Introduction
In 2020, Apple “agreed to pay up to $500 million” in a consumer-fraud lawsuit that alleged that it had issued a software update to intentionally slow down older phones.1 The suit alleged that the slowdown was intended to frustrate consumers into discarding their existing phones and purchasing new phones rather than simply replacing the phone battery.2
If the allegations in the suit were accurate, then Apple was engaged in a strategy of planned obsolescence.3 Planned obsolescence is a business strategy where a product is intentionally designed to have a limited lifespan and to become obsolete within a designated time frame.4 This strategy encourages (or in some cases, forces) consumers to replace their existing products with newer models, leading to repeat purchases and increased income for the manufacturer.5 In designing products to fail within a designated time frame, manufacturers are engaged in the mass production of intentionally useless objects.
Unsurprisingly, planned obsolescence strategies also generate enormous amounts of physical waste in the form of discarded objects.6 Electronic waste is one of the most harmful forms of this waste.7 Electronic waste is generated when consumers discard obsolete refrigerators, laptops, smartphones, gaming consoles, microwaves, cameras, printers, and so forth.8 These electronic objects contain toxic materials such as lead, mercury, cadmium, and brominated flame retardants that leach into the surrounding environment, poisoning water supplies and wildlife and posing grave risks to human health.9
Nearly sixty million tons of electronic waste is discarded annually, much of it produced by planned obsolescence, representing a substantial form of resource depletion.10 Intentionally useless objects require enormous amounts of energy and raw material, including rare and precious metals.11 As of 2019, electronic waste represented approximately sixty-two billion dollars’ worth of tangible raw materials (such as gold and other scarce metals) that have been intentionally rendered useless.12
Electronic waste also accounts for seventy percent of our toxic waste production.13 Only about twenty percent of electronic waste is recycled.14 The remaining eighty percent ends up in landfills and other waste repositories.15 Not only does this impose land use and other environmental costs, but it also imposes significant costs on human health, environmental justice, and community wellbeing.16
A great challenge posed by planned obsolescence is that most of the costs imposed by the practice are not borne by the manufacturers who profit from it.17 From the perspective of manufacturers, planned obsolescence is an extremely profitable strategy.18 In other words, planned obsolescence produces excessive negative externalities in the form of resource depletion and the proliferation of useless, toxic objects.19
To some degree, consumer protection law has attempted to address the issue (as evidenced by the Apple case), but consumer protection law has not succeeded in causing manufacturers to bear enough of the costs associated with planned obsolescence to disincentivize the practice.20 Legislation that specifically addresses planned obsolescence could potentially force manufacturers to internalize more of the social costs associated with the strategy.21 Indeed, the European Union has adopted a legislative model known as “extended producer responsibility” that requires manufacturers to take economic (and in some cases, physical) responsibility for the electronic waste generated by planned obsolescence.22 However, a successful legislative response to planned obsolescence has not been forthcoming in the United States.23 Fortunately, a legislative response is not the only means of correcting the negative externalities associated with planned obsolescence.
This Article demonstrates that common law property rules — as currently constituted and consistently applied — are capable of correcting some of the negative externalities of planned obsolescence. Property rules — when viewed through the lens of an antiwaste principle — limit manufacturers’ capacity to convey title to an object that has been intentionally rendered useless. When a manufacturer creates an object with an intentionally limited lifespan, the object has a defeasible condition24 built into the thing itself. Because the manufacturer has intentionally equipped the object with a utility time bomb, the manufacturer cannot convey title beyond the point in time of the planned obsolescence.
For example, if the object is a phone, it will only be a phone until the point of intentional obsolescence at which point it no longer functions as a phone and will transition into an intentionally useless object. In that scenario, the manufacturer cannot convey title to the phone in fee simple.25 Fee simple title means ownership of the object could potentially extend into infinity.26 It is impossible to own a phone indefinitely if it will — by design — cease existing as a functional phone within a predetermined period of time.27 Consequently, the manufacturer can only convey a defeasible title28: title until the intended obsolescence.29 Because the manufacturer can only convey a defeasible title, the manufacturer necessarily retains a reversionary interest30 in the object.31 The reversionary interest requires the manufacturer to assume responsibility for disposing of the intentionally useless object when it becomes obsolete.32
The idea that a fee simple cannot be conveyed in an object of planned obsolescence is consistent with property law’s broader commitment to an antiwaste principle.33 Antiwaste is a fundamental commitment of property law, although the relationship between common law property rules and antiwaste principles has been both misunderstood and undertheorized.34 In fact, many of the rules of property are rendered more coherent when we understand them as a series of instantiations of the Lockean imperative against waste.35 Often confused with a consequentialist efficiency imperative, the Lockean imperative against waste is a deontological proposition that it is wrong to intentionally (or negligently) destroy objects of property.36
Regardless of whether Locke gets this right (that is, whether the content of the proposition is true), this imperative against waste forms a central commitment of property doctrine as it is currently constituted.37 Central to the Lockean imperative against waste is the understanding that the right of ownership simply does not extend to the power to destroy.38 Insofar as we intentionally destroy an object, we lose the right to own it — and thereby the power to convey it.39
A consistent application of property law’s existing commitment to an antiwaste principle reveals that property law is already positioned to prompt manufacturers to bear more of the social costs of planned obsolescence. The existing rules of property, when consistently applied, prohibit the conveyance of a fee simple in an intentionally useless object.40 Applying the Lockean antiwaste imperative in this context would mean that manufacturers can only convey a defeasible interest in the object, retaining a reversionary interest that serves to correct some of the negative externalities associated with the strategy of planned obsolescence.
These arguments are presented in the following format. Part I of this piece offers an overview of the problem of intentionally useless objects. Part II describes the relationship between property law and the imperative against waste. Part III illuminates how a consistent application of property law’s preexisting commitment to the Lockean imperative against waste creates a reversionary interest in intentionally useless objects.
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* Professor of Law at the University of Alabama School of Law. The author would like to
thank Dean Mark Brandon, whose support of this project made it possible. The author is also
thankful to Dean William Brewbaker, Paula Monopoli, and Shalini Ray for their support of this
project. The author is grateful for exceptionally helpful comments from Gregory Alexander, Lee
Fennell, Jason Gillmer, Luke Herrine, Paul Horwitz, Gordon Hull, Ronald Krotoszynski, Ela
Leshem, Brandi Lupo, Anna Mance, Timothy Mulvaney, Michael Pappas, Michael Pardo, Joseph
Singer, Tyler Valeska, Fredrick Vars, and participants in the 2024 Grey Fellows Forum at Stanford
Law School.