Fourth Amendment Book Review 139 Harv. L. Rev. 914

Fourth Amendment Equilibrium Adjustment in an Age of Technological Upheaval


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Introduction

The Digital Fourth Amendment is written by Professor Orin Kerr, one of the country’s foremost authorities on the Fourth Amendment, electronic privacy, and criminal procedure.1 Kerr’s work has been deeply influential in shaping how courts are looking at and deciding issues raised by law enforcement’s powerful and novel capabilities, thanks to technological changes.2 He has written “more than 80 law review articles, more than half of which have been cited in judicial opinions, including eight articles referenced in U.S. Supreme Court decisions.”3

While Kerr started his career at the Department of Justice, it would be inaccurate to say that he brings a strictly pro–law enforcement attitude to the conversation. Kerr knows that technology has generally been a boon for law enforcement and has put the public’s privacy rights at a disadvantage (p. 39). The primary purpose of his book is to argue that courts should interpret the Fourth Amendment to account for this shift in the balance of power (p. 42). In several of his recommendations, Kerr would adopt stronger constitutional protections, even when this position would disadvantage law enforcement compared to the current status quo.4 He has provided model briefs for defendants seeking to suppress social-media evidence that the government forced providers to copy and preserve without first getting a warrant.5 And he has sometimes sided with defendants in criminal cases.6 His work is cautious and conservative (p. 43),7 and courts respect that, regardless of which side of the “v” Kerr’s name appears on.

While Kerr got his start in law enforcement, I spent my first nine years out of law school as a criminal defense lawyer in San Francisco. Most mornings I was at the City’s Hall of Justice, an “austere” building from the outside,8 yet inside teeming with people confronting the worst moments of their lives, and the lawyers who are supposed to help them. I got to see the Fourth Amendment at work, and I was not impressed. A police officer justified a warrantless search, testifying “he said I could look in his pockets,” as the man sitting at the defendant’s table vigorously shook his head “no.” Officers conducted a warrantless search of a car with a drug-sniffing dog,9 and found several kilos of cocaine, after the driver was stopped for “excessive honking” at a vehicle blocking the entryway to a housing complex he was visiting. That vehicle? The police put it there.

At the time, the internet was relatively new, and I left criminal defense work to help develop Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society, thinking “this new technology gives society a chance to start afresh and do a better job.”

Today, I am an ACLU lawyer with the national office’s Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project.10 As you might imagine, the cutting-edge privacy issues we work on substantially overlap with Kerr’s Fourth Amendment scholarship. When Kerr agrees with our positions, we are always delighted to have him as an ally before the court.

More often though, we disagree, collegially.11 As experts, he and I are often both invited to conferences to speak on novel privacy-and-technology issues. I have debated Orin so many times on so many panels at so many conferences,12 and then had a glass of wine with him afterward; I consider him an out-of-the-court friend.

The Digital Fourth Amendment takes on a topic that judges struggle with every day. Law enforcement has embraced powerful surveillance technologies that enable investigations that could never have taken place as little as twenty years ago (p. 2). Courts must decide whether and how to allow the government to use these powerful tools (pp. 3–4). Searches and seizures of data from computers, cell phones, and online accounts also raise complicated questions about the appropriate role of the Fourth Amendment in protecting the vast amount of data that we generate in our daily lives.

Kerr tackles these questions with characteristic clarity and persuasiveness. His writing is lively and can successfully be understood by lay people. Make no mistake, though: It is valuable and important for experts, too. Search warrants for electronic information are commonplace.13 Only law enforcement is in the room, these processes are often sealed, and most of them stay secret forever.14 The absence of published judicial decisions means conversations among scholars and advocates — such as those presented in Kerr’s book (and in book reviews like this one) — are critical to public understanding and democratic decision-making regarding difficult privacy questions.

In Part I of this Review, I describe the observations Kerr makes in his book, focusing on his original theory of “equilibrium-adjustment” (original both in the sense that Kerr identified and named it, and in that it is connected with the interpretive theory of constitutional originalism). Kerr argues that equilibrium adjustment is the proper framework in which to consider the Fourth Amendment in connection with novel surveillance techniques in our digital and online world, and I generally agree with him. In Part II, I review some criticisms of equilibrium adjustment as a theory. In Part III, I describe and criticize15 Kerr’s application of equilibrium adjustment to some specific challenges, including searches of electronic devices and metadata, geofence searches, mosaic theory, and border searches. Overall, The Digital Fourth Amendment should cement Kerr’s reputation as one of the country’s most scholarly authorities in this field. Also, sometimes he gets things wrong.

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Footnotes
  1. ^ Orin S. Kerr to Deliver Doyle-Winter Lecture, Yale L. Sch. (Mar. 12, 2024), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/orin-s-kerr-deliver-doyle-winter-lecture [https://perma.cc/6RZH-SCPV] (describing Kerr’s reputation in the legal academy).

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  2. ^ Monica Schreiber, Influential Criminal Procedure and Computer Crime Scholar Joins Stanford Law School Faculty, Stan. L. Sch. (Jan. 8, 2025), https://law.stanford.edu/press/influential-criminal-procedure-and-computer-crime-scholar-joins-stanford-law-school-faculty [https://perma.cc/AKY2-W65J].

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  3. ^ Id. Those Supreme Court decisions are United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 816 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, New Technologies]); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (citing Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 403, 404–05 (2013)); Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 258 (2016) (citing Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 Geo. L.J. 1077, 1099 (2011)); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2233 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 476, 512–17 (2011) [hereinafter Kerr, EA Theory]); id. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 113 (2015)); id. at 2245–46 (citing Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 504–05 (2007)); id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561, 563 n.5, 564 (2009)); Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1652 (2021) (citing Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1596, 1605–13 (2003)).

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  4. ^ Such proposals include use restrictions on nonresponsive data obtained during the search of an electronic device (pp. 101–10), a warrant requirement for searches of electronic devices at the border (pp. 114–29), and classifying data copying as a Fourth Amendment–regulated seizure (pp. 83–88).

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  5. ^ Orin S. Kerr, Updated Model Motion to Suppress for Unlawful Internet Preservation, Reason: Volokh Conspiracy (Mar. 1, 2023, at 03:37 ET), https://reason.com/volokh/2023/03/01/updated-model-motion-to-suppress-for-unlawful-internet-preservation [https://perma.cc/86FX-LE85].

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  6. ^ For two such cases that involve interpretations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, see Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1–2, Van Buren, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (No. 19-783), and United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (serving as pro bono defense counsel). Kerr also argued before the Supreme Court in a righteous but ultimately unsuccessful representation of the defendant in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011). See id. at 232 (rejecting Kerr’s argument and instead holding that evidence obtained in a search reliant on appellate precedent is not subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule, even if that precedent is later overruled); see also Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010–2011 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 237, 237, 255–56 (2011) (discussing Davis and suggesting that development of Fourth Amendment law requires more robust remedies to provide incentives to litigate claims).

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  7. ^ The author describes his equilibrium-adjustment theory as “a small-c conservative approach” and cites with approval English philosopher Michael Oakeshott’s 1956 essay preferring “small and limited innovations to large and indefinite ones” (p. 43) (quoting Michael Oakeshott, On Being Conservative, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays 407, 412 (1991)). See generally Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 3, at 805 (opining that courts applying the Fourth Amendment to developing technologies should be cautious and modest until the technology stabilizes).

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  8. ^ San Francisco Hall of Justice Replacement Project, VerPlanck Historic Pres. Consulting, https://www.verplanckconsulting.com/sf-hall-of-justice-replacement-project.html [https://perma.cc/CH8Z-NLNZ] (describing the building as “austere, granite-clad” and now “functionally obsolete and vulnerable to seismic activity”).

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  9. ^ See generally Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding canine inspection of an automobile during a legal traffic stop “does not implicate legitimate privacy interests”).

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  10. ^ Jennifer Stisa Granick, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/bio/jennifer-stisa-granick [https://perma.cc/FMJ3-8V4B].

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  11. ^ For example, Kerr is always gracious about publishing the ACLU’s point of view on his blog (reserving the right to rebuttal, of course). See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fifth Circuit Shuts Down Geofence Warrants — And Maybe a Lot More, Reason: Volokh Conspiracy (Aug. 13, 2024, at 05:28 ET), https://reason.com/volokh/2024/08/13/fifth-circuit-shuts-down-geofence-warrants-and-maybe-a-lot-more [https://perma.cc/KW8A-CQ2U] (criticizing in a blog post the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Smith, 110 F.4th 817 (5th Cir. 2024), holding that “geofence,” or reverse location search warrants violate the Fourth Amendment); Orin S. Kerr, The ACLU’s Response to My Post on the Fifth Circuit’s Smith Ruling — And My Reply to the ACLU, Reason: Volokh Conspiracy (Aug. 16, 2024, at 04:30 ET), https://reason.com/volokh/2024/08/16/the-aclus-response-to-my-post-on-the-fifth-circuits-smith-ruling-and-my-reply-to-the-aclu [https://perma.cc/V7KM-F4CV]. For my personal disagreements with Kerr over the years, see, for example, Orin Kerr, Debate: Metadata and the Fourth Amendment — A Reply to Jennifer Granick, Just Sec. (Sep. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Kerr, Debate: Metadata and the Fourth Amendment], https://www.justsecurity.org/1009/debate-metadatafourth-amendment-reply-jennifer-granick [https://perma.cc/9378-3UMK]; Jennifer Granick, With the CFAA, Law and Justice Are Not the Same: A Response to Orin Kerr, Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y (Jan. 15, 2013, at 01:55 PT), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/cfaa-law-and-justice-are-not-same-response-orin-kerr [https://perma.cc/BVT6-JKF3].

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  12. ^ Some recent examples include the Second Circuit Judicial Conference in June 2024, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference in May 2025, the Sixth Circuit Judicial Conference in September 2023, and the Federal Judicial Center’s Search and Surveillance Warrants Workshop in September 2024.

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  13. ^ See United States of America, Meta: Transparency Ctr., https://transparency.meta.com/reports/government-data-requests/country/US [https://perma.cc/XS6Z-7PVR] (reporting that Meta received 35,617 U.S. search warrants requesting user data from January to June 2025).

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  14. ^ Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade, 3 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 177, 209–12 (2009) (finding that over 90% of electronic surveillance orders issued from 1995–2007 by Houston magistrate judges remain sealed, and that the annual number of sealed search warrants had nearly tripled between 2001 and 2007); Jennifer Stisa Granick, Let the Sun Shine in: WaPo Story on the Magistrates’ Revolt, Just Sec. (Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/9873/wapo-story-magistrates-revolt [https://perma.cc/Z3EL-URWK] (noting that privacy rights associated with electronic data are defined in sealed proceedings and that, in the mid-2000s, some magistrate judges started to publish opinions so that other judges could assess whether the government’s unopposed ex parte legal analysis was reliable).

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  15. ^ I recognize it is easier to critique than to offer something better. My working theory of the Fourth Amendment over the past thirty-three years as a constitutional litigator has boiled down to this test: “Is it something the judge can imagine happening to her and her not liking it?”

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