 (2006) (quoting Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization 394 (1934)).

    Return to citation ^
  17. ^ See Stijn van Ewijk & Julia Stegemann, An Introduction to Waste Management and Circular Economy 142 (2023) (“The cost of waste generation and management may not be reflected in prices — it is ‘external’ to the producer. For a long time, it was very cheap to landfill waste, despite the environmental impacts. When the price of landfill does not reflect its environmental cost, it is used excessively.”).

    Return to citation ^
  18. ^ Indeed, Professor Jospeh Guiltinan asserts that planned obsolescence has become a necessary strategy for competing in a durable goods market. He observes “advances in manufacturing practice that yield faster product cycles are now a defining force in business strategy. . . . [T]he existence of a highly competitive environment, combined with the fundamental economic motives for obsolescence . . . have created a sort of path-dependence for product development strategies geared toward faster replacement of durables.” Guiltinan, supra note 6, at 21–22.

    Return to citation ^
  19. ^ Press Release, United Nations Env’t Programme, UN Report: Time to Seize Opportunity, Tackle Challenge of E-Waste (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/un-report-time-seize-opportunity-tackle-challenge-e-waste [https://perma.cc/LQ8L-F3BZ] (“Less than 20% of e-waste is formally recycled, with 80% either ending up in landfill or being informally recycled — much of it by hand in developing countries, exposing workers to hazardous and carcinogenic substances such as mercury, lead and cadmium. E-waste in landfill contaminates soil and groundwater, putting food supply systems and water sources at risk.”).

    Return to citation ^
  20. ^ See generally Larry A. DiMatteo & Stefan Wrbka, Planned Obsolescence and Consumer Protection: The Unregulated Extended Warranty and Service Contract Industry, 28 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 483 (2019).

    Return to citation ^
  21. ^ One potential legislative approach would be to prohibit the practice directly as a form of consumer fraud, imposing a civil (or even criminal) penalty structure. France adopted this approach in 2016, defining planned obsolescence as “techniques by which the person who places a product on the market aims to deliberately reduce the lifespan of the product to increase its replacement rate.” Stefan Wrbka & Larry A. DiMatteo, Comparative Warranty Law: Case of Planned Obsolescence, 21 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 907, 916 (2019) (quoting Code de la Consommation [Consumer Code] art. L441-2 (Fr.)).

    Return to citation ^
  22. ^ Becher & Sibony, supra note 4, at 131–33 (“In 2013, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) was the first to link EPR with the fight against obsolescence, noting that ‘manufacturers should also cover the cost of recycling if their goods have an expected lifetime of less than five years.’” Id. at 132 (quoting European Economic and Social Committee Press Release CES/13/61, The EESC Calls for a Total Ban on Planned Obsolescence (Oct. 17, 2013))).

    Return to citation ^
  23. ^ Id. at 127 (“[In] the United States, there has been little interest in regulating planned obsolescence.”).

    Return to citation ^
  24. ^ For an explanation of the phrase “defeasible condition,” see infra note 28 and accompanying text.

    Return to citation ^
  25. ^ A “fee simple” is the most robust package of ownership rights with respect to an object, in that it is generally an unlimited estate that could potentially “endure forever.” Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 218 (8th ed. 2014).

    Return to citation ^
  26. ^ See 1 Gerry W. Beyer & James M. Kosakow, Irrevocable Trusts § 3:4 (4th ed. 2023) (“[T]he interest of the person holding the fee simple absolute goes inward to the center of the earth and outward to infinity . . . .”).

    Return to citation ^
  27. ^ See Guiltinan, supra note 6, at 20 (describing the practice of “death dating” and offering the example of portable radios, which carried a scheduled “death date” of three years after which time they would become intentionally useless objects); Slade, supra note 16, at 164.

    Return to citation ^
  28. ^ A defeasible title, or a “defeasible estate,” is a more limited form of ownership than a fee simple in that a defeasible estate will end if a particular condition comes to pass. See 1 Restatement (First) of Prop. § 16 cmt. b, at 43 (Am. L. Inst. 1936). An example of a defeasible estate might be: “Blackacre to A, until A goes to prison.” This conveyance would create a type of defeasible estate known as a “fee simple determinable,” and “going to prison” is a defeasible condition that could trigger the end of A’s estate. See id. § 44, at 121. In this example, O (the original owner and grantor of this estate) has a “reversionary interest” in the estate. If A goes to prison, Blackacre will automatically return to O, and O will be the owner in fee simple again. “Reversionary interest” is a broad term that roughly describes an interest retained by O in a conveyance. 1 Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Donative Transfers § 1.4 cmt. c, at 49 (Am. L. Inst. 1983) (“A reversionary interest is what remains in a transferor who owns a vested interest and has made a transfer that does not exhaust the transferor’s interest in the property transferred, so that an interest in the transferred property may return to the transferor at some future date.”). Here, O’s “reversionary interest” is technically a “possibility of reverter.” See Dukeminier et al., supra note 25, at 296. Other reversionary interests that can be retained by O include a “reversion” and a “right of entry.” Id. For a discussion of defeasible estates and their corresponding future interests, see 1 Restatement (First) of Prop. § 16, at 43 (Am. L. Inst. 1936): “An estate in fee simple defeasible is an estate in fee simple which is subject to a special limitation (defined in § 23), a condition subsequent (defined in § 24), an executory limitation (defined in § 25) or a combination of such restrictions.”

    Return to citation ^
  29. ^ This is both a descriptive point and a normative point. It describes an understanding of property law’s existing commitment to an antiwaste principle that disallows the destruction of property in the absence of use and enjoyment. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 249 (London, Awnsham Churchill 1690). Applying this preexisting commitment in the context of planned obsolescence compels this result. However, it is reasonable to also characterize this as a normative point: that the antiwaste principle should be recognized to extend to this context. Some scholars might question whether a defeasible interest can be created in personal property, given the restriction of numerus clausus. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 17–18 (2000) (“A number of standard reference works state that personal property is subject to the same elaborate structure of forms that applies to estates in land (including future interests). Yet the case law does not fully support this broad proposition. It is reasonably well established that one can create a life estate in personal property. But there are few if any cases that address the question of whether more exotic interests, such as defeasible fees and executory interests, can be created in personal property.” (footnotes omitted)). However, in terms of the values that are supported by the rule of numerus clausus (for example, controlling complexity, lowering information costs, increasing certainty, and so forth, see id. at 8), there is little (if any) difference between the creation of a life estate in personal property (which is well established by case law) and a defeasible estate in personal property given that the defining characteristic in each estate is a future interest created in someone other than the present interest holder. In fact, a defeasible interest may serve to better control complexity, lower information costs, and increase certainty as compared to a life estate given that the termination date of a life estate is inherently unknowable, while a defeasible condition could potentially arise at a predictable point in time. Without a contrary directive from the courts, it is reasonable to assume that estates that exist in real property likewise exist in personal property. See Meredith M. Render, The Law of the Body, 62 Emory L.J. 549, 563 (2013) (“[I]n real and personal property the principal forms of ownership interest are the fee simple, fee simple defeasible, life estate, and leasehold.”); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1355 (1936) (“A will may create a defeasible interest in personal property, meaning an interest subject to defeat by an executory bequest over on the happening of a future event or contingency.”).

    Return to citation ^
  30. ^ For a discussion of the phrase “reversionary interest,” see supra note 28.

    Return to citation ^
  31. ^ Technically, this conveyance is a fee simple determinable. The future interest that follows a fee simple determinable is a possibility of reverter. A possibility of reverter becomes immediately possessory when the triggering defeasible event occurs. See 14C Massachusetts Practice Series: Summary Of Basic Law § 14:15 (5th ed. 2023).

    Return to citation ^
  32. ^ Functionally, this is similar to the extended producer responsibility model. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

    Return to citation ^
  33. ^ See infra Part II, pp. 1274–305.

    Return to citation ^
  34. ^ See Tara K. Righetti & Joseph A. Schremmer, Waste and the Governance of Private and Public Property, 93 U. Colo. L. Rev. 609, 611–13 (2022) (identifying a waste principle in property law and noting that “[f]ew scholars have devoted careful attention to the details of the [waste] doctrine’s different manifestations,” id. at 612).

    Return to citation ^
  35. ^ See Locke, supra note 29, at 249; Gordon Hull, Clearing the Rubbish: Locke, The Waste Proviso, and the Moral Justification of Intellectual Property, 23 Pub. Affs. Q. 67, 68–69 (2009) (claiming that Locke believed that “we are to strive for the optimal productive use of the resources given [to] us,” id. at 68).

    Return to citation ^
  36. ^ Locke, supra note 29, at 249 (“But how far has he given it us, to enjoy? As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.”).

    Return to citation ^
  37. ^ See infra section II.A, pp. 1275–89.

    Return to citation ^
  38. ^ Locke, supra note 29, at 249 (describing that ownership of property only goes as far as “one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils” and emphasizing that the right of ownership does not extend to the right “to spoil or destroy”).

    Return to citation ^
  39. ^ The right to convey is itself an ownership interest (or the right of a fiduciary acting on behalf of an owner) such that we cannot convey what we do not own. 5 Restatement (Fourth) of Prop. § 4.3 cmt. a (Am . L. Inst., Tentative Draft No. 5, 2024) (“[T]he grantor who owns the property is usually also the person with the authority to convey. Yet the owner may not have the power to convey, or the power to convey an interest may be held by a different person than the owner or possessor.”).

    Return to citation ^
  40. ^ See infra Part III, pp. 1305–15.

    Return to citation ^