

THE STATISTICS

TABLE I^a
(A) ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

	OPINIONS WRITTEN ^b				DISSENTING VOTES ^c		
	Opinions of Court ^d	Concur- rences ^e	Dissents ^e	TOTAL	In Disposition by		
					Opinion	Memo- randum ^f	TOTAL
Roberts	7	1	6	14	16	0	16
Scalia	9	4	15	28	23	0	23
Kennedy	6	4	3	13	9	0	9
Thomas	7	10	20	37	30	0	30
Ginsburg	7	5	1	13	10	0	10
Breyer	8	4	4	16	6	0	6
Alito	8	8	14	30	22	0	22
Sotomayor	7	3	6	16	8	0	8
Kagan	7	2	2	11	11	0	11
Per Curiam	8	—	—	8	—	—	—
Total	74	41	71	186	135	0	135

^a A complete explanation of how the tables are compiled may be found in *The Supreme Court, 2004 Term — The Statistics*, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 415–19 (2005).

Table I, with the exception of the dissenting-votes portion of section (A) and the memorandum tabulations in section (C), includes only full-opinion decisions. Eight per curiam decisions contained legal reasoning substantial enough to be considered full-opinion decisions during October Term 2014. These cases were *Taylor v. Barkes*, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015); *Woods v. Donald*, 135 S. Ct. 1372 (2015); *Grady v. North Carolina*, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015); *Christeson v. Roper*, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015); *Glebe v. Frost*, 135 S. Ct. 429 (2014); *Carroll v. Carman*, 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014); *Johnson v. City of Shelby*, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014); and *Lopez v. Smith*, 135 S. Ct. 1 (2014). This table includes every opinion designated by the Court as a 2014 Term Opinion except for two. See *2014 Term Opinions of the Court*, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=14> (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [<http://perma.cc/6XTV-9X6P>]. The omitted opinions are *United States v. California*, 135 S. Ct. 563 (2014), which granted a joint motion for entry of a supplemental decree, and *Kansas v. Nebraska*, 135 S. Ct. 1255 (2015), in which the Court issued a decree in light of its merits decision in that dispute.

A memorandum order is a case decided by summary order and contained in the Court’s weekly order lists issued throughout the Term. This category excludes summary orders designated as opinions by the Court. The memorandum tabulations include memorandum orders disposing of cases on their merits by affirming, reversing, vacating, or remanding. They exclude orders disposing of petitions for certiorari, dismissing writs of certiorari as improvidently granted, dismissing appeals for lack of jurisdiction, disposing of miscellaneous applications, and certifying questions for review. The memorandum tabulations also exclude orders relating to payment of docketing fees and dissents therefrom.

^b This portion of Table I(A) includes only opinions authored in the seventy-four cases with full opinions this Term. Thus, dissents from denials of certiorari and concurrences or dissents from summary affirmances are not included. A concurrence or dissent is recorded as a written opinion whenever its author provided a reason, however brief, for his or her vote.

TABLE I (*continued*)

^c A Justice is considered to have dissented whenever he or she voted to dispose of the case in any manner different from the manner specified by the majority of the Court.

^d A plurality opinion that announced the judgment of the Court is counted as the opinion of the Court. Thus, for example, Justice Ginsburg's opinion in *Yates v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015), is considered the opinion of the Court in that case.

^e Opinions concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in both are counted as concurrences. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part are counted as dissents.

^f Dissenting votes in memorandum decisions include instances in which Justices expressed that they would not have disposed of the case by memorandum order. There were no such instances this Term. This category does not include dissenting votes in orders relating to stays of execution; that information is presented in Table II(F) and its accompanying footnotes.

TABLE I (continued)
 (B1) VOTING ALIGNMENTS — ALL WRITTEN OPINIONS^g

		Roberts	Scalia	Kennedy	Thomas	Ginsburg	Breyer	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan
Roberts	O	—	45	47	35	45	48	42	48	45
	S	—	14	1	12	2	1	9	1	0
	D	—	59	48	47	46	48	51	48	45
	N	—	74	74	74	74	72	74	74	74
	P(%)	—	79.7	64.9	63.5	62.2	66.7	68.9	64.9	60.8
Scalia	O	45	—	41	35	38	40	38	39	40
	S	14	—	4	19	2	0	11	0	4
	D	59	—	45	53	40	40	49	39	44
	N	74	—	74	74	74	72	74	74	74
	P(%)	79.7	—	60.8	71.6	54.1	55.6	66.2	52.7	59.5
Kennedy	O	47	41	—	34	53	55	43	57	55
	S	1	4	—	5	1	0	5	3	3
	D	48	45	—	39	54	55	47	59	58
	N	74	74	—	74	74	72	74	74	74
	P(%)	64.9	60.8	—	52.7	73.0	76.4	63.5	79.7	78.4
Thomas	O	35	35	34	—	30	28	36	29	29
	S	12	19	5	—	2	0	16	0	2
	D	47	53	39	—	32	28	52	29	31
	N	74	74	74	—	74	72	74	74	74
	P(%)	63.5	71.6	52.7	—	43.2	38.9	70.3	39.2	41.9
Ginsburg	O	45	38	53	30	—	59	35	59	58
	S	2	2	1	2	—	10	0	8	11
	D	46	40	54	32	—	67	35	64	67
	N	74	74	74	74	—	72	74	74	74
	P(%)	62.2	54.1	73.0	43.2	—	93.1	47.3	86.5	90.5
Breyer	O	48	40	55	28	59	—	37	62	61
	S	1	0	0	0	10	—	0	6	8
	D	48	40	55	28	67	—	37	66	68
	N	72	72	72	72	72	—	72	72	72
	P(%)	66.7	55.6	76.4	38.9	93.1	—	51.4	91.7	94.4
Alito	O	42	38	43	36	35	37	—	38	36
	S	9	11	5	16	0	0	—	1	0
	D	51	49	47	52	35	37	—	38	36
	N	74	74	74	74	74	72	—	74	74
	P(%)	68.9	66.2	63.5	70.3	47.3	51.4	—	51.4	48.6
Sotomayor	O	48	39	57	29	59	62	38	—	60
	S	1	0	3	0	8	6	1	—	7
	D	48	39	59	29	64	66	38	—	65
	N	74	74	74	74	74	72	74	—	74
	P(%)	64.9	52.7	79.7	39.2	86.5	91.7	51.4	—	87.8
Kagan	O	45	40	55	29	58	61	36	60	—
	S	0	4	3	2	11	8	0	7	—
	D	45	44	58	31	67	68	36	65	—
	N	74	74	74	74	74	72	74	74	—
	P(%)	60.8	59.5	78.4	41.9	90.5	94.4	48.6	87.8	—

TABLE I (continued)
 (B₂) VOTING ALIGNMENTS — NONUNANIMOUS CASES^h

		Roberts	Scalia	Kennedy	Thomas	Ginsburg	Breyer	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan
Roberts	O	—	21	23	11	21	24	18	24	21
	S	—	14	1	12	2	1	9	1	0
	D	—	35	24	23	22	24	27	24	21
	N	—	50	50	50	50	48	50	50	50
	P(%)	—	70.0	48.0	46.0	44.0	50.0	54.0	48.0	42.0
Scalia	O	21	—	18	11	14	16	14	15	16
	S	14	—	4	19	2	0	11	0	4
	D	35	—	22	29	16	16	25	15	20
	N	50	—	50	50	50	48	50	50	50
	P(%)	70.0	—	44.0	58.0	32.0	33.3	50.0	30.0	40.0
Kennedy	O	23	18	—	10	29	31	19	33	31
	S	1	4	—	5	1	0	5	3	3
	D	24	22	—	15	30	31	23	35	34
	N	50	50	—	50	50	48	50	50	50
	P(%)	48.0	44.0	—	30.0	60.0	64.6	46.0	70.0	68.0
Thomas	O	11	11	10	—	6	4	12	5	5
	S	12	19	5	—	2	0	16	0	2
	D	23	29	15	—	8	4	28	5	7
	N	50	50	50	—	50	48	50	50	50
	P(%)	46.0	58.0	30.0	—	16.0	8.3	56.0	10.0	14.0
Ginsburg	O	21	14	29	6	—	35	11	35	34
	S	2	2	1	2	—	8	0	5	10
	D	22	16	30	8	—	43	11	40	43
	N	50	50	50	50	—	48	50	50	50
	P(%)	44.0	32.0	60.0	16.0	—	89.6	22.0	80.0	86.0
Breyer	O	24	16	31	4	35	—	13	38	37
	S	1	0	0	0	8	—	0	4	7
	D	24	16	31	4	43	—	13	42	44
	N	48	48	48	48	48	—	48	48	48
	P(%)	50.0	33.3	64.6	8.3	89.6	—	27.1	87.5	91.7
Alito	O	18	14	19	12	11	13	—	14	12
	S	9	11	5	16	0	0	—	1	0
	D	27	25	23	28	11	13	—	14	12
	N	50	50	50	50	50	48	—	50	50
	P(%)	54.0	50.0	46.0	56.0	22.0	27.1	—	28.0	24.0
Sotomayor	O	24	15	33	5	35	38	14	—	36
	S	1	0	3	0	5	4	1	—	5
	D	24	15	35	5	40	42	14	—	41
	N	50	50	50	50	50	48	50	—	50
	P(%)	48.0	30.0	70.0	10.0	80.0	87.5	28.0	—	82.0
Kagan	O	21	16	31	5	34	37	12	36	—
	S	0	4	3	2	10	7	0	5	—
	D	21	20	34	7	43	44	12	41	—
	N	50	50	50	50	50	48	50	50	—
	P(%)	42.0	40.0	68.0	14.0	86.0	91.7	24.0	82.0	—

TABLE I (*continued*)

^g Table I(B₁) records the frequency with which each Justice voted with each of the other Justices in full-opinion decisions, including the eight per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. See *supra* note a.

Two Justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the Reporter of Decisions or the explicit statement of a Justice in his or her own opinion. This table does not treat a Justice as having joined the opinion of the Court unless that Justice authored or joined at least part of the opinion of the Court and did not author or join any opinion concurring in the judgment, even in part, or dissenting, even in part. For the purpose of counting dissents and concurrences, however, a Justice who partially joined an opinion is considered to have fully joined it. Therefore, Justice Alito is not treated as having joined the opinion of the Court in *Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif*, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), because he authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. By contrast, Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Sotomayor are treated as having fully joined Justice Thomas's opinion in *Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett*, 135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015), even though they did not join the footnote.

In Tables I(B₁) and I(B₂), “O” represents the number of decisions in which a particular pair of Justices agreed in an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. “S” represents the number of decisions in which two Justices agreed in any opinion other than an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. Justices who together joined more than one separate opinion in a case are considered to have agreed only once. “D” represents the number of decisions in which two Justices agreed in a majority, plurality, concurring, or dissenting opinion. A decision is counted only once in the “D” category if two Justices both joined the opinion of the Court and joined a separate concurrence. Thus, in some situations the “D” value will be less than the sum of the “O” and “S” values. “N” represents the number of decisions in which both Justices participated, and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. “P” represents the percentage of decisions in which one Justice agreed with another Justice and is calculated by dividing the “D” value by the “N” value and multiplying the quotient by 100.

^h Like Table I(B₁), Table I(B₂) records the frequency with which each of the other Justices voted with each other Justice in full opinions, but Table I(B₂) records these voting alignments only for cases that were not unanimously decided. A decision is considered unanimous for purposes of Table I whenever all the Justices joined the opinion of the Court and no Justice concurred only in the judgment, even in part, or dissented, even in part. Removing the unanimous cases produces lower rates of agreement overall, providing a more accurate picture of how the Justices voted in divisive cases.

TABLE I (continued)
(C) UNANIMITY

	Unanimous	With Concurrence ⁱ	With Dissent	TOTAL
Full Opinions	24 (32.4%)	6 (8.1%)	44 (59.5%)	74
Memorandum Orders	99 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	99

(D) VOTING PATTERNS IN NONUNANIMOUS CASES^j

	Total Cases	JOINING THE OPINION OF THE COURT ^k		AGREEING IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ^l	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Roberts	50	33	66.0%	34	68.0%
Scalia	50	24	48.0%	27	54.0%
Kennedy	50	39	78.0%	41	82.0%
Thomas	50	14	28.0%	20	40.0%
Ginsburg	50	37	74.0%	40	80.0%
Breyer	48	40	83.3%	42	87.5%
Alito	50	22	44.0%	28	56.0%
Sotomayor	50	41	82.0%	42	84.0%
Kagan	50	38	76.0%	39	78.0%

ⁱ A decision is listed in this column if at least one Justice concurred in the judgment, but not in the Court's opinion in full, and no Justice dissented, even in part. See, e.g., *Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n*, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).

^j Table I(D) records the frequency with which each Justice joined the opinion of the Court in nonunanimous, full-opinion decisions. This table includes the eight per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions, see *supra* note a, if those decisions produced dissenting votes.

^k This portion of the table reports the number of times that each Justice joined the opinion of the Court, according to the rule described in note g.

^l This portion of the table reports the number of times that each Justice agreed with the Court's disposition of a case. It includes all cases in which a Justice joined the opinion of the Court, but, unlike the portion of the table described in note k, it also includes those cases in which a Justice concurred in the judgment without concurring in the Court's opinion in full. Cases in which the Justice dissented, even in part, are not included.

TABLE I (*continued*)
(E) 5–4 DECISIONS

Justices Constituting the Majority	Number of Decisions ^m
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan	10 ⁿ
Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito	5 ^o
Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor	2 ^p
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Alito	1 ^q
Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor	1 ^r
Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan	1 ^s
Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan	1 ^t
Total	21

^m This column lists the number of 5–4 full-opinion decisions in which each five-Justice group constituted the majority. A case is counted as 5–4 if four Justices voted to dispose of any issue, no matter how minor, differently than the majority of the Court. Cases involving plurality opinions are included so long as the Justices divided 5–4 on the disposition. *See, e.g.,* *Yates v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). Cases in which any Justice did not participate are not included.

ⁿ *Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (Ginsburg, J.); *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Kennedy, J.); *Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (Kennedy, J.); *Kingsley v. Hendrickson*, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015) (Breyer, J.); *City of Los Angeles v. Patel*, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (Sotomayor, J.); *Brumfield v. Cain*, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015) (Sotomayor, J.); *Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry*, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (Kennedy, J.); *United States v. Wong*, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015) (Kagan, J.); *Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015) (Breyer, J.); *Kansas v. Nebraska*, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015) (Kagan, J.).

^o *Glossip v. Gross*, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (Alito, J.); *Michigan v. EPA*, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Scalia, J.); *Horne v. Dep’t of Agric.*, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.); *Davis v. Ayala*, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015) (Alito, J.); *Kerry v. Din*, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion).

^p *Yates*, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (Ginsburg, J.) (plurality opinion); *Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens*, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.).

^q *Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) (Scalia, J.).

^r *Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne*, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (Alito, J.).

^s *Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar*, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.).

^t *Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015) (Breyer, J.).

TABLE I (continued)
 (F) AVERAGE OPINION LENGTH^u

	Opinion of the Court	Plurality Opinion	Concurring Opinion	Concurring in Judgment ^v	Dissenting Opinion ^v	Total Pages
Roberts	16.1	—	—	1.3	14.5	201.2
Scalia	9.1	14.1	6.0	4.6	9.0	241.9
Kennedy	20.3	—	3.4	2.7	2.6	141.7
Thomas	11.3	—	3.3	12.0	12.0	403.3
Ginsburg	14.9	19.0	0.8	4.3	18.3	133.7
Breyer	15.2	—	0.2	4.1	15.7	193.1
Alito	20.0	—	4.6	3.9	9.6	317.3
Sotomayor	14.4	—	2.2	0.2	13.5	186.5
Kagan	15.7	—	2.5	5.8	21.1	160.1
Per Curiam	5.5	—	—	—	—	43.9

^u The data in this table reflect the length of opinions as published in the Court's slip opinions, estimated to the nearest tenth of a page. Though the slip opinions are eventually superseded by official case publication in the *United States Reports*, the total opinion length, in pages, is generally preserved in the final publication. Average opinion length is obtained by summing the number of pages written by each Justice within each category of opinion and then dividing by the number of opinions of that type written by that Justice. For the number of opinions written by each Justice, see *supra* Table I(A).

^v Opinions concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in both are categorized here under Concurring in Judgment. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part are categorized here under Dissenting Opinion.

TABLE II^a
(A) FINAL DISPOSITION OF CASES

	Disposed of	Remaining on Docket	TOTAL
Original Docket	1	5	6
Appellate Docket ^b	1548	297 ^c	1845
Miscellaneous Docket ^d	5451	764 ^c	6215
Total	7000	1066	8066

(B) CASES GRANTED REVIEW^e

	Review Granted ^f	Petitions Considered ^g	Percent Granted
Appellate Docket	63	1582	4.0%
Miscellaneous Docket	8	5456	0.1%
Total	71	7038	1.0%

^a All numbers in Tables II(A), II(B), and II(C) are derived from data provided by the Supreme Court.

^b The appellate docket consists of all paid cases.

^c The number of cases remaining on the appellate and miscellaneous dockets is calculated by adding the number of cases not acted upon in the 2014 Term to the number of cases granted review in the 2014 Term but carried over to the 2015 Term.

^d The miscellaneous docket consists of all cases filed *in forma pauperis*.

^e Table II(B) reports data that versions of Table II prior to 1998 reported under the label “Review Granted.” For a full explanation, see *The Supreme Court, 1997 Term — The Statistics*, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 372 n.d (1998). Table II(B) does not include cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction.

^f The number of cases granted review includes only those cases granted plenary review in the 2014 Term. It includes neither cases summarily decided nor those granted review in a previous Term and carried over to the 2014 Term. It does include cases granted review in the 2014 Term but carried over to a subsequent Term.

^g The number of petitions considered is calculated by adding the number of cases docketed in the 2014 Term to the number of cases carried over from prior Terms and subtracting the number of cases not acted upon in the 2014 Term.

TABLE II (continued)
 (C) METHOD OF DISPOSITION^h

On Review	71
Summarily Decided	109
By Denial, Dismissal, or Withdrawal of Appeals or Petitions for Review	6819
Total	6999

(D) DISPOSITION OF CASES
 REVIEWED ON WRIT OF CERTIORARIⁱ

	Reversed ^j	Vacated ^k	Affirmed	TOTAL
Full Opinions	36 (50.7%)	16 (22.5%)	19 (26.8%)	71
Memorandum Orders	0 (0.0%)	98 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	98
Total	36 (21.3%)	114 (67.5%)	19 (11.2%)	169

^h Table II(C) does not include cases within the Court's original jurisdiction.

ⁱ Table II(D) reports the disposition of cases reviewed on writ of certiorari and decided on the merits. It does not include cases reviewed under other bases of jurisdiction, such as *Cantor v. Personhuballah*, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015) (mem.) (reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012)).

^j This category includes cases reversed in part and affirmed in part, as well as cases reversed in part and vacated in part.

^k This category includes cases vacated in part and affirmed in part.

TABLE II (continued)
 (E) ORIGINS OF CASES AND THEIR DISPOSITIONS^l

	FULL OPINIONS ^m			MEMORANDUM ORDERS			TOTAL
	Reversed ⁿ	Vacated ^o	Affirmed	Reversed	Vacated	Affirmed	
Federal Courts	35	16	17	0	94	0	162
<i>Circuit Courts</i>	35	15	16	0	93	0	159
First	0	0	1	0	2	0	3
Second	1	0	0	0	3	0	4
Third	3	0	0	0	2	0	5
Fourth	1	2	3	0	5	0	11
Fifth	5	1	2	0	6	0	14
Sixth	2	2	1	0	13	0	18
Seventh	1	2	0	0	1	0	4
Eighth	6	1	1	0	7	0	15
Ninth	8	2	5	0	9	0	24
Tenth	2	1	1	0	1	0	5
Eleventh	4	1	0	0	36	0	41
D.C.	2	1	1	0	3	0	7
Federal	0	2	1	0	5	0	8
<i>District Courts</i>	0	1 ^p	1 ^q	0	1	0	3
<i>Armed Forces</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
State Courts	1	1	3	0	5	0	10
Total	36	17	20	0	99	0	172

^l Table II(E) counts consolidated cases disposed of by the same lower court opinion as a single case. It does not include original jurisdiction cases.

^m This section reports only full opinions decided on the merits. It thus includes eight per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be counted as full opinions. See *supra* Table I, note a.

ⁿ This category includes cases reversed in part and affirmed in part, as well as cases reversed in part and vacated in part.

^o This category includes cases vacated in part and affirmed in part.

^p *Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).

^q *Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n*, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).

TABLE II (*continued*)
 (F) DISPOSITIONS OF APPLICATIONS FOR
 STAYS OF EXECUTION^r

	Granted ^s	Denied ^t	Percent Granted
Stay Applications	3	25	10.7%

^r This table treats multiple applications from the same death row inmate as a single application. Although the Court entertained sixty-three applications for stays of execution last Term, these applications pertained to only twenty-eight individuals.

This table includes only those dispositions that appear in the *Supreme Court Reporter* and excludes applications to vacate stays of execution.

For useful background information on how the Court handles stays of execution, see generally EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE §§ 18.1–.8, at 897–911 (9th ed. 2007); A REPORTER'S GUIDE TO APPLICATIONS PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2010), <http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf> [<http://perma.cc/W5CJ-XG8B>]; and *The Supreme Court, 2006 Term — The Statistics*, 121 HARV. L. REV. 436, 446 n.t (2007).

^s This Term, the Court granted two stay applications pending its decisions whether to grant certiorari in the underlying cases. See *Bower v. Texas*, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015) (mem.); *Christeson v. Roper*, 135 S. Ct. 433 (2014) (mem.). These stays were to terminate automatically upon the Court's denial of the associated certiorari petition, or if certiorari was granted, upon issuance of the judgment of the Court. In one case, certiorari was denied. See *Bower v. Texas*, 135 S. Ct. 1291 (2015) (mem.). In the other case, certiorari was granted, the judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded. See *Christeson v. Roper*, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015) (per curiam). A third application was granted pending the final disposition of the case in the Supreme Court. See *Glossip v. Gross*, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015) (mem.). In that case, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's affirmation of the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction, thereby terminating the stay. See *Glossip v. Gross*, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).

^t Sixteen denials were unanimous. Nine attracted dissents. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented together on seven occasions: *Zink v. Lombardi*, 135 S. Ct. 1758 (2015); *Clayton v. Lombardi*, 135 S. Ct. 1697 (2015); *Storey v. Lombardi*, 135 S. Ct. 1198 (2015); *Goodwin v. Lombardi*, 135 S. Ct. 780 (2014); *Taylor v. Lombardi*, 135 S. Ct. 701 (2014); *Ringo v. Lombardi*, 135 S. Ct. 40 (2014); and *Worthington v. Lombardi*, 135 S. Ct. 22 (2014). Justices Breyer and Sotomayor dissented together on two further occasions: *Hill v. Chatman*, 135 S. Ct. 1196 (2015); and *Holsey v. Chatman*, 135 S. Ct. 780 (2014). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito did not dissent from any denial of an application for a stay of execution.

TABLE III^a
SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS

	TOTAL	Principal Issue ^b		Decision ^c	
		Consti- tutional	Other	For Gov't	Against Gov't
CIVIL ACTIONS FROM INFERIOR FEDERAL COURTS	55	15	40	14	20
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	18	4	14	9	9
<i>Review of Administrative Action</i>	9	2	7	4	5
Administrative Procedure Act	1	0	1	1	0
Board of Immigration Appeals	2	0	2	0	2
Clean Air Act	1	0	1	0	1
Due Process	1	1	0	1	0
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	1	0	1	0	1
Federal Trade Commission	1	0	1	1	0
Statutory Interpretation	1	0	1	1	0
Takings Clause	1	1	0	0	1
<i>Other Action by or Against the United States or Its Officers</i>	9	2	7	5	4
Federal Employment	1	0	1	0	1
Federal Tort Claims Act	1	0	1	0	1
Presidential Powers	1	1	0	1	0
Qualified Immunity	1	0	1	1	0
Search and Seizure	1	0	1	0	1
Separation of Powers	1	1	0	1	0
Statutory Interpretation	1	0	1	1	0
Title VII	1	0	1	1	0
Wartime Limitations Act	1	0	1	0	1
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	17	10	7	5	11
Cruel and Unusual Punishment	1	1	0	1	0
Due Process and Equal Protection	1	1	0	0	1
Elections Clause	1	1	0	0	0
Equal Protection	1	1	0	0	1
Excessive Force	1	1	0	0	1
Fair Housing Act	1	0	1	0	1
Freedom of Speech	2	2	0	1	1
Procedure	1	0	1	0	1
Qualified Immunity	1	0	1	1	0
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act	1	0	1	0	1
RLUIPA	1	0	1	0	1
Search and Seizure	2	2	0	1	1
Supremacy Clause	1	1	0	1	0
Tax Injunction Act	1	0	1	0	1
Telecommunications Act	1	0	1	0	1

TABLE III (continued)
SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS

	TOTAL	Principal Issue ^b		Decision ^c	
		Constitutional	Other	For Gov't	Against Gov't
PRIVATE LITIGATION	20	1	19	—	—
<i>Diversity Jurisdiction</i>	2	0	2	—	—
Federal Rules of Evidence	1	0	1	—	—
Removal	1	0	1	—	—
<i>Federal Question Jurisdiction</i>	18	1	17	—	—
Americans with Disabilities Act	1	0	1	—	—
Appellate Review	1	0	1	—	—
Bankruptcy	5	1	4	—	—
ERISA	2	0	2	—	—
Fair Labor Standards Act	1	0	1	—	—
Lanham Act	2	0	2	—	—
Natural Gas Act	1	0	1	—	—
Patents	3	0	3	—	—
Securities Act of 1933	1	0	1	—	—
Truth in Lending Act	1	0	1	—	—
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES	6	2	4	1	4
Armed Career Criminal Act	1	1	0	0	1
Controlled Substances Act	1	0	1	0	0
Search and Seizure	1	1	0	0	1
Other Statutory Interpretation	3	0	3	1	2
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS	7	2	5	4	3
AEDPA Deference	1	0	1	1	0
AEDPA Retroactivity	2	0	2	2	0
<i>Atkins</i> Hearing	1	1	0	0	1
Harmless Error	1	0	1	1	0
Procedure	1	0	1	0	1
Right to Counsel	1	1	0	0	1
CIVIL ACTIONS FROM STATE COURTS	3	3	0	1	2
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	3	3	0	1	2
Dormant Commerce Clause	1	1	0	0	1
Freedom of Speech	1	1	0	1	0
Search and Seizure	1	1	0	0	1
PRIVATE LITIGATION	0	0	0	—	—
STATE CRIMINAL CASES	2	2	0	2	0
Confrontation Clause	1	1	0	1	0
Search and Seizure	1	1	0	1	0
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION	1	0	1	—	—
Interstate Compact Interpretation	1	0	1	—	—
TOTAL	74	24	50	22	29

TABLE III (*continued*)

^a Table III records the subject matter of dispositions by full opinion, including the eight cases with per curiam opinions on the merits containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. *See supra* Table I, note a.

^b Each case is categorized as primarily constitutional or not. Cases invoking a mixture of statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication are particularly difficult to classify.

^c “Government” refers to federal, state, or local government, or an agency thereof, or to an individual participating in the suit in an official capacity. A decision is counted as “for” the government if the government prevailed on all contested issues. When the federal government opposed a state or local government, a decision is counted as “for” the government if the federal government prevailed on all contested issues. When two states, two units of local government, or two federal agencies opposed each other, the decision is counted as neither “for” the government nor “against” the government. When the government prevailed on at least one but not all of the issues before the Court, a decision is counted as neither “for” nor “against” the government.