

THE STATISTICS

TABLE I^a
(A) ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

	OPINIONS WRITTEN ^b				DISSENTING VOTES ^c		
	Opinions of Court ^d	Concur- rences ^e	Dissents ^e	TOTAL	In Disposition by		
					Opinion	Memo- randum ^f	TOTAL
Roberts	6	1	4	11	7	0	7
Scalia	2	1	2	5	3	0	3
Kennedy	9	2	1	12	2	0	2
Thomas	7	14	18	39	22	3	25
Ginsburg	8	4	5	17	10	0	10
Breyer	8	5	3	16	5	0	5
Alito	7	6	7	20	14	3	17
Sotomayor	7	3	8	18	15	0	15
Kagan	8	1	3	12	4	0	4
Per Curiam	13	—	—	13	—	—	—
Total	75	37	51	163	82	6	88

^a A complete explanation of how the tables are compiled may be found in *The Supreme Court, 2004 Term — The Statistics*, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 415–19 (2005).

Table I, with the exception of the dissenting-votes portion of section (A) and the memorandum tabulations in section (C), includes only full-opinion decisions. Thirteen per curiam decisions contained legal reasoning substantial enough to be considered full-opinion decisions during October Term 2015. These cases were *Lynch v. Arizona*, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); *Johnson v. Lee*, 136 S. Ct. 1802 (2016); *Kernan v. Hinojosa*, 136 S. Ct. 1603 (2016); *Zubik v. Burwell*, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); *Woods v. Etherton*, 136 S. Ct. 1149 (2016); *Caetano v. Massachusetts*, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016); *V.L. v. E.L.*, 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016); *Weary v. Cain*, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016); *Amgen Inc. v. Harris*, 136 S. Ct. 758 (2016); *James v. City of Boise*, 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016); *White v. Wheeler*, 136 S. Ct. 456 (2015); *Mullenix v. Luna*, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015); and *Maryland v. Kulbicki*, 136 S. Ct. 2 (2015).

This table includes every opinion designated by the Court as a 2015 Term Opinion except for six. See *2015 Term Opinions of the Court*, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, <https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/15> (last updated Aug. 26, 2016) [<https://perma.cc/19DUQ-9TVQ>]. The omitted opinions are *Duncan v. Owens*, 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016), which dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, *Montana v. Wyoming*, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016), in which the Court issued a decree without an opinion, and *United States v. Texas*, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); *Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians*, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016); *Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n*, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016); and *Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore*, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016), in each of which an equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the court below.

A memorandum order is a case decided by summary order and contained in the Court’s weekly order lists issued throughout the Term. This category excludes summary orders designated as opinions by the Court. The memorandum tabulations include memorandum orders disposing of cases on their merits by affirming, reversing, vacating, or remanding. They exclude orders disposing of petitions for certiorari, dismissing writs of certiorari as improvidently granted, dismissing appeals for lack of jurisdiction, disposing of miscellaneous applications, and certifying questions for review. The memorandum tabulations also exclude orders relating to payment of docketing fees and dissents therefrom.

TABLE I (*continued*)

^b This portion of Table I(A) includes only opinions authored in the seventy-five cases with full opinions this Term. Thus, dissents from denials of certiorari and concurrences or dissents from summary affirmances are not included. A concurrence or dissent is recorded as a written opinion whenever its author provided a reason, however brief, for his or her vote.

^c A Justice is considered to have dissented whenever he or she voted to dispose of the case in any manner different from the manner specified by the majority of the Court.

^d A plurality opinion that announced the judgment of the Court is counted as the opinion of the Court. Thus, for example, Justice Breyer's opinion in *Luis v. United States*, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016), is considered the opinion of the Court in that case.

^e Opinions concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in both are counted as concurrences. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part are counted as dissents.

^f Dissenting votes in memorandum decisions include instances in which Justices expressed that they would not have disposed of the case by memorandum order. This category does not include dissenting votes in orders relating to stays of execution; that information is presented in Table II(F) and its accompanying footnotes.

TABLE I (continued)
 (BI) VOTING ALIGNMENTS — ALL WRITTEN OPINIONS^g

		Roberts	Scalia	Kennedy	Thomas	Ginsburg	Breyer	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan
Roberts	O	—	13	66	43	57	62	51	53	64
	S	—	1	0	3	0	0	5	2	0
	D	—	14	66	46	57	62	56	55	64
	N	—	17	75	75	75	75	73	74	74
	P(%)	—	82.4	88.0	61.3	76.0	82.7	76.7	74.3	86.5
Scalia	O	13	—	13	12	11	12	12	11	13
	S	1	—	0	2	0	0	2	0	0
	D	14	—	13	14	11	12	14	11	13
	N	17	—	17	17	17	17	16	17	17
	P(%)	82.4	—	76.5	82.4	64.7	70.6	87.5	64.7	76.5
Kennedy	O	66	13	—	44	62	67	52	56	69
	S	0	0	—	2	0	1	3	0	0
	D	66	13	—	45	62	67	53	56	69
	N	75	17	—	75	75	75	73	74	74
	P(%)	88.0	76.5	—	60.0	82.7	89.3	72.6	75.7	93.2
Thomas	O	43	12	44	—	35	40	40	34	41
	S	3	2	2	—	1	1	13	3	0
	D	46	14	45	—	36	41	51	37	41
	N	75	17	75	—	75	75	73	74	74
	P(%)	61.3	82.4	60.0	—	48.0	54.7	69.9	50.0	55.4
Ginsburg	O	57	11	62	35	—	60	44	55	61
	S	0	0	0	1	—	2	0	9	2
	D	57	11	62	36	—	62	44	62	63
	N	75	17	75	75	—	75	73	74	74
	P(%)	76.0	64.7	82.7	48.0	—	82.7	60.3	83.8	85.1
Breyer	O	62	12	67	40	60	—	49	55	66
	S	0	0	1	1	2	—	1	2	2
	D	62	12	67	41	62	—	49	57	68
	N	75	17	75	75	75	—	73	74	74
	P(%)	82.7	70.6	89.3	54.7	82.7	—	67.1	77.0	91.9
Alito	O	51	12	52	40	44	49	—	38	50
	S	5	2	3	13	0	1	—	1	0
	D	56	14	53	51	44	49	—	39	50
	N	73	16	73	73	73	73	—	72	72
	P(%)	76.7	87.5	72.6	69.9	60.3	67.1	—	54.2	69.4
Sotomayor	O	53	11	56	34	55	55	38	—	55
	S	2	0	0	3	9	2	1	—	0
	D	55	11	56	37	62	57	39	—	55
	N	74	17	74	74	74	74	72	—	73
	P(%)	74.3	64.7	75.7	50.0	83.8	77.0	54.2	—	75.3
Kagan	O	64	13	69	41	61	66	50	55	—
	S	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	—
	D	64	13	69	41	63	68	50	55	—
	N	74	17	74	74	74	74	72	73	—
	P(%)	86.5	76.5	93.2	55.4	85.1	91.9	69.4	75.3	—

TABLE I (continued)
 (B₂) VOTING ALIGNMENTS — NONUNANIMOUS CASES^h

		Roberts	Scalia	Kennedy	Thomas	Ginsburg	Breyer	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan
Roberts	O	—	4	37	14	28	33	22	24	35
	S	—	1	0	3	0	0	5	2	0
	D	—	5	37	17	28	33	27	26	35
	N	—	8	46	46	46	46	44	45	45
	P(%)	—	62.5	80.4	37.0	60.9	71.7	61.4	57.8	77.8
Scalia	O	4	—	4	3	2	3	3	2	4
	S	1	—	0	2	0	0	2	0	0
	D	5	—	4	5	2	3	5	2	4
	N	8	—	8	8	8	8	7	8	8
	P(%)	62.5	—	50.0	62.5	25.0	37.5	71.4	25.0	50.0
Kennedy	O	37	4	—	15	33	38	23	27	40
	S	0	0	—	2	0	0	2	0	0
	D	37	4	—	16	33	38	24	27	40
	N	46	8	—	46	46	46	44	45	45
	P(%)	80.4	50.0	—	34.8	71.7	82.6	54.5	60.0	88.9
Thomas	O	14	3	15	—	6	11	11	5	12
	S	3	2	2	—	1	1	12	3	0
	D	17	5	16	—	7	12	22	8	12
	N	46	8	46	—	46	46	44	45	45
	P(%)	37.0	62.5	34.8	—	15.2	26.1	50.0	17.8	26.7
Ginsburg	O	28	2	33	6	—	31	15	26	32
	S	0	0	0	1	—	2	0	8	2
	D	28	2	33	7	—	33	15	33	34
	N	46	8	46	46	—	46	44	45	45
	P(%)	60.9	25.0	71.7	15.2	—	71.7	34.1	73.3	75.6
Breyer	O	33	3	38	11	31	—	20	26	37
	S	0	0	0	1	2	—	0	2	2
	D	33	3	38	12	33	—	20	28	39
	N	46	8	46	46	46	—	44	45	45
	P(%)	71.7	37.5	82.6	26.1	71.7	—	45.5	62.2	86.7
Alito	O	22	3	23	11	15	20	—	9	21
	S	5	2	2	12	0	0	—	1	0
	D	27	5	24	22	15	20	—	10	21
	N	44	7	44	44	44	44	—	43	43
	P(%)	61.4	71.4	54.5	50.0	34.1	45.5	—	23.3	48.8
Sotomayor	O	24	2	27	5	26	26	9	—	26
	S	2	0	0	3	8	2	1	—	0
	D	26	2	27	8	33	28	10	—	26
	N	45	8	45	45	45	45	43	—	44
	P(%)	57.8	25.0	60.0	17.8	73.3	62.2	23.3	—	59.1
Kagan	O	35	4	40	12	32	37	21	26	—
	S	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	—
	D	35	4	40	12	34	39	21	26	—
	N	45	8	45	45	45	45	43	44	—
	P(%)	77.8	50.0	88.9	26.7	75.6	86.7	48.8	59.1	—

TABLE I (*continued*)

^g Table I(B1) records the frequency with which each Justice voted with each of the other Justices in full-opinion decisions, including the thirteen per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. See *supra* note a.

Two Justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the Reporter of Decisions or the explicit statement of a Justice in his or her own opinion. This table does not treat a Justice as having joined the opinion of the Court unless that Justice authored or joined at least part of the opinion of the Court and did not author or join any opinion concurring in the judgment, even in part, or dissenting, even in part. For the purpose of counting dissents and concurrences, however, a Justice who partially joined an opinion is considered to have fully joined it. Therefore, Justice Thomas is not treated as having joined the opinion of the Court in *Ross v. Blake*, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016), because he authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. By contrast, Justice Thomas is treated as having fully joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion in *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016), even though he did not join Part II–C.

In Tables I(B1) and I(B2), “O” represents the number of decisions in which a particular pair of Justices agreed in an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. “S” represents the number of decisions in which two Justices agreed in any opinion other than an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. Justices who together joined more than one separate opinion in a case are considered to have agreed only once. “D” represents the number of decisions in which two Justices agreed in a majority, plurality, concurring, or dissenting opinion. A decision is counted only once in the “D” category if two Justices both joined the opinion of the Court and joined a separate concurrence. Thus, in some situations the “D” value will be less than the sum of the “O” and “S” values. “N” represents the number of decisions in which both Justices participated, and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. “P” represents the percentage of decisions in which one Justice agreed with another Justice and is calculated by dividing the “D” value by the “N” value and multiplying the quotient by 100.

^h Like Table I(B1), Table I(B2) records the frequency with which each of the Justices voted with each other Justice in full opinions, but Table I(B2) records these voting alignments only for cases that were not unanimously decided. A decision is considered unanimous for purposes of Table I whenever all the Justices joined the opinion of the Court and no Justice concurred only in the judgment, even in part, or dissented, even in part. Removing the unanimous cases produces lower rates of agreement overall, providing a more accurate picture of how the Justices voted in divisive cases.

TABLE I (continued)
(C) UNANIMITY

	Unanimous	With Concurrence ⁱ	With Dissent	TOTAL
Full Opinions	29 (38.7%)	7 (9.3%)	39 (52.0%)	75
Memorandum Orders	110 (97.3%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (2.7%)	113

(D) VOTING PATTERNS IN NONUNANIMOUS CASES^j

	Total Cases	JOINING THE OPINION OF THE COURT ^k		AGREEING IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ^l	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Roberts	46	39	84.8%	39	84.8%
Scalia	8	4	50.0%	5	62.5%
Kennedy	46	44	95.7%	44	95.7%
Thomas	46	16	34.8%	24	52.2%
Ginsburg	46	35	76.1%	36	78.3%
Breyer	46	40	87.0%	41	89.1%
Alito	44	24	54.5%	30	68.2%
Sotomayor	45	29	64.4%	30	66.7%
Kagan	45	41	91.1%	41	91.1%

(E) 5–4 DECISIONS

There were no decisions this Term in which the Justices divided 5–4.

ⁱ A decision is listed in this column if at least one Justice concurred in the judgment, but not in the Court's opinion in full, and no Justice dissented, even in part. See, e.g., *Molina-Martinez v. United States*, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016).

^j Table I(D) records the frequency with which each Justice joined the opinion of the Court in nonunanimous, full-opinion decisions. This table includes the thirteen per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions, see *supra* note a, if those decisions produced dissenting votes.

^k This portion of the table reports the number of times that each Justice joined the opinion of the Court, according to the rule described in note g.

^l This portion of the table reports the number of times that each Justice agreed with the Court's disposition of a case. It includes all cases in which a Justice joined the opinion of the Court, but, unlike the portion of the table described in note k, it also includes those cases in which a Justice concurred in the judgment without concurring in the Court's opinion in full. Cases in which the Justice dissented, even in part, are not included.

TABLE I (continued)
 (F) AVERAGE OPINION LENGTH^m

	Opinion of the Court	Plurality Opinion	Concurring Opinion	Concurring in Judgment ⁿ	Dissenting Opinion ⁿ	Total Pages
Roberts	16.6	—	4.9	—	11.0	137.7
Scalia	11.7	—	—	1.0	11.7	47.6
Kennedy	15.3	—	1.2	—	16.6	156.3
Thomas	12.5	—	2.5	6.6	8.9	310.6
Ginsburg	14.1	—	1.5	0.7	8.4	160.0
Breyer	15.0	15.6	2.0	0.5	9.3	141.5
Alito	16.4	—	—	10.5	18.4	296.7
Sotomayor	10.6	—	1.5	—	10.0	158.8
Kagan	17.7	—	0.6	—	7.8	165.9
Per Curiam	3.7	—	—	—	—	66.5

^m The data in this table reflect the length of opinions as published in the Court's slip opinions, estimated to the nearest tenth of a page. Though the slip opinions are eventually superseded by official case publication in the *United States Reports*, the total opinion length, in pages, is generally preserved in the final publication. Average opinion length is obtained by summing the number of pages written by each Justice within each category of opinion and then dividing by the number of opinions of that type written by that Justice. For the number of opinions written by each Justice, see *supra* Table I(A).

ⁿ Opinions concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in both are categorized here under Concurring in Judgment. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part, or concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, are categorized here under Dissenting Opinion.

TABLE II^a
(A) FINAL DISPOSITION OF CASES

	Disposed of	Remaining on Docket	TOTAL
Original Docket	1	7	8
Appellate Docket ^b	1539	300 ^c	1839
Miscellaneous Docket ^d	4963	722 ^c	5685
Total	6503	1029	7532

(B) CASES GRANTED REVIEW^e

	Review Granted ^f	Petitions Considered ^g	Percent Granted
Appellate Docket	69	1565	4.4%
Miscellaneous Docket	12	4971	0.2%
Total	81	6536	1.2%

^a All numbers in Tables II(A), II(B), and II(C) are derived from data provided by the Supreme Court.

^b The appellate docket consists of all paid cases.

^c The number of cases remaining on the appellate and miscellaneous dockets is calculated by adding the number of cases not acted upon in the 2015 Term to the number of cases granted review in the 2015 Term but carried over to the 2016 Term.

^d The miscellaneous docket consists of all cases filed *in forma pauperis*.

^e Table II(B) reports data that versions of Table II prior to 1998 reported under the label “Review Granted.” For a full explanation, see *The Supreme Court, 1997 Term — The Statistics*, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 372 n.d (1998). Table II(B) does not include cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction.

^f The number of cases granted review includes only those cases granted plenary review in the 2015 Term. It includes neither cases summarily decided nor those granted review in a previous Term and carried over to the 2015 Term. It does include cases granted review in the 2015 Term but carried over to a subsequent Term.

^g The number of petitions considered is calculated by adding the number of cases docketed in the 2015 Term to the number of cases carried over from prior Terms and subtracting the number of cases not acted upon in the 2015 Term.

TABLE II (*continued*)
(C) METHOD OF DISPOSITION^h

On Review	81
Summarily Decided	145
By Denial, Dismissal, or Withdrawal of Appeals or Petitions for Review	6277
Total	6503

(D) DISPOSITION OF CASES
REVIEWED ON WRIT OF CERTIORARIⁱ

	Reversed ^j	Vacated ^k	Affirmed	TOTAL
Full Opinions	32 (41.6%)	20 (26.0%)	25 (32.5%)	77
Memorandum Orders	0 (0.0%)	113 (98.3%)	2 (1.7%) ^l	115
Total	32 (16.7%)	133 (69.3%)	27 (14.1%)	192

^h Table II(C) does not include cases within the Court's original jurisdiction.

ⁱ Table II(D) reports the disposition of cases reviewed on writ of certiorari and decided on the merits. It does not include cases reviewed under other bases of jurisdiction, such as *Evenwel v. Abbott*, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016) (reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012)).

^j This category includes cases reversed in part and affirmed in part, as well as cases reversed in part and vacated in part.

^k This category includes cases vacated in part and affirmed in part.

^l In *Missud v. Court of Appeals*, 136 S. Ct. 329 (2015), five Justices disqualified themselves. In *Smith v. Scalia*, 136 S. Ct. 554 (2015), four Justices disqualified themselves. Because a quorum was therefore unobtainable in both cases, the Court affirmed the judgments below as if by an equally divided court. These opinions are not included in Table I(C).

TABLE II (continued)
 (E) ORIGINS OF CASES AND THEIR DISPOSITIONS^m

	FULL OPINIONS ⁿ			MEMORANDUM ORDERS			TOTAL
	Reversed ^o	Vacated ^p	Affirmed	Reversed	Vacated	Affirmed	
Federal Courts	20	16	25	0	56	1	118
<i>Circuit Courts</i>	20	16	22	0	56	1	115
First	0	1	2	0	1	0	4
Second	1	1	4	0	1	0	7
Third	1	1	1	0	1	0	4
Fourth	1	2	3	0	8	0	14
Fifth	4	1	2	0	8	0	15
Sixth	3	0	1	0	8	0	12
Seventh	0	0	0	0	6	0	6
Eighth	1	1	3	0	5	0	10
Ninth	5	3	2	0	2	0	12
Tenth	1	2	1	0	2	0	6
Eleventh	1	2	0	0	10	0	13
D.C.	1	1	2	0	0	1	5
Federal	1	1	1	0	4	0	7
<i>District Courts</i> ^q	0	0	3 ^r	0	0	0	3
<i>Armed Forces</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
State Courts	12	4	3	0	57	1	77
Total	32	20	28	0	113	2	195

^m Table II(E) counts consolidated cases disposed of by the same lower court opinion as a single case. It does not include original jurisdiction cases.

ⁿ This section reports only full opinions decided on the merits. It thus includes thirteen per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be counted as full opinions. *See supra* Table I, note a.

^o This category includes cases reversed in part and affirmed in part, as well as cases reversed in part and vacated in part.

^p This category includes cases vacated in part and affirmed in part.

^q This category includes statutorily authorized direct appeals from district courts.

^r *Wittman v. Personhuballah*, 136 S. Ct. 1732 (2016) (dismissing appeal for lack of standing); *Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n*, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016); *Evenwel v. Abbott*, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).

TABLE II (*continued*)
 (F) DISPOSITIONS OF APPLICATIONS FOR
 STAYS OF EXECUTION^s

	Granted ^t	Denied ^u	Percent Granted
Stay Applications	1	22	4.3%

^s This table treats multiple applications from the same death row inmate as a single application. Although the Court entertained forty-three applications for stays of execution last Term, these applications pertained to only twenty-three individuals.

This table includes only those dispositions that appear in the *Supreme Court Reporter* and excludes applications to vacate stays of execution.

For useful background information on how the Court handles stays of execution, see generally EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE §§ 18.1–.8, at 897–911 (9th ed. 2007); A REPORTER'S GUIDE TO APPLICATIONS PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2016), <http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/88TB-4FLH>]; and *The Supreme Court, 2006 Term — The Statistics*, 121 HARV. L. REV. 436, 446 n.t (2007).

^t This Term, the Court granted one stay application pending the disposition of the death row inmate's appeal. See *Johnson v. Lombardi*, 136 S. Ct. 443 (2015) (mem.). The lower court ultimately dismissed that appeal, but “[t]he State has not established a new execution date” and litigation in the case continues. See *Johnson v. Lombardi*, 815 F.3d 451, 452 (8th Cir. 2016).

^u Eighteen denials were unanimous. In *Lopez v. Stephens*, 136 S. Ct. 17 (2015) (mem.), the Court denied the inmate leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*, in addition to denying certiorari. *Id.* at 18. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would have granted the motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. *Id.* Three further denials attracted dissents. Justice Sotomayor dissented in *Gissendaner v. Bryson*, 136 S. Ct. 25 (2015) (mem.). Justice Breyer dissented in *Brooks v. Alabama*, 136 S. Ct. 708 (2016) (mem.), and *Glossip v. Oklahoma*, 136 S. Ct. 26 (2015) (mem.). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Kagan did not dissent from any denial of an application for a stay of execution.

TABLE III^a
SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS

	TOTAL	Principal Issue ^b		Decision ^c	
		Consti- tutional	Other	For Gov't	Against Gov't
CIVIL ACTIONS FROM INFERIOR FEDERAL COURTS	42	9	33	10	12
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	13	1	12	5	6
<i>Review of Administrative Action</i>	6	0	6	3	3
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act	1	0	1	0	1
Clean Water Act	1	0	1	0	1
Federal Power Act	1	0	1	1	0
Immigration and Nationality Act	1	0	1	1	0
Patents	1	0	1	1	0
Veterans Affairs	1	0	1	0	1
<i>Other Action by or Against the United States or Its Officers</i>	7	1	6	2	3
Affordable Care Act	1	1	0	0	0
False Claims Act	1	0	1	0	0
Federal Tort Claims Act	1	0	1	0	1
Prison Litigation Reform Act	1	0	1	1	0
Statute of Limitations	1	0	1	1	0
Title VII	2	0	2	0	2

^a Table III records the subject matter of dispositions by full opinion, including the thirteen cases with per curiam opinions on the merits containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. *See supra* Table I, note a.

^b Each case is categorized as primarily constitutional or not. Cases invoking a mixture of statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication are particularly difficult to classify.

^c "Government" refers to federal, state, or local government, or an agency thereof, or to an individual participating in the suit in an official capacity. A decision is counted as "for" the government if the government prevailed on all contested issues. When the federal government opposed a state or local government, a decision is counted as "for" the government if the federal government prevailed on all contested issues. When two states, two units of local government, or two federal agencies opposed each other, the decision is counted as neither "for" the government nor "against" the government. When the government prevailed on at least one but not all of the issues before the Court, a decision is counted as neither "for" nor "against" the government.

TABLE III (continued)
 SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS

	TOTAL	Principal Issue		Decision	
		Constitutional	Other	For Gov't	Against Gov't
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	13	6	7	5	6
Abortion	1	1	0	0	1
Equal Protection	3	3	0	3	0
Federal Election Law	1	0	1	0	1
Federal Power Act	1	0	1	0	1
Federal Preemption	2	0	2	0	2
First Amendment	1	1	0	0	1
Indian Law	1	0	1	0	0
Prison Litigation Reform Act	1	0	1	0	0
Qualified Immunity	1	0	1	1	0
Standing	1	1	0	1	0
PRIVATE LITIGATION	16	2	14	—	—
<i>Diversity Jurisdiction</i>	3	0	3	—	—
Diversity Requirements	1	0	1	—	—
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act	1	0	1	—	—
Procedure	1	0	1	—	—
<i>Federal Question Jurisdiction</i>	13	2	11	—	—
Bankruptcy	1	0	1	—	—
Class Actions	1	0	1	—	—
Copyright Act	1	0	1	—	—
ERISA	2	0	2	—	—
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act	1	0	1	—	—
Fair Labor Standards Act	1	0	1	—	—
Mootness	1	0	1	—	—
Patents	1	0	1	—	—
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act	1	0	1	—	—
Securities Exchange Act	1	0	1	—	—
Separation of Powers	1	1	0	—	—
Standing	1	1	0	—	—

TABLE III (*continued*)
SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS

	TOTAL	Principal Issue		Decision	
		Constitutional	Other	For Gov't	Against Gov't
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES	12	3	9	6	6
Armed Career Criminal Act	1	0	1	0	1
Hobbs Act	2	0	2	2	0
Jury Instructions	1	0	1	0	1
Procedure	1	0	1	1	0
Right to Counsel	2	2	0	1	1
Sentencing Guidelines	2	0	2	1	1
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act	1	0	1	0	1
Statutory Interpretation	1	0	1	1	0
<i>Teague</i> Retroactivity	1	1	0	0	1
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS	4	0	4	4	0
AEDPA	1	0	1	1	0
AEDPA Deference	2	0	2	2	0
Procedural Default	1	0	1	1	0
CIVIL ACTIONS FROM STATE COURTS	4	3	1	0	1
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	2	2	0	0	1
Full Faith and Credit	1	1	0	0	0
Supremacy Clause	1	1	0	0	1
PRIVATE LITIGATION	2	1	1	—	—
Federal Arbitration Act	1	0	1	—	—
Full Faith and Credit	1	1	0	—	—
STATE CRIMINAL CASES^d	13	13	0	4	8
<i>Batson</i> Doctrine	1	1	0	0	1
Capital Sentencing	3	3	0	1	2
Double Jeopardy	1	1	0	0	1
Due Process	2	2	0	0	2
Right to Bear Arms	1	1	0	0	1
Right to Counsel	1	1	0	1	0
Right to Speedy Trial	1	1	0	1	0
Search and Seizure	2	2	0	1	0
<i>Teague</i> Retroactivity	1	1	0	0	1
TOTAL	75	28	47	24	27

^d *Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle*, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016), which reached the Court on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, is included in this category.