The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union

Article by bradford r. clark :: Leading theories of the Eleventh Amendment start from the premise that its text makes no sense. These theories regard the Amendment as either underinclusive, overinclusive, or an incoherent compromise because it prohibits federal courts from hearing “any suit” against a state by out-of-state citizens, but does not prohibit suits against a state by its own citizens. Two of these theories would either expand or contract the immunity conferred by the text of the Amendment in order to avoid this absurd or anomalous result. This Article suggests that the Eleventh Amendment made sense as written when understood in its full historical context.
READ MORE | DOWNLOAD PDF | June 2010

The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell

Article by john c.p. goldberg and benjamin c. zipursky :: The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, authored by Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, cannot sustain the burden it has set for itself. The evidence it marshals is surprisingly scant, consisting of anecdotes about products that suffered declining sales after being linked to certain injuries, observations about consumers’ improved access to safety information, a brief review of inconclusive studies of whether a rule of strict liability better deters the sale of unsafe products than a negligence rule, reminders of the high costs of civil litigation, and a smattering of microeconomic theory. These observations are nowhere near sufficient. In essence, Uneasy argues for the elimination of an entire body of law based on the absence of social scientific evidence of a certain sort demonstrating the significance of its contribution to the goals of deterrence and compensation.
READ MORE | DOWNLOAD PDF | June 2010

A Skeptical Attitude About Product Liability Is Justified: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky

Article by a. mitchell polinsky and steven shavell ::

In The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell maintained that the benefits of product liability are likely to be less than its costs for many products, especially widely sold ones. The article was intended to alter the dominant view held by the judiciary and commentators that product liability has a clear justification on grounds of public policy. It argued instead that a skeptical attitude toward product liability should be adopted.

Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky strongly criticize the article in The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell. To a significant extent, however, they attack a straw man, for they impute to the article a radical thesis — that product liability should be eliminated for all widely sold products — that Uneasy manifestly did not advance.
READ MORE | DOWNLOAD PDF | June 2010


Presidential Administration

Special Republication: Article by elena kagan :: This Article examines a recent and dramatic transformation in the relationship between the President (and his staff) and the administrative state. Professor Kagan argues that President Clinton, building on a foundation President Reagan laid, increasingly made the regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies into an extension of his own policy and political agenda. He did so, primarily, by exercising directive authority over these agencies and asserting personal ownership of their regulatory activity — demonstrating in the process, against conventional wisdom, that enhanced presidential control over administration can serve pro-regulatory objectives. Professor Kagan offers a broad though not unlimited defense of the resulting system of “presidential administration” against legal and policy objections.
READ MORE | DOWNLOAD PDF | June 2001

CURRENT ISSUE CONTENTS
Online Forum

Should Antitrust Condemn Tying Arrangements that Increase Price Without Restraining Competition?

Steven Semeraro :: In his article Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, Professor Einer Elhauge attempted to demonstrate that tying, the practice whereby a firm conditions the sale of one product on the customer’s agreement to purchase another, always harms consumers. He determined that antitrust law should prohibit tying even when that tying did not restrain competition in the tied product’s market. In this response, Professor Steven Semeraro argues that this form of tying actually benefits consumers in the long term. READ MORE

Disappearing Neighbors

David D. Troutt :: In his article Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, Professor Richard C. Schragger explored the consequences of local governments’ attempts to entice — and then exploit — mobile capital. He concluded that cities possess, but must not abuse, the power to assert democratic control over capital flow. In this response, Professor David D. Troutt argues that current foreclosure crisis demonstrates the weakness of cities in relation to mobile capital. READ MORE

Freeing Employee Choice: The Case For Secrecy in Union Organizing and Voting

Cynthia Estlund :: In his article Enabling Employee Choice, Professor Benjamin Sachs provided a nuanced analysis of what is wrong both with current law and with the leading reform proposal. In this response, Professor Cynthia Estlund argues that Professor Sachs’s reform proposal is likely to set the terms for future scholarly analysis and for serious public debate over the role of law in union organizing regardless of the fate of labor law reform in the current Congress. READ MORE

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