Vol. 129 No. 3 Should foreign intelligence collection be subject to more rigorous oversight, and therefore, improved accountability, through a policy process that involves deeper personal involvement by...
Vol. 129 No. 3 Professor Samuel Rascoff’s Presidential Intelligence reflects both the conceptual and research strengths of the author, which are formidable, and the practical difficulties of intelligence...
Vol. 129 No. 3 Regulating the secret executive actions required to defend the state within a government legitimized by the informed consent of the electorate has challenged American...
Response to A Response to Professor Samuel Rascoff’s Presidential Intelligence, A Response to Professor Rascoff’s Presidential Intelligence, Comment on Presidential Intelligence
Vol. 129 No. 3 In arguing for a new approach to governing intelligence collection, and in assigning the White House a critical role in realizing that goal, Presidential...
Vol. 129 No. 3 When scholars — especially legal academics — talk about intelligence oversight, they typically have in mind a set of processes and institutions designed to...
Responding to David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 512 (2013)
Response to The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information
Responding to David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 512 (2013)
Response to The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information
Vol. 127 No. 2 The United States government leaks like a sieve. Presidents denounce the constant flow of classified information to the media from unauthorized, anonymous sources. National security professionals decry the consequences. And yet the laws against leaking are almost never enforced. Throughout U.S. history, roughly a dozen criminal cases have been brought against suspected leakers. There is a dramatic disconnect between the way our laws and our leaders condemn leaking in the abstract and the way they condone it in practice.
This Article challenges the standard account of that disconnect, which emphasizes the difficulties of apprehending and prosecuting offenders, and advances an alternative theory of leaking.