“[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy”1×1. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *23 (1765); accord Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting Blackstone). — unless there isn’t. “The remedial powers of an equity court . . . are not unlimited,”2×2. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971). and “traditional principles of equity jurisdiction” sometimes leave rightsholders without remedies for legal injuries.3×3. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319 (1999) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2941 (2d ed. 1995)); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Nature of Constitutional Rights: The Invention and Logic of Strict Judicial Scrutiny 156 (2019) (similar observation). Recently, in Juliana v. United States,4×4. 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). the Ninth Circuit held that ordering the federal government to adopt “a comprehensive scheme to decrease fossil fuel emissions and combat climate change” would exceed a federal court’s remedial authority.5×5. Id. at 1171. The result in Juliana is not surprising. But Juliana’s reasoning, which suggests that “limited and precise” legal standards must always constrain a court in issuing equitable relief, subtly but significantly narrows the remedial capacity of courts adjudicating large-scale “structural reform” cases.6×6. Structural-reform injunctions “seek to effectuate the reorganization of an ongoing social institution” in order to safeguard a legal right on a continuing basis. Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 7 (1978) (defining the concept); see, e.g., Jason Parkin, Aging Injunctions and the Legacy of Institutional Reform Litigation, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 167, 176–82 & nn.26–28 (describing such injunctions and attributing “structural-reform” characterization to Fiss and others).
Environmental groups have long sought to enlist the federal courts in their fight against anthropogenic climate change.7×7. See, e.g., David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 15, 30–37 (2012) (taxonomizing cases); Richard J. Lazarus, The Rule of Five: Making Climate History at the Supreme Court (2020) (recounting history of one such attempt). Most of these attempts have drawn on common law tort theories8×8. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 418–20 (2011); City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 960 F.3d 570, 575–76 (9th Cir. 2020) (providing examples). or federal statutory law, in particular the 1970 Clean Air Act.9×9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q; see, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533–34 (2007) (holding that Clean Air Act requires EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions unless it determines that such emissions do not endanger the “public health or welfare,” id. at 533 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1))). In 2015, however, one environmental group — Our Children’s Trust, a coalition of young people and environmental lawyers10×10. See Our Team, Our Children’s Trust, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/our-team [https://perma.cc/A9FE-STXJ] (listing organization’s leadership); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 15-cv-01517) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint]. The suit was brought in the names of eighteen individual young people and their guardians, a nonprofit organization called “Earth Guardians,” and “future generations” of Americans on behalf of their putative “guardian,” scientist James Hansen. Id. at 2. For ease of reference, this comment refers to the plaintiffs collectively as “the Trust.” — took a more aggressive approach. Contending that the Constitution guarantees an unenumerated fundamental right to a “stable climate system,”11×11. First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 279. The Trust couched this claim in four separate ways: as a substantive due process right arising under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, see id. ¶¶ 277–89; as a claim for “violat[ion]” of “the equal protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment, embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” id. ¶ 291; as a claim for a violation of the Ninth Amendment, see id. ¶¶ 302–06; and as a claim rooted in “rights under the public trust doctrine” as “secured by the Ninth Amendment and embodied in the reserved powers doctrines of the Tenth Amendment and the Vesting, Nobility, and Posterity Clauses of the Constitution,” id. ¶ 308. Following the district court’s lead, this comment groups these claims together. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1248–61 (analyzing one claim for “infringement of a fundamental right,” id. at 1248 & n.6, and another public-trust claim “rest[ing] ‘directly on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,’” id. at 1261 (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 243 (1979)). the Trust filed suit against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon.12×12. First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 1. The Trust argued that the United States had “continued to permit, authorize, and subsidize fossil fuel extraction . . . [and] consumption” despite these activities’ contributions to global warming.13×13. Id. ¶ 7. This choice, it continued, had “infringed on” the Trust’s “constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property.”14×14. Id. ¶ 8. As relief, the Trust demanded (inter alia) an “[o]rder” requiring the United States “to prepare and implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and . . . stabilize the climate system.”15×15. Id. ¶ 7.
In the district court, the United States moved to dismiss. It argued that the Trust had raised only political questions, lacked standing, and had not stated a claim for which relief could be granted.16×16. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1235. The district court disagreed and denied the motion.17×17. Id. at 1263. According to the district court, although climate policy was “politically charged,” the Trust’s suit did not raise political questions.18×18. Id. at 1236; see id. at 1237–42. Because an “order” requiring the United States “to swiftly phase out CO2 emissions” would “partially redress” the Trust’s “asserted injuries” from United States-caused climate change, the Trust had standing to sue.19×19. Id. at 1247–48. And because “a climate system capable of sustaining human life” was “fundamental to a free and ordered society,” the Trust had “state[d] a claim for a due process violation.”20×20. Id. at 1250 (suggesting that climate change would cause large-scale social harms). The district court also found that the Trust had stated a claim under a constitutionalized version of the public trust doctrine. See id. at 1261. “This lawsuit may be ground-breaking,” the District Court concluded, but that was not the Trust’s fault.21×21. Id. at 1262. Rather, “[f]ederal courts too often [had] been cautious” in adjudicating environmental law cases, “and the world [had] suffered for it.”22×22. Id. The United States sought an interlocutory appeal.23×23. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1166 (describing procedural history).
After some procedural wrangling,24×24. The district court originally denied the United States’ request that it certify the appeal. Juliana v. United States, No. 15-cv-01517, 2017 WL 2483705, at *2 (D. Or. June 8, 2017). After unsuccessfully petitioning the Ninth Circuit for mandamus and the Supreme Court for a stay, see In re United States, 884 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Or., 139 S. Ct. 16 (2018), the United States returned to the district court and sought summary judgment. The district court denied the United States’ summary judgment motion, but this time — under pressure from the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court — “reluctantly” agreed to certify. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1166; Juliana v. United States, 949 F.3d 1125, 1126 (9th Cir. 2020) (recounting this history). the Ninth Circuit reversed on standing grounds.25×25. The panel first considered and rejected an argument that the government had made for the first time on summary judgment: that plaintiffs were required to bring their challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1167; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C). According to the panel, “[b]ecause the APA only allows challenges to discrete agency decisions,” plaintiffs would not have been able to “effectively pursue their constitutional claims . . . under that statute.” Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1167 (citations omitted). “Because denying any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim presents a serious constitutional question, Congress’s intent through a statute to do so must be clear.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). And “[n]othing in the APA,” the panel concluded, “evince[d] such an intent.” Id. Writing for the panel, Judge Hurwitz26×26. Judge Hurwitz was joined by Judge Murguia. began with the basics: “To have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must have (1) a concrete and particularized injury that (2) is caused by . . . challenged conduct and (3) is likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision.”27×27. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1168. Agreeing with the district court, Judge Hurwitz found that “[a]t least some plaintiffs” had claimed “particularized injuries,” since climate change threatened to harm certain plaintiffs in “concrete and personal” ways if left unchecked.28×28. Id. (describing plaintiff forced “to evacuate his coastal home”). And some plaintiffs had also established causation, since there was “at least a genuine factual dispute as to whether” U.S. climate policy was a “substantial factor” in exacerbating the plaintiffs’ climate change–related injuries.29×29. Id. at 1169. Thus, the Trust’s standing turned on redressability: “whether the plaintiffs’ claimed injuries [were] redressable by an Article III court.”30×30. Id.
“Reluctantly,” the panel found “such relief . . . beyond [its] constitutional power.”31×31. Id. at 1165. To establish redressability, it explained, the Trust needed to identify relief that was both “(1) substantially likely to redress [its] injuries” and “(2) within the district court’s power to award.”32×32. Id. at 1170. On the first prong, “plaintiffs’ experts” had established that only a comprehensive, government-led plan to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions could mitigate “the global consequences of climate change” and thereby bring the Trust redress.33×33. Id. The panel expressed some skepticism that even such a plan would redress the Trust’s injuries, but did not need to reach that question given its ultimate holding. Id. at 1171–72. But, turning to the second prong, supervising such a plan “would necessarily require” judges to make “a host of complex policy decisions.”34×34. Id. at 1171. The Trust had argued that “the district court need not itself make policy decisions, because if their general request for a remedial plan [were] granted, the political branches” could have “decide[d] what policies [would] best . . . draw down excess atmospheric CO2.” Id. at 1172. But, the panel replied, “even under such a scenario,” the judiciary would be required to “subsequently . . . pass judgment on the sufficiency of the government’s response to the order, which necessarily would entail a broad range of policymaking.” Id. How quickly, for example, should the United States transition to renewable energy? How much should it invest in public transit?35×35. Id. “‘[A] constitutional directive or legal standards’ must guide the courts’ exercise of equitable power,” the panel concluded, and “limited and precise” legal rules simply could not answer these kinds of questions.36×36. Id. at 1173 (quoting Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2500, 2508 (2019)) (“Rucho found partisan gerrymandering claims presented political questions . . . [because] there was no ‘limited and precise’ standard discernable in the Constitution for redressing [them] . . . . It is impossible to reach a different conclusion here.”). And because no remedy subject to limited and precise definition could redress the Trust’s injuries, issuing such relief was not within the district court’s power. The Trust thus lacked standing.
Judge Staton dissented.37×37. Judge Staton, of the Central District of California, was sitting by designation. “Plaintiffs bring suit,” she lamented, “to enforce the most basic structural principle embedded in our system of ordered liberty: that the Constitution does not condone the Nation’s willful destruction.”38×38. Id. at 1175 (Staton, J., dissenting). In Judge Staton’s view, a district court had the power to award the Trust relief unless its claims ran afoul of the political question doctrine.39×39. See id. at 1185. Since the Trust’s claims did not pose political questions, she continued, they should have proceeded.40×40. Id. at 1185–86. “[O]ur history is no stranger to widespread, programmatic changes . . . ushered in by the judiciary,” Judge Staton concluded, and the “slow churn” of institutional-reform litigation “should not dissuade us here.”41×41. Id. at 1189.
Although Juliana’s result was predictable, its reasoning sweeps more broadly than one might think. By suggesting that Article III courts cannot order injunctive relief unless constrained by “limited and precise” legal standards,42×42. Id. at 1173 (majority opinion) (quoting Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019)). Juliana subtly but significantly narrows the remedial authority of federal courts sitting in equity. In particular, it is not clear how “structural-reform” injunctions — in which courts require schools, firms, and other social institutions to change their behavior in order to make amends for past lawbreaking, most notably racial discrimination43×43. See Fiss, supra note 6, at 6–7. — fit within Juliana’s vision of the judiciary’s remedial powers.
As many outside observers noted, Juliana was always a “long shot.”44×44. John Schwartz, Court Quashes Youth Climate Change Case Against Government, N.Y. Times (Jan. 17, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2Tya7j1 [https://perma.cc/TL7Q-5EL5] (quoting Professor Ann Carlson); see id. (quoting Professor David Uhlmann describing Juliana as “a case where your heart says yes but your mind says no”); Jonathan H. Adler, Is Kids Climate Case Coming to an End?, Reason: Volokh Conspiracy (Nov. 26, 2018, 6:09 PM), https://reason.com/2018/11/26/is-kids-climate-case-coming-to-an-end [https://perma.cc/XN28-AYP2] (similar) [hereinafter Adler, Kids Climate Case]; Ronald Collins, Ask the Author: Lawyers’ Law — Those Who Helped the Supreme Court Shape the Environmental Law of the Land, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 13, 2020, 10:08 AM), https://bit.ly/2Z4mzZS [https://perma.cc/D342-ZG7E] (quoting Professor Richard Lazarus describing Juliana theory as “strikingly far-reaching”). Doctrinally, among other problems, the Supreme Court has mostly gotten “out of the business” of recognizing new unenumerated fundamental rights.45×45. See, e.g., Jonathan Adler, Divided Sixth Circuit Panel Discovers Constitutional Right to a “Basic Minimum Education,” Reason: Volokh Conspiracy (Apr. 23, 2020, 2:49 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/04/23/divided-sixth-circuit-panel-discovers-constitutional-right-to-a-basic-minimum-education [https://perma.cc/W27Q-7252] (“For the past two decades, the Supreme Court has been out of the business of recognizing or discovering new constitutional rights . . . .”); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (adopting narrow test for recognition of unenumerated fundamental rights). And more practically, climate change is the kind of complex, multistakeholder issue that Anglo-American common law has historically left for politicians rather than judges to solve.46×46. For a canonical statement of this view, see Lon L. Fuller & Kenneth I. Winston, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 394–404 (1978) (describing such “polycentric” problems). Juliana’s outcome may therefore have been overdetermined, both as a doctrinal and as a sociological matter. The question was less whether the Trust might win, and more how it would lose.47×47. Cf. Adler, Kids Climate Case, supra note 44 (so suggesting).
That said, the specific doctrinal path that the Ninth Circuit chose in Juliana may have significant legal and practical implications. First, Juliana’s central doctrinal suggestion — that courts lack the Article III authority to issue injunctions implicating “complex policy decisions”48×48. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171. unless “limited and precise”49×49. Id. at 1173 (quoting Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019)). “legal principles”50×50. Id. at 1175 (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1928 (2018)). require as much — is novel. To be sure, “[e]quitable relief in a federal court” has always been “subject to restrictions.”51×51. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945). One line of cases, closely connected with the development of the political question doctrine, has limited courts’ remedial authority where the Constitution’s text “commits” certain issues to “the political branches of government.”52×52. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (holding that district court injunction imposing “continuing judicial surveillance,” id. at 2, on a state National Guard unit conflicted with the Constitution’s vesting of the authority to “‘organiz[e], arm, and discipline’. . . the National Guard” with Congress, id. at 6 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16)); see, e.g., Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 797 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining that courts cannot promulgate laws directly, because that authority is committed to Congress); cf. M.S. v. Brown, 902 F.3d 1078, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2017) (broadly agreeing with Smith & Lee, but suggesting that “in certain circumstances,” “structural constitutional limits” may not “prevent federal courts from ordering government officials to enact or implement a bill that has not completed a lawfully prescribed legislative process,” id. at 1087). The cases are merely “related” to the political question doctrine because, Judge Staton’s dissent notwithstanding, there is a difference between deciding that a right involves a political question and deciding that a remedy does. See infra pp. 1935–36. And another line, describing prudential limitations on judicial discretion, has emphasized that courts must respect the separation of powers and “principles of federalism” when they craft equitable remedies.53×53. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (holding that district court injunction imposing continuing supervision on city police department was abuse of discretion in light of, inter alia, “principles of federalism”); see, e.g., O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501 (1974) (holding that analogous injunction against state criminal court system was abuse of discretion in light of “established principles of [federal-state] comity”); Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 277–80 (1990) (holding that injunction requiring municipal legislators to enact voted-on ordinance was abuse of discretion in light of importance of their legislative function); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50–51 (1990) (holding that courts cannot directly levy state or municipal taxes, although they may compel other entities to do so). But Juliana does not rest on a textual commitment of climate policy to another branch of government, although the Juliana majority did note (almost in passing) that the Constitution expressly grants Congress the “Power to dispose of” public lands and thus the fossil fuels beneath them.54×54. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1170 (quoting U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2). And Juliana did not hold that the district court had abused its discretion in imposing a particular remedy in light of separation of powers principles; it held that Article III categorically rules out injunctive relief where no “constitutional directive or legal standard” can constrain “the courts’ exercise of equitable power.”55×55. Id. at 1173 (quoting Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019)). Juliana’s rationale thus departs from, and extends beyond, the reasoning of prior Supreme Court cases setting the boundaries of federal district courts’ remedial capabilities.56×56. Judge Staton, making a broadly analogous argument in dissent, appears to have assumed that the political question doctrine supplies the sole constraint on redressable injuries. See id. at 1185–89 (Staton, J., dissenting) (“I readily concede that courts must on occasion refrain from answering questions that are truly reserved for the political branches . . . . This deference is known as the ‘political question doctrine.’” Id. at 1185.). But this position goes too far as well. Sometimes a plaintiff’s injury is not redressable, not because his case raises political questions, but because the plaintiff does not seek damages and prudential factors weigh heavily against granting injunctive relief. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff seeks relief requiring continuing supervision of a state court system. Cf. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 379–80. Per Rizzo, such supervision might amount to an abuse of discretion independent of the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. See id. This would leave the plaintiff without a redressable injury and thus without standing. But this is not a result of the political question doctrine. Rather, permanent injunctions are always discretionary, eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), and a court that has already decided not to grant an injunction on discretionary grounds has no reason to reach the merits of a plaintiff’s legal theory unless that plaintiff seeks more than an injunction.
Second, more practically, Juliana’s focus on “limited and precise” legal standards57×57. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1173. could conceivably disrupt longstanding judicial practice in large-scale structural-reform cases. Structural-reform litigation is often long on judicial “flexibility” and short on specific doctrinal rules.58×58. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (describing “practical flexibility” of equity). Some scholars celebrate this manner of judicial problem-solving; others do not. Compare, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1288–90 (1976), and Fiss, supra note 6, chs. 3–4 (arguing in favor of structural-reform litigation), with William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635, 635–45 (1982), and Frank Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Agreements, 1 U. Chi. L.F. 19, 33–41 (1987) (arguing against). In developing school desegregation remedies, for example, federal courts immerse themselves in the details of public school logistics: which schools to open and which to close, which teachers to hire and which to fire, and so on.59×59. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18–32 (1971); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 78–79 (1995); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 250–69 (D. Mass. 1975), aff’d, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976) (representative examples of school desegregation plans). Some legal principles “guide [the] exercise” of this “equitable power”60×60. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1173. — the plans must “eliminate the vestiges” of prior “de jure segregation”61×61. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 518 (1992). — but translating these principles into practice leaves much to individual jurists’ discretion.62×62. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 Hastings L.J. 482–507 (1999) (describing how two district courts handled desegregation of similar cities very differently); see also Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 718–32 (1976) (providing examples outside the desegregation context). Climate change policy and school desegregation are probably distinguishable; among other things, desegregating a single school system, though complicated, is vastly less complex than decarbonizing an entire country. But the Juliana panel did not offer any explicit guidance on how to distinguish desegregation cases (or their analogs) from climate change.63×63. Despite Judge Staton’s citation to the school desegregation cases in her dissent. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1188 (Staton, J., dissenting). As a result, at minimum, defendants in future structural-reform suits will have plausible arguments that Juliana imposes new limits on district courts’ remedial authority.
Rucho v. Common Cause,64×64. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). which the Juliana panel seemed to believe compelled Juliana’s result,65×65. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1173 (arguing that “it is impossible to reach a different conclusion” than the one the Supreme Court reached in Rucho). in fact confirms the novelty of Juliana’s reasoning. Rucho, from which Juliana derives its key “limited and precise”66×66. Id. (quoting Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508). and “constitutional directive”67×67. Id. (quoting Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500). language, held that suits challenging the constitutionality of partisan gerrymanders present nonjusticiable political questions because no “limited and precise” legal standard can separate good gerrymanders from bad ones.68×68. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500. But this kind of indeterminacy involves rules governing primary conduct — “How much [partisan gerrymandering or climate change] is too much?”69×69. Id. at 2501. — rather than remedies — “Having decided that partisan gerrymandering or climate change is unlawful, what do we do about it?” And the Supreme Court has long acknowledged that courts enjoy a “broad power to formulate” equitable remedies, one which extends beyond their power to recognize and parameterize new rights.70×70. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 36 (1976) (contrasting judicial authority “absent a finding of a constitutional violation” with such authority after a violation is found); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 & n.9 (1978) (invoking Swann in the prison-litigation context). Juliana, however, assumes that Rucho’s discussion of rights applies equally to remedies. By collapsing this distinction between flexible rights-recognition and flexible remedy-implementation, Juliana thus narrows the remedial powers of Article III courts.
Justice Thomas has suggested that large-scale structural injunctions are “at odds with the history and tradition of the equity power and the Framers’ [constitutional] design.”71×71. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 126 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); accord, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 365 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). Juliana does not go quite that far, at least on its face. But although Juliana’s holding is limited to climate change litigation, its reasoning may prove hard to cabin. Ultimately, at least in the Ninth Circuit, Juliana may come to stand for broad and significant limitations on the powers of federal district courts sitting in equity.