

# THE STATISTICS

TABLE I<sup>a</sup>  
(A) ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

	OPINIONS WRITTEN <sup>b</sup>				DISSENTING VOTES <sup>c</sup>		
	Opinions of Court <sup>d</sup>	Concurrences <sup>e</sup>	Dissents <sup>e</sup>	TOTAL	In Disposition by		
					Opinion	Memo-randum <sup>f</sup>	TOTAL
Roberts	7	2	3	12	6	0	6
Scalia	8	9	6	23	8	2	10
Kennedy	8	1	1	10	4	0	4
Thomas	7	7	1	15	10	0	10
Ginsburg	7	4	5	16	12	0	12
Breyer	7	1	6	14	10	0	10
Alito	8	9	4	21	9	0	9
Sotomayor	8	6	5	19	14	0	14
Kagan	7	0	3	10	8	0	8
Per Curiam	5	—	—	5	—	—	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>33<sup>g</sup></b>	<b>144<sup>g</sup></b>	<b>81</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>83</b>

<sup>a</sup> A complete explanation of how the tables are compiled may be found in *The Supreme Court, 2004 Term — The Statistics*, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 415–19 (2005).

Table I, with the exception of the dissenting-votes portion of section (A) and the memorandum tabulations in section (C), includes only full-opinion decisions. Five per curiam decisions contained legal reasoning substantial enough to be considered full-opinion decisions during October Term 2013. These cases were *Martinez v. Illinois*, 134 S. Ct. 2070 (2014); *Tolan v. Cotton*, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014); *Hinton v. Alabama*, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014); *Ford Motor Co. v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 510 (2013); and *Stanton v. Sims*, 134 S. Ct. 3 (2013). This table includes every opinion designated by the Court as a 2013 Term Opinion except for three. See *2013 Term Opinions of the Court*, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=13> (last visited Sept. 28, 2014) [<http://perma.cc/PT56-CPXZ>]. The omitted opinions are *Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall*, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013), and *Madigan v. Levin*, 134 S. Ct. 2 (2013), which each dismissed the associated writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, and *Williams v. Johnson*, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014), which granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and remanded the case for further consideration. *Williams* is instead classified as a memorandum order.

A memorandum order is a case decided by summary order and contained in the Court's weekly order lists issued throughout the Term. This category excludes summary orders designated as opinions by the Court. The memorandum tabulations include memorandum orders disposing of cases on their merits by affirming, reversing, vacating, or remanding. They exclude orders disposing of petitions for certiorari, dismissing writs of certiorari as improvidently granted, dismissing appeals for lack of jurisdiction, disposing of miscellaneous applications, and certifying questions for review. The memorandum tabulations also exclude orders relating to payment of docketing fees and dissents therefrom.

<sup>b</sup> This portion of Table I(A) includes only opinions authored in the seventy-two cases with full opinions this Term. Thus, dissents from denials of certiorari and concurrences or dissents from summary affirmances are not included. A concurrence or dissent is recorded as a written opinion whenever its author provided a reason, however brief, for his or her vote.

<sup>c</sup> A Justice is considered to have dissented whenever he or she voted to dispose of the case in any manner different from the manner specified by the majority of the Court.

TABLE I (*continued*)

<sup>d</sup> A plurality opinion that announced the judgment of the Court is counted as the opinion of the Court. Thus, for example, Justice Kagan's opinion in *Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio*, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014), is considered the opinion of the Court in that case.

<sup>e</sup> Opinions concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in both are counted as concurrences. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part are counted as dissents.

<sup>f</sup> Dissenting votes in memorandum decisions include instances in which Justices expressed that they would not dispose of the case by memorandum order. There were two such instances this Term: *Ajoku v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting); and *Russell v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This category does not include dissenting votes in orders relating to stays of execution; that information is presented in Table II(F) and its accompanying footnotes.

<sup>g</sup> Justices Breyer and Kagan coauthored a short dissent in *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). For the purposes of Table I(A), each Justice was credited with a full dissent, while the total number of dissents treats their joint opinion as a single dissent.

TABLE I (continued)  
 (B1) VOTING ALIGNMENTS — ALL WRITTEN OPINIONS<sup>h</sup>

		Roberts	Scalia	Kennedy	Thomas	Ginsburg	Breyer	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan
Roberts	O	—	49	60	48	50	55	49	49	53
	S	—	6	2	5	0	2	4	1	0
	D	—	55	62	53	50	57	53	50	53
	N	—	72	72	72	72	71	71	71	70
	<b>P (%)</b>	—	<b>76.4</b>	<b>86.1</b>	<b>73.6</b>	<b>69.4</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>74.6</b>	<b>70.4</b>	<b>75.7</b>
Scalia	O	49	—	49	49	43	44	48	41	46
	S	6	—	1	17	2	0	11	1	2
	D	55	—	50	65	45	44	58	42	48
	N	72	—	72	72	72	71	71	71	70
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>76.4</b>	—	<b>69.4</b>	<b>90.3</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>62.0</b>	<b>81.7</b>	<b>59.2</b>	<b>68.6</b>
Kennedy	O	60	49	—	48	53	56	51	51	57
	S	2	1	—	1	0	1	2	1	0
	D	62	50	—	49	53	57	53	52	57
	N	72	72	—	72	72	71	71	71	70
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>86.1</b>	<b>69.4</b>	—	<b>68.1</b>	<b>73.6</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>74.6</b>	<b>73.2</b>	<b>81.4</b>
Thomas	O	48	49	48	—	43	45	48	41	46
	S	5	17	1	—	1	1	12	1	1
	D	53	65	49	—	44	46	59	42	47
	N	72	72	72	—	72	71	71	71	70
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>73.6</b>	<b>90.3</b>	<b>68.1</b>	—	<b>61.1</b>	<b>64.8</b>	<b>83.1</b>	<b>59.2</b>	<b>67.1</b>
Ginsburg	O	50	43	53	43	—	54	42	52	56
	S	0	2	0	1	—	9	1	14	7
	D	50	45	53	44	—	61	43	62	63
	N	72	72	72	72	—	71	71	71	70
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>69.4</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>73.6</b>	<b>61.1</b>	—	<b>85.9</b>	<b>60.6</b>	<b>87.3</b>	<b>90.0</b>
Breyer	O	55	44	56	45	54	—	44	52	56
	S	2	0	1	1	9	—	1	11	5
	D	57	44	57	46	61	—	44	60	61
	N	71	71	71	71	71	—	70	70	69
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>62.0</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>64.8</b>	<b>85.9</b>	—	<b>62.9</b>	<b>85.7</b>	<b>88.4</b>
Alito	O	49	48	51	48	42	44	—	39	44
	S	4	11	2	12	1	1	—	2	0
	D	53	58	53	59	43	44	—	40	44
	N	71	71	71	71	71	70	—	70	69
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>74.6</b>	<b>81.7</b>	<b>74.6</b>	<b>83.1</b>	<b>60.6</b>	<b>62.9</b>	—	<b>57.1</b>	<b>63.8</b>
Sotomayor	O	49	41	51	41	52	52	39	—	53
	S	1	1	1	1	14	11	2	—	7
	D	50	42	52	42	62	60	40	—	60
	N	71	71	71	71	71	70	70	—	69
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>70.4</b>	<b>59.2</b>	<b>73.2</b>	<b>59.2</b>	<b>87.3</b>	<b>85.7</b>	<b>57.1</b>	—	<b>87.0</b>
Kagan	O	53	46	57	46	56	56	44	53	—
	S	0	2	0	1	7	5	0	7	—
	D	53	48	57	47	63	61	44	60	—
	N	70	70	70	70	70	69	69	69	—
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>75.7</b>	<b>68.6</b>	<b>81.4</b>	<b>67.1</b>	<b>90.0</b>	<b>88.4</b>	<b>63.8</b>	<b>87.0</b>	—

TABLE I (continued)  
 (B2) VOTING ALIGNMENTS — NONUNANIMOUS CASES<sup>i</sup>

		Roberts	Scalia	Kennedy	Thomas	Ginsburg	Breyer	Alito	Sotomayor	Kagan
Roberts	O	—	14	25	13	15	21	14	14	19
	S	—	6	2	5	0	2	4	1	0
	D	—	20	27	18	15	23	18	15	19
	N	—	37	37	37	37	37	36	36	36
	<b>P (%)</b>	—	<b>54.1</b>	<b>73.0</b>	<b>48.6</b>	<b>40.5</b>	<b>62.2</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>52.8</b>
Scalia	O	14	—	14	14	8	10	13	6	12
	S	6	—	1	16	2	0	10	1	2
	D	20	—	15	30	10	10	23	7	14
	N	37	—	37	37	37	37	36	36	36
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>54.1</b>	—	<b>40.5</b>	<b>81.1</b>	<b>27.0</b>	<b>27.0</b>	<b>63.9</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>38.9</b>
Kennedy	O	25	14	—	13	18	22	16	16	23
	S	2	1	—	1	0	1	2	1	0
	D	27	15	—	14	18	23	18	17	23
	N	37	37	—	37	37	37	36	36	36
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>73.0</b>	<b>40.5</b>	—	<b>37.8</b>	<b>48.6</b>	<b>62.2</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>47.2</b>	<b>63.9</b>
Thomas	O	13	14	13	—	8	11	13	6	12
	S	5	16	1	—	1	1	11	1	1
	D	18	30	14	—	9	12	24	7	13
	N	37	37	37	—	37	37	36	36	36
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>48.6</b>	<b>81.1</b>	<b>37.8</b>	—	<b>24.3</b>	<b>32.4</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>36.1</b>
Ginsburg	O	15	8	18	8	—	20	7	17	22
	S	0	2	0	1	—	8	1	11	7
	D	15	10	18	9	—	27	8	27	29
	N	37	37	37	37	—	37	36	36	36
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>40.5</b>	<b>27.0</b>	<b>48.6</b>	<b>24.3</b>	—	<b>73.0</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>80.6</b>
Breyer	O	21	10	22	11	20	—	10	18	23
	S	2	0	1	1	8	—	0	9	5
	D	23	10	23	12	27	—	10	26	28
	N	37	37	37	37	37	—	36	36	36
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>62.2</b>	<b>27.0</b>	<b>62.2</b>	<b>32.4</b>	<b>73.0</b>	—	<b>27.8</b>	<b>72.2</b>	<b>77.8</b>
Alito	O	14	13	16	13	7	10	—	4	10
	S	4	10	2	11	1	0	—	1	0
	D	18	23	18	24	8	10	—	5	10
	N	36	36	36	36	36	36	—	35	35
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>63.9</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>27.8</b>	—	<b>14.3</b>	<b>28.6</b>
Sotomayor	O	14	6	16	6	17	18	4	—	19
	S	1	1	1	1	11	9	1	—	7
	D	15	7	17	7	27	26	5	—	26
	N	36	36	36	36	36	36	35	—	35
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>47.2</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>72.2</b>	<b>14.3</b>	—	<b>74.3</b>
Kagan	O	19	12	23	12	22	23	10	19	—
	S	0	2	0	1	7	5	0	7	—
	D	19	14	23	13	29	28	10	26	—
	N	36	36	36	36	36	36	35	35	—
	<b>P (%)</b>	<b>52.8</b>	<b>38.9</b>	<b>63.9</b>	<b>36.1</b>	<b>80.6</b>	<b>77.8</b>	<b>28.6</b>	<b>74.3</b>	—

TABLE I (*continued*)

<sup>h</sup> Table I(B1) records the frequency with which each Justice voted with each other Justice in full-opinion decisions, including the five per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. See *supra* note a.

Two Justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the Reporter of Decisions or the explicit statement of a Justice in his or her own opinion. This table does not treat a Justice as having joined the opinion of the Court unless that Justice authored or joined at least part of the opinion of the Court and did not author or join any opinion concurring in the judgment, even in part, or dissenting, even in part. For the purpose of counting dissents and concurrences, however, a Justice who partially joined an opinion is considered to have fully joined it. Therefore, Justice Thomas is not treated as having joined the opinion of the Court in *Town of Greece v. Galloway*, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), because he authored an opinion concurring in part. By contrast, Justice Alito is treated as having fully joined Justice Scalia's opinion in *Burrage v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014), even though he did not join Part III-B.

In Tables I(B1) and I(B2), "O" represents the number of decisions in which a particular pair of Justices agreed in an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. "S" represents the number of decisions in which two Justices agreed in any opinion other than an opinion of the Court or an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. Justices who together joined more than one separate opinion in a case are considered to have agreed only once. "D" represents the number of decisions in which two Justices agreed in a majority, plurality, concurring, or dissenting opinion. A decision is counted only once in the "D" category if two Justices both joined the opinion of the Court and joined a separate concurrence. Thus, in some situations the "D" value will be less than the sum of "O" and "S." "N" represents the number of decisions in which both Justices participated, and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. "P" represents the percentage of decisions in which one Justice agreed with another Justice and is calculated by dividing "D" by "N" and multiplying the resulting figure by 100.

<sup>i</sup> Like Table I(B1), Table I(B2) records the frequency with which each Justice voted with each other Justice in full opinions, but Table I(B2) records these voting alignments only for cases that were not unanimously decided. A decision is considered unanimous for purposes of Table I whenever all the Justices joined the opinion of the Court and no Justice concurred only in the judgment, even in part, or dissented, even in part. Removing the unanimous cases produces lower rates of agreement overall, providing a more accurate picture of how the Justices voted in divisive cases.

TABLE I (continued)  
(C) UNANIMITY

	Unanimous	With Concurrence <sup>j</sup>	With Dissent	TOTAL
Full Opinions	35 (48.6%)	11 (15.3%)	26 (36.1%)	72
Memorandum Orders	59 (96.7%)	0 (0%)	2 <sup>k</sup> (3.3%)	61

(D) VOTING PATTERNS IN NONUNANIMOUS CASES<sup>l</sup>

	JOINING THE OPINION OF THE COURT <sup>m</sup>			AGREEING IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE <sup>n</sup>		
	Joined Court	Total Cases	Percentage	Agreed in Disposition	Total Cases	Percentage
Roberts	28	37	75.7%	31	37	83.8%
Scalia	18	37	48.6%	29	37	78.4%
Kennedy	32	37	86.5%	33	37	89.2%
Thomas	16	37	43.2%	27	37	73.0%
Ginsburg	23	37	62.2%	25	37	67.6%
Breyer	26	37	70.3%	27	37	73.0%
Alito	18	36	50.0%	27	36	75.0%
Sotomayor	20	36	55.6%	22	36	61.1%
Kagan	28	36	77.8%	28	36	77.8%

<sup>j</sup> A decision is listed in this column if at least one Justice concurred in the judgment, but not in the Court's opinion in full, and no Justice dissented, even in part. *See, e.g.*, *Burrage v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).

<sup>k</sup> *Ajoku v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting); *Russell v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

<sup>l</sup> Table I(D) records the frequency with which each Justice joined the opinion of the Court in nonunanimous, full-opinion decisions. This table includes the five per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions, *see supra* note a, if those decisions produced dissenting votes.

<sup>m</sup> This portion of the table reports the number of times that each Justice joined the opinion of the Court, according to the rule described in note h.

<sup>n</sup> This portion of the table reports the number of times that each Justice agreed with the Court's disposition of a case. It includes all cases in which a Justice joined the opinion of the Court, but, unlike the portion of the table described in note m, it also includes those cases in which a Justice concurred in the judgment without concurring in the Court's opinion in full. Cases in which the Justice dissented, even in part, are not included.

TABLE I (*continued*)

## (E) 5–4 DECISIONS

Justices Constituting the Majority	Number of Decisions <sup>o</sup>
Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito <sup>p</sup>	4
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan <sup>q</sup>	2
Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito <sup>r</sup>	1
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Kagan <sup>s</sup>	1
Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan <sup>t</sup>	1
Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Kagan <sup>u</sup>	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>

<sup>o</sup> This column lists the number of 5–4 full-opinion decisions in which each five-Justice group constituted the majority. A case is counted as 5–4 if four Justices voted to dispose of any issue, no matter how minor, differently than the majority of the Court. Cases involving plurality opinions are included so long as the Justices divided 5–4 on the disposition. *See, e.g.*, *Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio*, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). Cases in which there was a 5–4 split on the reasoning of the majority opinion but not on the disposition of the case are not included. *See, e.g.*, *NLRB v. Noel Canning*, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). Cases in which any Justice did not participate are not included.

<sup>p</sup> *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Alito, J.); *Harris v. Quinn*, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (Alito, J.); *Town of Greece v. Galloway*, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (Kennedy, J.); *McCutcheon v. FEC*, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (Roberts, C.J.).

<sup>q</sup> *Abramski v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014) (Kagan, J.); *Hall v. Florida*, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (Kennedy, J.).

<sup>r</sup> *Navarette v. California*, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (Thomas, J.).

<sup>s</sup> *Paroline v. United States*, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (Kennedy, J.).

<sup>t</sup> *Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty.*, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014) (Kagan, J.).

<sup>u</sup> *Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio*, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014) (Kagan, J.).

TABLE I (continued)  
 (F) AVERAGE OPINION LENGTH<sup>v</sup>

	OPINION OF THE COURT	CONCURRING OPINION	CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT <sup>w</sup>	DISSENTING OPINION	TOTAL PAGES
Roberts	21.1	1.3	3.6	14.2	213.1
Scalia	15.7	1.2	13.8	10.3	299.1
Kennedy	18.3	3.4	—	16.5	165.1
Thomas	14.0	0.8	10.9	17.5	161.8
Ginsburg	20.4	0.7	—	9.9	195.2
Breyer <sup>x</sup>	18.4	—	5.2	10.4	196.3
Alito	20.5	6.1	2.0	9.0	229.7
Sotomayor	12.0	3.6	11.0	24.5	254.3
Kagan <sup>x</sup>	17.1	—	—	16.2	183.4
Per Curiam	8.5	—	—	—	42.6

<sup>v</sup> The data in Table I(F) reflect the length of opinions as published in the Court's slip opinions, estimated to the nearest tenth of a page. Though the slip opinions are eventually superseded by official case publication in the *United States Reports*, the total opinion length, in pages, is generally preserved in the final publication. To obtain the average length figure, the number of pages written by each Justice was summed within each category of opinion and divided by the number of opinions of that type written by that Justice. For the number of opinions written by each Justice, see *supra* Table I(A).

<sup>w</sup> Opinions concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, or concurring in both are categorized here under Concurring in Judgment. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part are categorized under Dissenting Opinion.

<sup>x</sup> For the purposes of Table I(F), Justices Breyer and Kagan are each credited with having authored the full dissent in *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). See *supra* note g.

TABLE II<sup>a</sup>  
 (A) FINAL DISPOSITION OF CASES

	Disposed of	Remaining on Docket	TOTAL
Original Docket	0	5	5
Appellate Docket <sup>b</sup>	1561	308 <sup>c</sup>	1869
Miscellaneous Docket <sup>d</sup>	5980	726 <sup>c</sup>	6706
<b>Total</b>	<b>7541</b>	<b>1039</b>	<b>8580</b>

(B) CASES GRANTED REVIEW<sup>e</sup>

	Review Granted <sup>f</sup>	Petitions Considered <sup>g</sup>	Percent Granted
Appellate Docket	68	1602	4.2%
Miscellaneous Docket	8	5984	0.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>7586</b>	<b>1.0%</b>

<sup>a</sup> All numbers in Tables II(A), II(B), and II(C) are derived from data provided by the Supreme Court.

<sup>b</sup> The appellate docket consists of all paid cases.

<sup>c</sup> The number of cases remaining on the appellate and miscellaneous dockets is calculated by adding the number of cases not acted upon in the 2013 Term to the number of cases granted review in the 2013 Term but carried over to the 2014 Term.

<sup>d</sup> The miscellaneous docket consists of all cases filed *in forma pauperis*.

<sup>e</sup> Table II(B) reports data that versions of Table II prior to 1998 reported under the label “Review Granted.” For a full explanation, see *The Supreme Court, 1997 Term — The Statistics*, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 372 n.d (1998). Table II(B) does not include cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction.

<sup>f</sup> The number of cases granted review includes only those cases granted plenary review in the 2013 Term. It includes neither cases summarily decided nor those granted review in a previous Term and carried over to the 2013 Term. It does include cases granted review in the 2013 Term but carried over to a subsequent Term.

<sup>g</sup> The number of petitions considered is calculated by adding the number of cases docketed in the 2013 Term to the number of cases carried over from prior Terms and subtracting the number of cases not acted upon in the 2013 Term.

TABLE II (*continued*)  
 (C) METHOD OF DISPOSITION<sup>h</sup>

On Review	76
Summarily Decided	69
By Denial, Dismissal, or Withdrawal of Appeals or Petitions for Review	7396
<b>Total</b>	<b>7541</b>

(D) DISPOSITION OF CASES  
 REVIEWED ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI<sup>i</sup>

	Reversed <sup>j</sup>	Vacated <sup>k</sup>	Affirmed	TOTAL
Full Opinions	42 (58.3%)	12 (16.7%)	18 (25.0%)	72
Memorandum Orders	0 (0.0%)	60 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	60
<b>Total</b>	<b>42 (31.8%)</b>	<b>72 (54.5%)</b>	<b>18 (13.6%)</b>	<b>132</b>

<sup>h</sup> Table II(C) does not include cases within the Court's original jurisdiction.

<sup>i</sup> Table II(D) reports the disposition of cases reviewed via writ of certiorari and decided on the merits. It does not include cases reviewed under other bases of jurisdiction, such as *James v. FEC*, 134 S. Ct. 1806 (2014) (mem.) (reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012)).

<sup>j</sup> This category includes cases reversed in part and affirmed in part, as well as cases reversed in part and vacated in part.

<sup>k</sup> This category includes cases vacated in part and affirmed in part.

TABLE II (continued)  
 (E) ORIGINS OF CASES AND THEIR DISPOSITIONS<sup>1</sup>

	FULL OPINIONS <sup>m</sup>			MEMORANDUM ORDERS			TOTAL
	Reversed <sup>n</sup>	Vacated <sup>o</sup>	Affirmed	Reversed	Vacated	Affirmed	
<b>Federal Courts</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>122</b>
Circuit Courts	37	10	16	0	57	0	120
First	3	0	0	0	3	0	6
Second	2	0	3	0	2	0	7
Third	1	0	0	0	3	0	4
Fourth	1	0	1	0	3	0	5
Fifth	3	3	1	0	16	0	23
Sixth	7	2	2	0	10	0	21
Seventh	1	0	3	0	2	0	6
Eighth	2	0	0	0	6	0	8
Ninth	9	1	1	0	4	0	15
Tenth	1	1	2	0	1	0	5
Eleventh	1	1	1	0	2	0	5
D.C.	3	0	1	0	1	0	5
Federal	3	2	1	0	4	0	10
District Courts	1 <sup>p</sup>	0	0	0	1	0	2
Armed Forces	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>State Courts</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>133</b>

<sup>1</sup> Table II(E) counts consolidated cases disposed of by the same lower court opinion as a single case. It does not include original cases.

<sup>m</sup> This section reports only full opinions decided on the merits. It thus includes five per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be counted as full opinions. *See supra* Table I, note a.

<sup>n</sup> This category includes cases reversed in part and affirmed in part, as well as cases reversed in part and vacated in part.

<sup>o</sup> This category includes cases vacated in part and affirmed in part.

<sup>p</sup> *See* *McCutcheon v. FEC*, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).

TABLE II (*continued*)  
 (F) DISPOSITION OF APPLICATIONS FOR  
 STAYS OF EXECUTION<sup>q</sup>

	Granted <sup>r</sup>	Denied <sup>s</sup>	Percent Granted
Stay Applications	1	32	3.0%

<sup>q</sup> Table II(F) treats multiple applications from the same death row inmate as a single application. Although the Court entertained sixty-eight applications for stays of execution last Term, these applications pertained to only thirty-two different people.

Table II(F) includes only those dispositions that appear in the *Supreme Court Reporter* and excludes applications to vacate stays of execution.

For useful background information on how the Court handles stays of execution, see generally EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., *SUPREME COURT PRACTICE* §§ 18.1–.8, at 897–911 (9th ed. 2007); A REPORTER'S GUIDE TO APPLICATIONS PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2010), <http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf> [<http://perma.cc/W5CJ-XG8B>]; and *The Supreme Court, 2006 Term — The Statistics*, 121 HARV. L. REV. 436, 446 n.t (2007).

<sup>r</sup> This Term, the application granted was done so pending appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. *Bucklew v. Lombardi*, 134 S. Ct. 2333 (2014). The same inmate's state application was denied. *Bucklew v. Missouri*, 134 S. Ct. 2333 (2014).

<sup>s</sup> Twenty-six denials were unanimous. Six attracted dissents. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented together twice. *Villegas v. Texas*, 134 S. Ct. 1870 (2014); *Ferguson v. Lombardi*, 134 S. Ct. 1582 (2014). Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor dissented together once. *Tamayo v. Stephens*, 134 S. Ct. 1021 (2014). Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented together once. *Taylor v. Lombardi*, 134 S. Ct. 1375 (2014). Justice Breyer dissented alone once. *Muhammad v. Florida*, 134 S. Ct. 894 (2014). Justice Sotomayor dissented alone once. *Winfield v. Lombardi*, 134 S. Ct. 2838 (2014). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito did not dissent from any denial of an application for a stay of execution.

**TABLE III<sup>a</sup>**  
**SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS**

	Principal Issue <sup>b</sup>		Decision		TOTAL
	Constitu- tional	Other	For Gov't <sup>c</sup>	Against Gov't <sup>c</sup>	
<b>CIVIL ACTIONS FROM INFERIOR FEDERAL COURTS</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>51</b>
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	4	10	7	5	14
<i>Review of Administrative Action</i>	1	6	4	2	7
Child Status Protection Act	0	1	1	0	1
Clean Air Act	0	2	1	0	2
Recess Appointments	1	0	0	1	1
Religious Freedom Restoration Act	0	1	0	1	1
Taxation	0	2	2	0	2
<i>Other Actions by or Against the     United States or Its Officers</i>	3	4	3	3	7
Freedom of Speech	2	0	1	1	2
Forum Selection	0	1	0	1	1
Internal Revenue Service	0	1	1	0	1
Personal Jurisdiction	1	0	1	0	1
Railway Land Grants	0	1	0	1	1
Sovereign Immunity	0	1	–	–	1

<sup>a</sup> Table III records the subject matter of dispositions by full opinion, including the five cases with per curiam opinions on the merits containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. See *supra* Table I, note a.

<sup>b</sup> Each case is categorized as primarily constitutional or not. Cases invoking a mixture of statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication are particularly difficult to classify.

<sup>c</sup> “Government” refers to federal, state, or local government, or an agency thereof, or to an individual participating in the suit in an official capacity. A decision is counted as “for” the government if the government prevailed on all contested issues. When the federal government opposed a state or local government, a decision is counted as “for” the government if the federal government prevailed on all contested issues. When two states, two units of local government, or two federal agencies opposed each other, the decision is counted as neither “for” the government nor “against” the government. When the government prevailed on at least one but not all of the issues before the Court, a decision is counted as neither “for” nor “against” the government.

TABLE III (continued)  
 SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS

	Principal Issue		Decision		TOTAL
	Constitutional	Other	For Gov't	Against Gov't	
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	7	4	4	7	11
Abstention	0	1	0	1	1
Equal Protection	1	0	1	0	1
Establishment Clause	1	0	1	0	1
Fourth Amendment	1	0	1	0	1
Freedom of Speech	3	0	0	3	3
Native American Tribe					
Sovereign Immunity	0	1	0	1	1
Qualified Immunity	0	2	1	1	2
Standing	1	0	0	1	1
PRIVATE LITIGATION	1	25	—	—	26
<i>Diversity Jurisdiction</i>					
Federal Preemption	0	1	—	—	1
<i>Federal Question Jurisdiction</i>	1	24	—	—	25
Arbitration	0	1	—	—	1
Attorney's Fees	0	1	—	—	1
Bankruptcy	0	3	—	—	3
Class Actions	0	1	—	—	1
Copyright Act of 1976	0	2	—	—	2
Employee Retirement Income					
Security Act	0	2	—	—	2
Fair Labor Standards Act	0	1	—	—	1
Federal Preemption	0	1	—	—	1
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act	0	1	—	—	1
Hague Convention on the Civil					
Aspects of International Child					
Abduction	0	1	—	—	1
Lanham Act	0	1	—	—	1
Patent Act of 1952	0	2	—	—	2
Patents	0	4	—	—	4
Personal Jurisdiction	1	0	—	—	1
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002	0	1	—	—	1
Securities Litigation Uniform					
Standards Act	0	1	—	—	1
Standing	0	1	—	—	1

**TABLE III** (*continued*)  
**SUBJECT MATTER OF DISPOSITIONS WITH FULL OPINIONS**

	Principal Issue		Decision		TOTAL
	Constitutional	Other	For Gov't	Against Gov't	
<b>FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>
Controlled Substances Act	0	1	0	1	1
Criminal Forfeiture	1	0	1	0	1
Federal Bank Fraud	0	1	1	0	1
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act	0	1	1	0	1
Statutory Interpretation	0	5	3	1	5
Title 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)	0	1	—	—	1
<b>FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>
AEDPA Deference	0	2	2	0	2
<b>CIVIL ACTIONS FROM STATE COURTS</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT LITIGATION	0	1	1	0	1
Removal Jurisdiction	0	1	1	0	1
PRIVATE LITIGATION	0	1	—	—	1
Aviation and Transportation Security Act	0	1	—	—	1
<b>STATE CRIMINAL CASES</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>
Capital Punishment	1	0	0	1	1
Double Jeopardy	1	0	0	1	1
Fourth Amendment	1	0	1	0	1
Right to Counsel	1	0	0	1	1
Search and Seizure	2	0	1	1	2
Self-Incrimination	1	0	1	0	1
<b>ORIGINAL JURISDICTION</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>72</b>