Being poor in America is taxing. For decades, claimants seeking assistance from social support programs have navigated bureaucratic processes and endured significant delays.1 In the heyday of the “due process revolution,”2 the Supreme Court took on a robust role in superintending welfare administration to safeguard beneficiaries’ access to social services.3 But today, the Court has increasingly absented itself from contests over social welfare.4 The Court’s retreat has occurred against the backdrop of the adoption of procedural barriers at the federal and state levels that can place benefits out of reach for lower-income Americans.5 In an extreme formulation, a state may refuse to facilitate the welfare claims process entirely, while foreclosing action-forcing litigation through Kafkaesque jurisdictional roadblocks.6 In Williams v. Reed,7 the Supreme Court struck down that very system, holding that Alabama’s administrative exhaustion requirement could not bar claimants from filing lawsuits under § 19838 challenging delays in the State’s unemployment compensation system.9 In so doing, the Court implicitly nodded to due process values but declined to involve due process doctrine directly, instead resting its holding on jurisdictional grounds.10 By adopting the mood but not the language of due process, the Court missed an opportunity to reaffirm the jurisprudence of procedural due process in the welfare state at a time of continued need.11
Under Alabama’s unemployment compensation regime, an individual who files a benefits claim is entitled to a “prompt[]” determination accompanied by a reasoned explanation.12 The claimant can seek review of an initial determination in an appeals tribunal13 or before the Alabama Department of Labor’s board of appeals.14 Regardless of the forum chosen, the claimant will “promptly” receive notice of the outcome of their appeal and an explanation of the adjudicator’s decision.15 Federal law independently requires Alabama to establish systems to resolve unemployment benefits claims in a timely manner.16 The Alabama Code contains an administrative exhaustion requirement that precludes claimants from challenging a “decision allowing or disallowing a claim for benefits” until their claim has wound its way through the Department’s internal procedures.17
In 2022, twenty-six Alabamians filed a lawsuit against Alabama Secretary of Labor Fitzgerald Washington and the State’s Department of Labor in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County,18 alleging that the Secretary had failed to process their unemployment benefits claims in a timely manner — or, in some cases, to facilitate the process at all.19 According to the plaintiffs, the State had ignored claimants’ requests;20 effected “interminable delays” when making benefits determinations;21 allowed appeals to languish for years;22 denied claims without justification;23 and provided claimants with insufficient notice.24 The plaintiffs sued under § 1983,25 alleging that the Secretary’s refusal to facilitate the benefits administration process violated the Social Security Act26 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.27
The circuit court granted Secretary Washington’s motion to dismiss without stating the legal grounds for its dismissal.28 The plaintiffs appealed.29
The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.30 Writing for the majority, Justice Mitchell’s opinion31 held that Alabama’s exhaustion requirement deprived the State’s courts of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ claims.32 The court reasoned that the State had furnished its administrative tribunals with “the exclusive authority” to address both “procedural challenges” and substantive claims regarding the administration of unemployment benefits.33 Justice Mitchell then rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents had restricted states’ ability to require exhaustion as a prerequisite to bringing § 1983 lawsuits.34 The majority reasoned that any federal preemption under § 1983 would apply only in federal courts, leaving state courts’ jurisdiction unaffected.35
Justice Sellers concurred specially36 to contend that even where a statute has not “expressly conditioned [state court] jurisdiction upon the exhaustion of administrative remedies,”37 courts should give effect to administrative exhaustion requirements “as a ‘judicially imposed prudential limitation.’”38 Such requirements, he asserted, serve the interests of judicial economy and deference to the subject matter expertise of administrative agencies.39
Justice Cook dissented.40 He began by noting that the text of the exhaustion requirement covers “decision[s] allowing or disallowing a claim for benefits.”41 And because the plaintiffs’ claims had been ignored outright, there was no “decision” to which the administrative exhaustion regime could attach.42 On preemption, Justice Cook contended that U.S. Supreme Court precedent forbids a state court from applying an exhaustion requirement to preclude an action under § 1983, especially absent a clear statement stripping the state courts of jurisdiction.43 Finding no such clear statement, Justice Cook questioned the statute’s ability to “overrid[e]” the Supreme Court’s word.44 Justice Cook further concluded that “the basic principles of due process warrant relief” in light of the plaintiffs’ “troubling” allegations of procedural impropriety.45
The Supreme Court reversed.46 Writing for the Court,47 Justice Kavanaugh held that where application of an exhaustion requirement effectively bars § 1983 suits challenging administrative delays, state courts may not reject a claim on the basis of a failure to exhaust the administrative process.48 Justice Kavanaugh pointed to precedent holding that states cannot “immuniz[e] state officials” from federal civil rights lawsuits, even when such suits are brought in state courts.49 Applying that principle, the majority reasoned that Alabama sought to do just that.50 By barring litigants from challenging administrative delays in its unemployment compensation scheme until after the administrative process had run its course, Alabama had made it so claimants “can never challenge delays in the administrative process,” functionally immunizing its agents from § 1983 liability.51
Justice Kavanaugh then responded to claims raised by the State and the dissent. The majority rebuffed Alabama’s argument that the jurisdictional character of its exhaustion requirement rendered the preemption inquiry distinct,52 responding that the Court “ha[d] not treated the jurisdictional label of state rules as dispositive” when statutes “functionally immunize defendants from a class of § 1983 claims in state court.”53 And Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that the plaintiffs need not have sought mandamus relief before suing under § 1983, given that mandamus may not have been available and that imposing such an obligation could raise mootness concerns.54 In closing, the Court noted that it “resolve[d] this dispute but [wa]s careful not to go beyond this Court’s existing precedents,”55 and reserved the question of whether its prior holdings imposed a per se bar on state and federal courts’ ability to reject § 1983 suits on failure-to-exhaust grounds.56 The Court also declined to offer a position as to whether the delays in Alabama’s “administrative process violated [the plaintiffs’] due process and statutory rights.”57
Justice Thomas dissented.58 Writing only for himself in Part I, Justice Thomas asserted that states can generally deprive their courts of jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law, with the possible exception of instances implicating federal preemption.59 Justice Thomas contended that § 1983 could not preempt Alabama’s exhaustion requirement because the plaintiffs could have litigated their claims in federal court.60 After recommending that the Court set aside “demonstrably erroneous” preemption precedents,61 Justice Thomas suggested that the “[p]etitioners’ suit implicates other precedents that may not withstand scrutiny,” pointing specifically to the Court’s landmark procedural due process case and questioning whether § 1983 provides a cause of action.62 Continuing in Part II for a four-justice minority,63 Justice Thomas contended that Alabama’s exhaustion requirement did not fall within any of the established categories limiting states’ authority to restrict their courts’ jurisdiction over federal causes of action.64 Thus, the Supreme Court “ha[d] no authority to interfere with Alabama’s choice” to limit state court jurisdiction over unemployment benefits claims through its exhaustion requirement.65
By adopting the mood but not the language of due process, the Williams majority gave voice to due process intuitions but missed an opportunity to reaffirm the doctrine itself. In a past age, the Court recognized that the economic precarity of welfare recipients and foundational constitutional principles demanded robust protection from arbitrary deprivation.66 Today, the Court steps back. Granted, Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion invoked the rhetoric of due process,67 and eight Justices refused to join Justice Thomas’s invitation to overturn the Court’s foundational welfare rights case.68 But the Williams Court’s rhetorical invocation, rather than outright expression, of due process left much to be desired. The Court cast due process as relevant only to the merits of the plaintiffs’ suit,69 while failing to consider how the Due Process Clause’s obligations might apply to the State’s administrative exhaustion requirement itself.70 And the majority met Justice Thomas’s broadside with silence, missing an opportunity to reaffirm the continued validity of the doctrine.71 By hanging its hat on a jurisdictional holding about the impropriety of an “immunity rule”72 and offering nothing more,73 the Court adopted due process intuitions but failed to reinforce its doctrinal relevance, with consequences for the Court’s ability to ensure that its due process jurisprudence meets the moment.
In the heyday of the “due process revolution,”74 the Court constructed an expansive view of the procedural protections that a welfare beneficiary is owed when the state curtails access to social support.75 In Goldberg v. Kelly,76 the Court constitutionalized Professor Charles Reich’s articulation of the due process values at stake when the state deprives an individual of their means of survival77 by requiring that administrators provide meaningful process before revoking welfare entitlements.78 Six years later, in Mathews v. Eldridge,79 the Court granted jurisdictions more leeway in structuring their welfare administration regimes.80 The Mathews Court adopted a balancing test that evaluates the constitutionality of an administrative procedure by weighing the beneficiaries’ needs alongside the government’s interests.81 Mathews is considered the Court’s “leading procedural due process case,”82 and courts have consistently relied on Goldberg for the principle that beneficiaries have a property interest in welfare protected by the Due Process Clause.83 These cases, and their progeny, form the heartland of the procedural due process doctrine.84
Alabama’s administrative exhaustion requirement posed a direct challenge to Goldberg and Mathews. By creating a “catch-22” wherein claimants could be denied access to benefits and barred from suing to challenge the State’s inaction,85 Alabama’s scheme may have blocked eligible beneficiaries from receiving entitlements to which they have a property interest under Goldberg and Mathews.86 By denying the plaintiffs any “opportunity to be heard”87 through either administrative hearings88 or litigation, Alabama’s system replicated practices that the Justices had condemned in Goldberg89 and struck at the fundamental “right of access to the courts” found in the Due Process Clause.90 The Mathews Court indicated that courts should consider a claimant’s interests even at the jurisdictional stage when it allowed Mr. Eldridge to mount a constitutional challenge despite his admitted failure to exhaust.91 And Goldberg’s concern — that “termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits”92 — was at its zenith in Williams, where the plaintiffs experienced pronounced financial hardship while awaiting relief.93 Thus, while the Court was correct in holding that Alabama’s exhaustion requirement was “an immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb,”94 the State’s regime also ran afoul of due process.95
Perhaps the Court could be praised for going no further than necessary. The parties did not frame the exhaustion requirement as a due process issue in their briefing96 — although, to be sure, Justice Thomas put due process on the majority’s radar.97 And the majority’s refusal to invoke the Due Process Clause in settling a question that could be resolved on purely jurisdictional grounds aligns with principles of constitutional avoidance98 and the demand for judicial minimalism99 that several Justices have recently reemphasized.100 But the Williams Court’s oversight, in a case falling in the heartland of due process, represents a missed opportunity to reaffirm the doctrine for two key reasons.
First, mounting threats to procedural due process warranted an unflinching modern statement reaffirming its legitimacy, but the majority responded with subtler undertones. Justice Thomas put Goldberg in his crosshairs, using his dissent as an opportunity to lay the groundwork for the case’s reversal.101 And in multiple cases decided later in the 2024 Term, Justice Thomas cited his Williams dissent in casting Goldberg as a “radical redefinition of ‘property’”102 and an “abandonment of the Due Process Clause’s original meaning.”103 The majority’s apparent hesitancy to assert the continued validity of procedural due process in the face of direct opposition leaves open the prospect that lower courts may interpret silence as doctrinal uncertainty.104 As Professors Curtis Bradley and Tara Leigh Grove describe, the Court signals that a prior decision is “disfavored” when the Justices “make disparaging statements about a precedent”105 or “simply ignore a precedent — by failing to rely on it in cases where it would seem by its terms to apply.”106 Both conditions appear present in Williams.107 And in a manifestation of another warning sign described by Bradley and Grove,108 several Justices have authored separate writings advancing narrow constructions of Mathews in recent cases involving state conduct likely to impose disproportionate burdens on the poor.109 Accordingly, lower courts seeking to read the Supreme Court’s tea leaves may wonder whether the Court is still willing to apply Goldberg and Mathews as expansively as it has in years prior.110
Second, the Williams Court’s due process minimalism is part and parcel of the Court’s overarching retreat from safeguarding the rights of the poor at a time when judicial supervision is no less necessary. As Professor Karen Tani has documented, in the decades since the “due process revolution,” the Court has narrowed the substantive and procedural avenues through which welfare beneficiaries may seek relief from the judiciary.111 As a result, welfare recipients have been increasingly underrepresented on the Court’s docket,112 and cases implicating poverty law have seen notable recent losses entrenching need and deprivation.113 Williams is a reminder that as states continue to restrict access to social services in novel ways, vigorous enforcement of procedural due process remains a necessary safeguard against arbitrary deprivation. But the Court has failed to keep pace.
What’s more, the need for a robust vision of procedural due process in the welfare state may be even greater in the years to come. The Kafkaesque barriers experienced by the Williams plaintiffs are not limited to Alabama and have been exacerbated by recent technological changes.114 With the political branches cutting back core social welfare programs115 and sharply reducing staff levels in agencies that manage benefits administration,116 Goldberg’s worry117 could come to fruition, as individuals struggling to make ends meet can hardly be expected to navigate the complex and time-intensive welfare bureaucracy.118 Thus, classwide impact litigation may be the only realistic means by which a poor individual could preserve access to basic means of survival.119 However, such avenues become less appealing if courts are doctrinally constrained in their ability to entertain cases brought by welfare beneficiaries120 or enforce a robust vision of procedural due process. A due process holding in Williams could have opened the door to innovative litigation challenging these barriers. But if the Court refuses to apply the procedural due process doctrine to modern challenges, the doctrine will stagnate where it could have flourished.
Not long ago, welfare beneficiaries could expect courts to assess their claims under a framework that considers the weighty interests at stake for those who depend on the welfare state.121 Now, litigants can hope that reviewing courts will at least shade their analysis with due process values, as Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion did.122 But the Williams Court’s adoption of the tenor of due process while opting for a narrow jurisdictional holding represents a missed opportunity. And the Court’s due process minimalism may be especially consequential in an era in which the judiciary may be the only backstop against governmental efforts to restrict the reach of programs that help poor Americans “meet[] the basic demands of subsistence.”123 As Justice Brennan reflected in Goldberg, “[w]e have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty”124 — a sentiment that rings true in our modern era of instability. The Court can choose to amplify those forces or stem their tide. It remains to be seen which path it will take.