

THE STATISTICS

TABLE I^a

(A) ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

	OPINIONS WRITTEN ^b				DISSENTING VOTES ^c		
	Opinions of Court ^d	Concurrences ^e	Dissents ^e	TOTAL	In Disposition by		
					Opinion	Memo-randum ^f	TOTAL
Roberts	7	2	3	12	11	1	12
Thomas	8	13	7	28	19	3	22
Ginsburg	6	2	6	14	18	0	18
Breyer	8	2	10	20	17	0	17
Alito	7	5	8	20	14	3	17
Sotomayor	7	4	10	21	18	0	18
Kagan	8	2	3	13	13	0	13
Gorsuch	8	4	10	22	19	2	21
Kavanaugh	7	5	2	14	7	0	7
Per Curiam	6	—	—	6	—	—	—
Total	72	39	59	170	136	9	145

^a A complete explanation of how the tables are compiled may be found in *The Supreme Court, 2004 Term — The Statistics*, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 415–19 (2005).

Table I, with the exception of the dissenting-votes portion of section (A) and the memorandum tabulations in section (C), includes only full-opinion decisions. Six per curiam decisions contained legal reasoning substantial enough to be considered full-opinion decisions in October Term 2018. These opinions were *Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc.*, 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019); *Frank v. Gaos*, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019); *Yovino v. Rizo*, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019); *Moore v. Texas*, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019); *Shoop v. Hill*, 139 S. Ct. 504 (2019); and *City of Escondido v. Emmons*, 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019).

This table includes every opinion designated by the Court as a 2018 Term Opinion except for one. See *Opinions of the Court — 2018*, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, <https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/18> [<https://perma.cc/AC5M-Z5UE>]. The omitted opinion is *Emulex Corp v. Varjabedian*, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019) (mem.), in which the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

A memorandum order is a case decided by summary order and contained in the Court's weekly order lists issued throughout the Term. This category excludes summary orders designated as opinions by the Court. The memorandum tabulations include memorandum orders disposing of cases on their merits by affirming, reversing, vacating, or remanding. They exclude orders disposing of petitions for certiorari, dismissing writs of certiorari as improvidently granted, dismissing appeals for lack of jurisdiction, disposing of miscellaneous applications, and certifying questions for review. The memorandum tabulations also exclude orders relating to payment of docketing fees and dissents therefrom.

TABLE I (*continued*)

^b This portion of Table I(A) includes only opinions authored in the seventy-two cases with full opinions this Term. Thus, dissents from denials of certiorari and concurrences or dissents from summary affirmances are not included. A concurrence or dissent is recorded as a written opinion whenever its author provided a reason, however brief, for his or her vote.

^c A Justice is considered to have dissented whenever he or she voted to dispose of the case in any manner different from the manner specified by the majority of the Court.

^d A plurality opinion that announced the judgment of the Court is counted as the opinion of the Court. Thus, for example, Justice Kagan's opinion in *Gundy v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019), is considered the opinion of the Court in that case, even though only three Justices joined her reasoning.

^e Opinions concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in both are counted as concurrences. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part are counted as dissents.

^f Dissenting votes in memorandum decisions include instances in which Justices expressed that they would not have disposed of the case by memorandum order. This category does not include dissenting votes in orders relating to stays of execution; that information is presented in Table II(F) and its accompanying footnotes.

TABLE I (continued)
 (B1) VOTING ALIGNMENTS — ALL WRITTEN OPINIONS⁸

		Roberts	Thomas	Ginsburg	Breyer	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan	Gorsuch	Kavanaugh
Roberts	O	—	37	38	40	47	39	42	36	44
	S	—	6	1	4	13	1	2	4	10
	D	—	43	39	42	56	40	43	39	51
	N	—	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	64
	P (%)	—	59.7	54.2	58.3	77.8	55.6	59.7	54.2	79.7
Thomas	O	37	—	29	27	39	29	32	38	35
	S	6	—	0	0	12	0	1	16	8
	D	43	—	29	27	51	29	33	52	42
	N	72	—	72	72	72	72	72	72	64
	P (%)	59.7	—	40.3	37.5	70.8	40.3	45.8	72.2	65.6
Ginsburg	O	38	29	—	41	33	45	45	32	31
	S	1	0	—	13	0	18	15	3	0
	D	39	29	—	52	33	59	57	34	31
	N	72	72	—	72	72	72	72	72	64
	P (%)	54.2	40.3	—	72.2	45.8	81.9	79.2	47.2	48.4
Breyer	O	40	27	41	—	35	43	45	28	35
	S	4	0	13	—	4	15	14	1	3
	D	42	27	52	—	37	55	55	29	36
	N	72	72	72	—	72	72	72	72	64
	P (%)	58.3	37.5	72.2	—	51.4	76.4	76.4	40.3	56.3
Alito	O	47	39	33	35	—	33	37	37	43
	S	13	12	0	4	—	0	0	9	12
	D	56	51	33	37	—	33	37	45	52
	N	72	72	72	72	—	72	72	72	64
	P (%)	77.8	70.8	45.8	51.4	—	45.8	51.4	62.5	81.3
Sotomayor	O	39	29	45	43	33	—	46	32	31
	S	1	0	18	15	0	—	16	2	0
	D	40	29	59	55	33	—	58	33	31
	N	72	72	72	72	72	—	72	72	64
	P (%)	55.6	40.3	81.9	76.4	45.8	—	80.6	45.8	48.4
Kagan	O	42	32	45	45	37	46	—	34	35
	S	2	1	15	14	0	16	—	3	1
	D	43	33	57	55	37	58	—	36	36
	N	72	72	72	72	72	72	—	72	64
	P (%)	59.7	45.8	79.2	76.4	51.4	80.6	—	50.0	56.3
Gorsuch	O	36	38	32	28	37	32	34	—	34
	S	4	16	3	1	9	2	3	—	4
	D	39	52	34	29	45	33	36	—	37
	N	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	—	64
	P (%)	54.2	72.2	47.2	40.3	62.5	45.8	50.0	—	57.8
Kavanaugh	O	44	35	31	35	43	31	35	34	—
	S	10	8	0	3	12	0	1	4	—
	D	51	42	31	36	52	31	36	37	—
	N	64	64	64	64	64	64	64	64	—
	P (%)	79.7	65.6	48.4	56.3	81.3	48.4	56.3	57.8	—

TABLE I (continued)
 (B2) VOTING ALIGNMENTS — NONUNANIMOUS CASES^h

		Roberts	Thomas	Ginsburg	Breyer	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan	Gorsuch	Kavanaugh
Roberts	O	—	16	17	19	26	18	21	15	26
	S	—	6	1	4	12	1	2	3	10
	D	—	22	18	21	35	19	22	18	33
	N	—	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	44
	P (%)	—	44.9	36.7	42.9	71.4	38.8	44.9	36.7	75.0
Thomas	O	16	—	8	6	18	8	11	17	17
	S	6	—	0	0	12	0	1	16	8
	D	22	—	8	6	30	8	12	31	24
	N	49	—	49	49	49	49	49	49	44
	P (%)	44.9	—	16.3	12.2	61.2	16.3	24.5	63.3	54.5
Ginsburg	O	17	8	—	20	12	24	24	11	13
	S	1	0	—	13	0	17	15	3	0
	D	18	8	—	31	12	38	36	13	13
	N	49	49	—	49	49	49	49	49	44
	P (%)	36.7	16.3	—	63.3	24.5	77.6	73.5	26.5	29.5
Breyer	O	19	6	20	—	14	22	24	7	17
	S	4	0	13	—	4	15	14	1	3
	D	21	6	31	—	16	34	34	8	18
	N	49	49	49	—	49	49	49	49	44
	P (%)	42.9	12.2	63.3	—	32.7	69.4	69.4	16.3	40.9
Alito	O	26	18	12	14	—	12	16	16	25
	S	12	12	0	4	—	0	0	8	12
	D	35	30	12	16	—	12	16	24	34
	N	49	49	49	49	—	49	49	49	44
	P (%)	71.4	61.2	24.5	32.7	—	24.5	32.7	49.0	77.3
Sotomayor	O	18	8	24	22	12	—	25	11	13
	S	1	0	17	15	0	—	16	2	0
	D	19	8	38	34	12	—	37	12	13
	N	49	49	49	49	49	—	49	49	44
	P (%)	38.8	16.3	77.6	69.4	24.5	—	75.5	24.5	29.5
Kagan	O	21	11	24	24	16	25	—	13	17
	S	2	1	15	14	0	16	—	3	1
	D	22	12	36	34	16	37	—	15	18
	N	49	49	49	49	49	49	—	49	44
	P (%)	44.9	24.5	73.5	69.4	32.7	75.5	—	30.6	40.9
Gorsuch	O	15	17	11	7	16	11	13	—	16
	S	3	16	3	1	8	2	3	—	4
	D	18	31	13	8	24	12	15	—	19
	N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	—	44
	P (%)	36.7	63.3	26.5	16.3	49.0	24.5	30.6	—	43.2
Kavanaugh	O	26	17	13	17	25	13	17	16	—
	S	10	8	0	3	12	0	1	4	—
	D	33	24	13	18	34	13	18	19	—
	N	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	—
	P (%)	75.0	54.5	29.5	40.9	77.3	29.5	40.9	43.2	—

TABLE I (continued)

^g Table I(B1) records the frequency with which each Justice voted with each of the other Justices in full-opinion decisions, including the six per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. See *supra* note a.

Two Justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the Reporter of Decisions or the explicit statement of a Justice in his or her own opinion. This table does not treat a Justice as having joined the opinion of the Court unless that Justice authored or joined the opinion of the Court in full, or authored or joined at least part of the opinion of the Court and did not author or join any opinion concurring in the judgment, even in part, or dissenting, even in part. For the purpose of counting dissents and concurrences, however, a Justice who partially joined an opinion is considered to have fully joined it. Therefore, Justice Thomas is not treated as having joined the opinion of the Court in *Nieves v. Bartlett*, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019), because he authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. By contrast, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan are treated as having fully joined Justice Breyer's dissent in *Bucklew v. Precythe*, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), even though they did not join Part III.

In Tables I(B1) and I(B2), "O" represents the number of decisions in which a particular pair of Justices agreed in an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. "S" represents the number of decisions in which two Justices agreed in any opinion other than an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. Justices who together joined more than one separate opinion in a case are considered to have agreed only once. "D" represents the number of decisions in which two Justices agreed in a majority, plurality, concurring, or dissenting opinion. A decision is counted only once in the "D" category if two Justices both joined the opinion of the Court and joined a separate concurrence. Thus, in some situations the "D" value will be less than the sum of the "O" and "S" values. "N" represents the number of decisions in which both Justices participated, and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. "P" represents the percentage of decisions in which one Justice agreed with another Justice and is calculated by dividing the "D" value by the "N" value, and multiplying the quotient by 100.

^h Like Table I(B1), Table I(B2) records the frequency with which each of the Justices voted with each other Justice in full opinions, but Table I(B2) records these voting alignments only for cases that were not unanimously decided. A decision is considered unanimous for purposes of Table I whenever all the Justices joined the opinion of the Court and no Justice concurred only in the judgment, even in part, or dissented, even in part. Removing the unanimous cases produces lower rates of agreement overall, providing a more accurate picture of how the Justices voted in divisive cases.

TABLE I (*continued*)

(C) UNANIMITY

	Unanimous	With Concurrence ⁱ	With Dissent	TOTAL
Full Opinions	23 (31.9%)	5 (6.9%)	44 (61.1%)	72
Memorandum Orders ^j	30 (90.9%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (9.1%)	33

(D) VOTING PATTERNS IN NONUNANIMOUS CASES^k

	TOTAL CASES	JOINING THE OPINION OF THE COURT ^l		AGREEING IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ^m	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Roberts	49	37	75.5%	38	77.6%
Thomas	49	24	49.0%	30	61.2%
Ginsburg	49	29	59.2%	31	63.3%
Breyer	49	31	63.3%	32	65.3%
Alito	49	31	63.3%	35	71.4%
Sotomayor	49	29	59.2%	31	63.3%
Kagan	49	35	71.4%	36	73.5%
Gorsuch	49	26	53.1%	30	61.2%
Kavanaugh	44	34	77.3%	37	84.1%

ⁱ A decision is listed in this column if at least one Justice concurred in the judgment, but not in the Court's opinion in full, and no Justice dissented, even in part. *See, e.g.,* *Kisor v. Wilkie*, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).

^j In *Johnson v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 92 (2018) (mem.), seven out of the eight Justices disqualified themselves. Because the Court therefore lacked a quorum, this opinion is not included in Table I(C).

^k Table I(D) records the frequency with which each Justice joined the opinion of the Court in nonunanimous, full-opinion decisions. This table includes the six per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions, *see supra* note a, if those decisions produced dissenting votes.

^l This portion of the table reports the number of times that each Justice joined the opinion of the Court, according to the rule described in note g.

^m This portion of the table reports the number of times that each Justice agreed with the Court's disposition of a case. It includes all cases in which a Justice joined the opinion of the Court, but unlike the portion of the table described in note l, it also includes those cases in which a Justice concurred in the judgment without joining the Court's opinion in full. Cases in which the Justice dissented, even in part, are not included.

TABLE I (continued)

(E) 5-4 DECISIONS

Justices Constituting the Majority	Number of Decisions ⁿ
Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh ^o	7
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch ^p	3
Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh ^q	1
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh ^r	1
Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan ^s	1
Roberts, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Kavanaugh ^t	1
Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch ^u	1
Roberts, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kavanaugh ^v	1
Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan ^w	1
Total	17

(F) AVERAGE OPINION LENGTH^x

	Opinion of the Court	Plurality Opinion	Concurring Opinion	Concurring in Judgment ^y	Dissenting Opinion ^y	TOTAL PAGES
Roberts	19.7	—	1.2	—	6.3	157.8
Thomas	11.1	—	6.9	5.4	13.7	265.6
Ginsburg	10.0	—	1.0	12.8	7.7	119.9
Breyer	10.6	17.3	1.9	1.8	12.9	224.0
Alito	24.2	15.7	1.9	2.7	18.2	299.5
Sotomayor	15.0	—	3.9	—	12.0	228.1
Kagan	17.1	17.3	0.6	—	20.7	199.9
Gorsuch	17.1	19.1	0.7	20.6	11.6	319.0
Kavanaugh	13.7	—	2.5	9.7	19.5	161.4
Per Curiam	3.9	—	—	—	—	27.4

ⁿ This column lists the number of 5-4 full-opinion decisions in which each five-Justice group constituted the majority. A case is counted as 5-4 if four Justices voted to dispose of any issue in a manner different from that specified by a majority of the Court. Cases involving plurality opinions are included so long as the Justices divided 5-4 on the disposition. *See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wisconsin*, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019). Cases in which any Justice did not participate are not included. *See, e.g., Madison v. Alabama*, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019).

^o *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (Roberts, C.J.); *Knick v. Twp. of Scott*, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (Roberts, C.J.); *Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck*, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.); *Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt*, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (Thomas, J.); *Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela*, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019) (Roberts, C.J.); *Bucklew v. Precythe*, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.); *Nielson v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (Alito, J.).

^p *United States v. Davis*, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.); *Herrera v. Wyoming*, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019) (Sotomayor, J.); *Wash. State Dep't of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.*, 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019) (Breyer, J.).

^q *Stokeling v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (Thomas, J.).

^r *Apple Inc. v. Pepper*, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.).

^s *Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson*, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019) (Thomas, J.).

^t *Mont v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019) (Thomas, J.).

^u *Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill*, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) (Ginsburg, J.).

^v *Mitchell v. Wisconsin*, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019) (Alito, J.).

^w *Dep't of Commerce v. New York*, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (Roberts, C.J.).

^x The data in this table reflect the length of opinions as published in the Court's slip opinions, estimated to the nearest tenth of a page. Though the slip opinions are eventually superseded by official case publication in the *United States Reports*, the total opinion length, in pages, is generally preserved in the final publication. Average opinion length is obtained by summing the number of pages written by each Justice within each category of opinion and then dividing by the number of opinions of that type written by that Justice. For the number of opinions written by each Justice, see *supra* Table I(A).

^y Opinions concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in both are categorized here under Concurring in Judgment. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part, or concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, are categorized here under Dissenting Opinion.

TABLE II^a

(A) FINAL DISPOSITION OF CASES

	Disposed of	Remaining on Docket	TOTAL
Original Docket	2	9	11
Appellate Docket ^b	1586	315 ^c	1901
Miscellaneous Docket ^d	4952	759 ^c	5711
Total	6540	1083	7623

(B) CASES GRANTED REVIEW^e

	Review Granted ^f	Petitions Considered ^g	Percent Granted
Appellate Docket	77	1634	4.7%
Miscellaneous Docket	9	4947	0.2%
Total	86	6581	1.3%

^a All numbers in Tables II(A), II(B), and II(C) are derived from data provided by the Supreme Court.

^b The appellate docket consists of all paid cases.

^c The number of cases remaining on the appellate and miscellaneous dockets is calculated by adding the number of cases not acted upon in the 2018 Term to the number of cases granted review in the 2018 Term but carried over to the 2019 Term.

^d The miscellaneous docket consists of all cases filed *in forma pauperis*.

^e Table II(B) reports data that versions of Table II prior to 1998 reported under the label "Review Granted." For a full explanation, see *The Supreme Court, 1997 Term — The Statistics*, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 372 n.d (1998). Table II(B) does not include cases within the Court's original jurisdiction.

^f The number of cases granted review includes only those cases granted plenary review in the 2018 Term. It includes neither cases summarily decided nor those granted review in a previous Term and carried over to the 2018 Term. It does include cases granted review in the 2018 Term but carried over to a subsequent Term.

^g The number of petitions considered is calculated by adding the number of cases docketed in the 2018 Term to the number of cases carried over from prior Terms and subtracting the number of cases not acted upon in the 2018 Term.

TABLE II (*continued*)
 (C) METHOD OF DISPOSITION^h

On Review	73
Summarily Decided	56
By Denial, Dismissal, or Withdrawal of Appeals or Petitions for Review	6409
Total	6538

(D) DISPOSITION OF CASES
 REVIEWED ON WRIT OF CERTIORARIⁱ

	Reversed ^j	Vacated ^k	Affirmed	TOTAL
Full Opinions	28 (40.0%)	18 (25.7%)	24 (34.3%)	70
Memorandum Orders	0 (0.0%)	33 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%) ^l	33
Total	28 (27.2%)	51 (49.5%)	24 (23.3%)	103

^h Table II(C) does not include cases within the Court's original jurisdiction.

ⁱ Table II(D) reports the disposition of cases reviewed on writ of certiorari and decided on the merits. It does not include the cases reviewed under other bases of jurisdiction. This Term, these cases were *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012)) and *Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill*, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) (reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012)).

^j This category includes cases reversed in part and affirmed in part, as well as cases reversed in part and vacated in part.

^k This category includes cases vacated in part and affirmed in part.

^l In *Johnson v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 92 (2018) (mem.), seven out of eight Justices disqualified themselves. Because a quorum was therefore unobtainable, the Court affirmed the judgment below as if by an equally divided court. This opinion is not included in Table I(C).

TABLE II (continued)
 (E) ORIGINS OF CASES AND THEIR DISPOSITIONS^m

	FULL OPINIONS ⁿ			MEMORANDUM ORDERS			TOTAL
	Reversed ^o	Vacated ^p	Affirmed	Reversed	Vacated	Affirmed	
Federal Courts	25	15	22	0	29	0	91
<i>Circuit Courts</i> ^q	24	14	22	0	28	0	88
First	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
Second	4	0	1	0	0	0	5
Third	0	2	1	0	0	0	3
Fourth	1	1	2	0	1	0	5
Fifth	0	3	1	0	3	0	7
Sixth	2	1	4	0	5	0	12
Seventh	1	0	0	0	6	0	7
Eighth	2	1	1	0	3	0	7
Ninth	8	4	2	0	3	0	17
Tenth	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
Eleventh	3	0	4	0	6	0	13
D.C.	1	0	2	0	0	0	3
Federal	1	1	2	0	1	0	5
<i>District Courts</i> ^r	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
<i>Armed Forces</i>	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
State Courts	5	4	2	0	4	0	15
Total	30	19	24	0	33	0	106

^m Table II(E) counts consolidated cases disposed of by the same lower court opinion as a single case. Table II(E) does not include original jurisdiction cases.

ⁿ This section reports only full opinions decided on the merits. It thus includes six per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be counted as full opinions. See *supra* Table I, note a.

^o This category includes cases reversed in part and affirmed in part, as well as cases reversed in part and vacated in part.

^p This category includes cases vacated in part and affirmed in part.

^q A consolidated case originating from multiple circuits is counted in each originating circuit, but only once toward the Circuit Court sum. For example, this Term included the consolidated case *United States v. Still*, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018). *Still* is thus counted in the individual counts for the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, because it reversed the Sixth Circuit decision in *United States v. Still*, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017), and vacated and remanded the Eighth Circuit decision in *United States v. Sims*, 854 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2017). See 139 S. Ct. at 408. Because the Supreme Court case was named for the Sixth Circuit decision, which was reversed, *Still* is counted only once toward the total number of circuit court cases reversed on appeal.

^r This category includes statutorily authorized direct appeals from district courts.

TABLE II (*continued*)
 (F) DISPOSITIONS OF APPLICATIONS FOR
 STAYS OF EXECUTION^s

	Granted ^t	Denied ^u	Percent Granted
Stay Applications	1	16	5.9%

^s This table treats multiple applications from the same death row inmate as a single application. Although the Court entertained thirty-three applications for stays of execution last Term, these applications pertained to only seventeen individuals.

This table includes only those dispositions that appear in the *Supreme Court Reporter* and excludes applications to vacate stays of execution.

For useful background information on how the Court handles stays of execution, see generally EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., *SUPREME COURT PRACTICE* §§ 18.1–8, at 897–911 (9th ed. 2007); A REPORTER'S GUIDE TO APPLICATIONS PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2017), <https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/QUU3-HD26>]; and *The Supreme Court, 2006 Term — The Statistics*, 121 HARV. L. REV. 436, 446 n.t (2007).

^t This Term, the Court granted one stay application pending its decision whether to grant certiorari in the underlying case. See *Murphy v. Collier*, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (2019) (mem.). The stay was to terminate automatically upon the Court's denial of the associated certiorari petition, or if certiorari was granted, upon issuance of the judgment of the Court.

^u Twelve denials were unanimous. Four denials attracted dissents. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg and by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan as to all but Part II, authored a dissent from the denial of the application for stay and denial of certiorari in *Price v. Dunn*, 139 S. Ct. 1794 (2019) (mem.). Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, authored a dissent from the denial for stay and denial of certiorari in *Zagorski v. Parker*, 139 S. Ct. 11 (2018) (mem.). Justice Sotomayor authored a dissent from the denial of the application for stay and denial of certiorari in *Miller v. Parker*, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018) (mem.), and *Zagorski v. Haslam*, 139 S. Ct. 20 (2018) (mem.), and authored a dissent from the denial of the application for stay in *Irick v. Tennessee*, 139 S. Ct. 1 (2018) (mem.). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh did not dissent from any denial of an application for a stay of execution.

TABLE III^a
SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS

	TOTAL	Principal Issue ^b		Decision ^c	
		Consti- tutional	Other	For Gov't	Against Gov't
CIVIL ACTIONS FROM INFERIOR FEDERAL COURTS	50	10	40	11	16
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	13	2	11	4	9
<i>Review of Administrative Action</i>	9	2	7	3	6
Administrative Procedure Act	1	0	1	0	1
Auer Deference	1	1	0	1	0
Endangered Species Act	1	0	1	0	1
Lanham Act	1	1	0	0	1
Medicare Act	1	0	1	0	1
Patents	1	0	1	0	1
Securities Act of 1934	1	0	1	1	0
Social Security Act	2	0	2	1	1
<i>Other Action by or Against the United States or Its Officers</i>	4	0	4	1	3
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act	1	0	1	0	1
Attorney's Fees	1	0	1	0	1
False Claims Act	1	0	1	1	0
Federal Tort Claims Act	1	0	1	0	1
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	14	7	7	7	7
Abortion	1	1	0	0	1
Age Discrimination in Employment Act	1	0	1	0	1
Cruel and Unusual Punishment	1	1	0	1	0
Dormant Commerce Clause	1	1	0	0	1
Establishment Clause	1	1	0	1	0
Legislative Apportionment	1	1	0	1	0
Preemption	1	0	1	1	0
Procedure	1	0	1	1	0
Qualified Immunity	1	0	1	1	0
Section 1983	2	0	2	1	1
Standing	1	1	0	0	1
Takings Clause	1	1	0	0	1
Title VII	1	0	1	0	1

^a Table III records the subject matter of dispositions by full opinion, including the six cases with per curiam opinions on the merits containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. See *supra* Table I, note a.

^b Each case is categorized as primarily constitutional or not. Cases invoking a mixture of statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication are particularly difficult to classify.

^c “Government” refers to federal, state, or local government, or an agency thereof, or to an individual participating in the suit in an official capacity. A decision is counted as “for” the government if the government prevailed on all contested issues. When the federal government opposed a state or local government, a decision is counted as “for” the government if the federal government prevailed on all contested issues. When two states, two units of local government, or two federal agencies opposed each other, the decision is counted as neither “for” nor “against” the government. When the government prevailed on at least one but not all of the issues before the Court, a decision is counted as neither “for” nor “against” the government.

TABLE III (continued)

SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS

	TOTAL	Principal Issue		Decision	
		Consti- tutional	Other	For Gov't	Against Gov't
PRIVATE LITIGATION	23	1	22	—	—
<i>Diversity Jurisdiction</i>	3	0	3	—	—
Federal Preemption	2	0	2	—	—
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure	1	0	1	—	—
<i>Federal Question Jurisdiction</i>	20	1	19	—	—
Antitrust	1	0	1	—	—
Bankruptcy	2	0	2	—	—
Class Actions	1	0	1	—	—
Copyright Act of 1976	2	0	2	—	—
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act	1	0	1	—	—
Federal Arbitration Act	3	0	3	—	—
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act	1	0	1	—	—
Freedom of Information Act	1	0	1	—	—
Freedom of Speech	1	1	0	—	—
Hobbs Act	1	0	1	—	—
International Organizations Immunities Act	1	0	1	—	—
Maritime Law	2	0	2	—	—
Patents	1	0	1	—	—
Railroad Retirement Tax Act	1	0	1	—	—
Removal	1	0	1	—	—
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES	9	4	5	6	3
Administrative Procedure Act	1	1	0	1	0
Armed Career Criminal Act	3	0	3	3	0
Double Jeopardy	1	1	0	1	0
Due Process	2	2	0	0	2
Pretrial Detention	1	0	1	1	0
Statutory Interpretation	1	0	1	0	1
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS	2	0	2	1	1
AEDPA Deference	1	0	1	0	1
Immigration and Nationality Act	1	0	1	1	0

TABLE III (continued)

SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS

	TOTAL	Principal Issue		Decision	
		Consti- tutional	Other	For Gov't	Against Gov't
CIVIL ACTIONS FROM STATE COURTS	5	2	3	2	3
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	5	2	3	2	3
Due Process	1	1	0	0	1
Exemption from State Taxation	1	0	1	1	0
Indian Affairs	1	0	1	0	1
Preemption	1	0	1	0	1
State Sovereign Immunity	1	1	0	1	0
PRIVATE LITIGATION	0	0	0	—	—
STATE CRIMINAL CASES	6	6	0	0	6
<i>Batson</i> Doctrine	1	1	0	0	1
Capital Punishment	1	1	0	0	1
Due Process	1	1	0	0	1
Eighth Amendment	1	1	0	0	1
Fourth Amendment	1	1	0	0	1
Right to Counsel	1	1	0	0	1
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION	0	0	0	—	—
TOTAL	72	22	50	20	29